Seoul, Korea by Jong-suk Ahn et al.












Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University















Dean of the Graduate Collegeiii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There is “Time might have been flying like an arrow,” in Korean proverb.
However, long nine years, I felt, did not pass very quickly. In retrospect, during the long
years of days and nights, I have faced the struggles to fight with myself: exhaustion,
distraction, and chaos. Furthermore, I have to deal with the limits of my capabilities with
honesty. All in all, it was the time of pain, agony, frustration, patience, and love in which
I could grow up as a mature human-being in mentally and spiritually as well as a scholar.
Without those who have been constant sources of guidance, encouragement, help, and
pray for me, I could not possible to finish this dissertation.
First of all, without the help and guidance of my professors and my friends at the
history department at Oklahoma State University, I could not finish my degree today. I
would like to thank the chair of my doctoral committee, Dr. Ronald Petrin and
dissertation advisor, Laura Belmonte. Thank them for their suggestions, comments and
guidance to improve and strength this study. Of course, any shortcomings are mine
alone. Especially, had it not been for Dr. Petrin’s timely suggestions and guidance as the
dissertation committee chair, I would not have been possible to finish this dissertation. I
would also like to thank the rest of my dissertation committees, Dr. Joseph Byrnes, and
Dr. Yonglin Jiang for their encouragement and support when I faced difficult times.
Also, I appreciate Dr. Brad Bays as the outside member of committee. I would like toiv
thank Dr. James Huston, Dr. Elizabeth Williams, Dr. Richard Rohrs, Dr. Michael Smith,
and former faculty member of the history department, Dr. Park Chung Shin, who taught
and encouraged me through graduate school.
My fellow graduate students and history department staff contributed to the
completion of my dissertation. Among them, I would like to offer special thanks to the
late Mr. John Adams who thoroughly read the first draft of my dissertation. Without his
kind correction of my English, the presentation was rough. I miss him so much right now
and pray that he is peacefully at rest in heaven. My graduate friend, Tom Franzmann, of
the history department read my final draft. He helped me tremendously to finish this
dissertation. I really appreciate his thorough proof-reading, comments, and advise. I
would like to thank all of my fellow graduate students who helped me through my course
work and this dissertation, Bill Homan, Dr. Mark Van de Logt, Dr. James Klein, Dr.
Aaron Christianson, and Kult Lively. Diana Hover and Susan Oliver as the Department
Secretaries helped me to complete my dissertation.
The staffs of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park,
Maryland and Truman Library also greatly aided with my research.
Lastly, I would like to express sincere thanks to my wife, Kang Eun Ju, who
supported and stayed with me during the long journey of this project. Without her
encouragement, wisdom, and patience, I could not have finished this project. My kids,
Won, Su, Danny, and Andy, are the source of my energy, joy, and happiness during these
long years. I would like to thank them and am pleased to see them grow up into healthy,v
sweet, and kind persons. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Hong Bong Ki and
Lee Jong Hyun, who always supported, sacrificed, and prayed for me during these long




II. EARLY US DIPLOMACY TOWARD KOREA…………………………. 26
III. WARTIME DIPLOMACY………………………………………................49
IV. LIBERATION AND MILITARY OCCUPATION OF KOREA…..............93 
 
V. THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND THE JOINT COMMISSION…… 143
VI. TWO KOREAS AND WITHDRAWL OF FOREIGN
OCCUPATION FORCES…………………………………………………..176





American involvement in Korea before 1945 was minimal; since World War II
America has been deeply involved in Korea because of US strategic interests in East
Asia. The post-war involvement in Korea differed from relations during earlier periods.
Americans now had to deal with a new configuration in domestic ethnic politics—namely
a resurgent Korean nationalism
1—that sometimes conflicted with or challenged the
interests of the United States. Many American diplomatic historians who study U.S.-
Korean relations during the Cold War have overlooked an important factor: the voice of
the Korean people themselves.
Traditional historians contend that the United States was resisting the spread of
communism in local areas as well as international arena. Thus, the United States saved
Korea from the spread of communism during the period of American military
government, as it did in the Korean War, too, to preserve a basis for future democracy.
Policy makers in the United States believed that communists, or for that matter, any
1 The cultural dimensions of Korean nationalism and its limits, the means by which that heritage was
transmitted, and how groups selectively appropriated from that thought system to generate the appearance
of consensus all are important considerations for the study of the early Cold War period on the peninsula.
Unfortunately, such as investigation is beyond the scope of this study. The stress herein is on how
nationalism impacted unification. How the discourse on nationalism was normalized in public discourse is
certainly worthy of a separate analysis. Instead, this study employs a more revisionist or post-revisionist
approach to political study. Its focus is on the legitimized use of power rather than an emphasis on cultural
competition over defining that concept.2
leftists, were monolithic and Soviet-directed. According to the traditional historians, that
was the main reason the United States government chose Syngman Rhee, a die-hard anti-
communist, as the leader of South Korea. Revisionists counter the ideas of traditionalists
with arguments that the United States pursued economic imperialism after World War II
ended. A representative revisionist scholar, Bruce Cumings, denigrated Rhee as “the
father of division of Korea,” criticized the policy of the United States that he felt betrayed
the hope and desires of Korean people and asserted that it must be held responsible for
the division of Korea and the outbreak of the Korean War.
Bruce Cumings framed his analysis upon a world system theory linking US
hegemony strategy to the advancement of a world capitalist system; in his opinion, this is
the key to understanding U.S. policy towards Korea. However, Cumings’ conceptual
framework that stressed the structural position of the United States within the world
system and the center-semiperiphery-periphery hierarchy within the world structure,
which situates Korea on the periphery and marginalizes Korean history as a whole.
2 In
other words, his methodology opts to subsume local historical events and personalities
beneath an analysis of the development of world capitalism in the region as a whole.
Therefore, by overlooking the internal energy and developments associated with the
Korean people’s efforts to resolve the crisis of national division, Cumings’ analysis
unfortunately takes on a one-sided viewpoint, and any indigenous practical efforts at
resolving the national question are seen as trivial under the structured world system.
3
2 Chung Yong Wook, “History of US Policy Regarding the Occupation of Korea (1945-1948): Trends in
Existing Research,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 7 (1994): 60-61.
3 Ibid., 62.3
This study accepts the view of Choi Sang Yong, a noted political scientist of
Korea, which attributes the response of nationalist movements to the external pressure of
U.S. occupation and the effects of the Cold War within and outside Korea. This study
examines relations between the United States and Korea and Korean efforts to build a
durable nation-state on the peninsula in the post-WWII period. It stresses several
important assertions, including many points American diplomatic historians, both
traditional and revisionist, have usually slighted or ignored in their treatments regarding
U.S.-Korean relations.
First of all, these scholars have put undue emphasis on an external factors—the
Cold War context and the history of Soviet-American relations— to the neglect of close
scrutiny of key individuals in more localized geographic settings and their role in local
politics. Their actions, and inaction, impacted not only the interactions in Korea between
regional power bases and the superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—but
also the course of the Cold War in East Asia as a whole. That story is too vast an
enterprise to undertake at present. Instead, this study focuses more narrowly on the
prevalence, persistence, and influence of Korean nationalism.
A second point grows out of the first. Power relations, regardless of whether one
is addressing the United States and South Korea or the Soviet Union and North Korea,
rarely flow in a one-dimensional manner from the top down within any political
framework. Considering the balance-of-power and degrees of leverage adds another
dimension of analysis. In this case, American diplomatic historians traditionally have
downplayed the influence of the Third World as an active player in geopolitical grand
strategy. This study suggests a need to study both regional structures and superpower4
contexts. For instance, even if the two superpowers occupied Korea and dictated much of
its destiny, local leaders nevertheless used that circumstance to advance their own
designs, including the pursuit of political hegemony throughout the peninsula, and not
always to the delight of their superpower allies.
Third, many diplomatic historians have emphasized short term factors in postwar
Korea. This study, though, probes deep into the period when relations between the
United States and Korea were initiated. Finally, this analysis confirms that idealistic U.S.
rhetoric, was often though not always, cloak for the pursuit of self-interest. Viewed from
this perspective, United States aid to Korean democratization proved to have clear limits.
Actions, simply put, fell short of words.
More than sixty years have passed since World War II ended. Upon the victory of
the Allied powers, Korea anticipated becoming a liberated and independent country free
from the longtime domination of the Japanese. Instead, on August 15, 1945, when the
Japanese emperor unconditionally surrendered to the Allied powers, Korea was divided
along the 38
th parallel. The Soviet Union controlled the north and the United States the
south. Both powers intended the partition to be a ‘temporary military occupation’ until
the Korean interim government could be established. Yet three years later, the United
States and the Soviet Union created two separate Korean governments, the Republic of
Korea (ROK) in the south, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in
the north.
The partition along the 38
th parallel became permanent in 1948 because the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had deteriorated with the
onset of the Cold War. This important change in context made the task of political5
reunification of the peninsula even more difficult. Indeed, all efforts at unification during
the five years after 1945 had proved disappointing. Then, a bitter war began in June 1950
and Koreans subsequently experienced the most tragic time in their modern history.
Among the countries partitioned by the foreign powers after World War II ended, such as
Germany, Vietnam, or Korea, only the latter country is still divided into Communist
North and Capitalist South at the beginning of the twenty first-century. The Cold War,
we are often told today, ended almost two decades ago. Actually, it still persists in Korea
until the present day and there is no end in sight.
4
In the 1980s and early 1990s, scholars engaged in much controversy over the role
of the United States in modern Korean history. The Kwangju People’s uprising to
democratize Korea, and the tragic results of the “Kwangju massacre” by the leaders of
the military coup d’etat in May 1980, played a crucial role in shaping evaluations from
hindsight about the role of the United States and democracy in Korea since 1945. In the
aftermath of massacre, anti-Americanism became more visible and blatant. It was a
shocking development for those observers who had long perceived the United States as a
“benevolent Great Power” that defended the fragile democracy of South Korea,
especially against communist aggression during the Korean War.
The Kwangju democratization movement became a turning point in U.S.-Korean
relations as Korean people began to reassess the role of the United States in their history.
Korean radical groups, including young scholars, student leaders in the colleges, and anti-
government leaders, now depicted the United States as an imperialist power that had
4 Bruce Cumings, “The Wicked Witch of West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East,” ed.
Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 98.6
betrayed the hopes and desires of the Korean people to democratize their society. Many
Koreans soon blamed the United States government for supporting the military
dictatorship in Korea solely for American interests and purposes. According to David F.
Schmitz, diplomatic historian, the United States at the time allied itself to dictatorship as
long as its leaders provided “stability and order, welcomed and protected investments,
and were bulwarks against communism.”
5 Schmitz argues that although the United
States is philosophically and morally dedicated to broaden ideals such as supporting
democracies and human rights abroad, as the Cold War deepened, it blinded American
foreign policy makers to those concerns and instead prompted them to choose dictators
who said they were against the Communists and desired to be a part of the “free world.”
6
In the long run, however, Schmitz points out how these “dictatorships created a backlash
of anti-American sentiment in the Third World that radical nationalist movements led to
establish socialist governments the United States most opposed and originally tried to
prevent.”
7 American commitment to Korea, it seems, fits this scenario. At a minimum, it
shows American foreign policy supported authoritarian regimes during the Cold War and
relegated idealistic Wilsonian principles of democracy and self-determination of peoples
to a subordinate status to the pragmatic dictates of expediency. After Korean radical
groups reviewed the revisionist history of their country, they reached the conclusion that
5 David F. Schmitz, Thanks God They’re On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships,
1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 176.
6 Ibid., 3.
7 Ibid., 6.7
the United States was primarily responsible for the division of the peninsula, the Korean
War, and the continued “colonial” rule of Korean society by the western superpower.
8
Traditional or orthodox Korean historians deny that the United States was entirely
responsible for the division of Korea. Traditionalists believe United States policy
towards Korea was a means of protecting democracy and freedom against the Communist
threat in East Asia after World War II.
9 On the other hand, revisionist historians argue
that the United States’ foreign policy was the most crucial determinant in the partition of
the Korean peninsula, which eventually led to the Korean War. According to
revisionists, even though the United States government demanded Korea become an
independent nation, its establishment was imposed in an imperialistic manner designed to
assure the continuation of a capitalist system which, in turn, preserved the continued
prosperity and safety of American interests in East Asia. As a result, Korean self-
determination was put on hold. In order to achieve its goal of containing Soviet
expansion, the United States neglected to foster efforts among Koreans to reunify their
8 A younger generation of Korean scholars and students born in or after the Korean War have critically
debated the period between and 1945 and 1948, in particular, and the nature of Korean society since 1945.
This period shows how the U.S. military government shaped the foundation of South Korean politics and
society. The debate was tremendously influenced by Bruce Cumings’ work on the origins of the Korean
War during the 1980s. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate
Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). A young Marxist group has argued
that Korea was a “colonial semi-feudal” society during the Japanese colonial rule and American military
rule. Another Marxist group defines the period under American rule as “neo-colonial semi-capitalistic”
society. Cho Hi-yon traces the historical background of the debate on the nature of Korean society and
presents the debate in Cho Hi Yon, ed. Hanguk Sahoi Kusonch’e Nonjaeng (Debate on Korean Social
Formation) (Seoul: P’ulbit Press, 1989) 2 vols; cited in Lee Sang Min, “The Political Economy of
Occupation: United States Foreign Economy Policy in Korea, 1945-1949” (Ph.D. dissertation, Northern
Illinois University, 1991), 6.
9 Kim Joungwon Alexander, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1976); Kim Hak Joon, Unification Policy of South and North Korea, 1945-1991:
A Comparative Study (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1978).8
country. American objectives, intentions, and actions thereby changed the destiny of
Korean people and tremendously influenced the direction of their modern history.
Most revisionists argue that the oft-proclaimed threat of the Soviet Union was not
actually all that important to American policy makers. Gabriel Kolko, a revisionist
historian, maintains that “The economic component remains the single most important
factor in its [America’s] postwar conduct in the Third World, even if it is far from being a
sufficient explanation.”
10 Another revisionist historian, Walter LaFeber, argues that “The
expansion of the capitalist system is more important than the expansion of liberal
democratic systems” in United States foreign policy.
11 In short, what was most important
to Washington leaders, it seems, was to spread American ideas, values, institutions, and
systems in other parts of the world where they suspected indigenous people might want to
adopt them. In a similar vein, William Appleman Williams contends that, “America’s
freedom and prosperity depend upon the continued expansion of its economic and
ideological system through the policy of the open door.”
12 Moreover, after World War II
ended, Americans also evidently believed they should accept the moral obligation of
world leadership earlier rejected after World War I. In the process, the line between
idealism and realism continued to become more blurred.
Most studies of American policy toward Korea focus on the period either from the
American occupation in 1945 to the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, or
10 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980 (New York:
Pantheon Book, 1988), 291. See also, Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and the United
States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968).
11 Walter LaFeber, “Tension between Democracy and Capitalism during the American Century,”
Diplomatic History, 23 (Spring 1999), 264-65.
12 William Appleman Wiliams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, revised edition, (New York: The
World Publishing Co., Inc, 1959), 2099
the American involvement in the Korean War from 1950-1953. These studies usually
investigated broad questions: what were the causes for the division of the Korean
Peninsula? Who was responsible for starting the Korean War? Due to the overt emphasis
on Cold War conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, these approaches
ignore much local context. In particular, they neglect Korean nationalist movements that
emerged during Japanese colonial rule and climaxed under American military
occupation, or how their call for national independence and creation of a united and
democratic country eventually conflicted with goals of the United States government and
policies more often designed to establish a friendly government as a “bulwark against
communism.” Many studies also neglect the theme of continuity and change over time.
They pay little attention to how American policy toward Korea evolved from 1945
through the period immediately before the Korean War as a response to contingent
circumstances.
As a prelude, this dissertation carries the tale of national relations between
Koreans and Americans back to 1882 when a modern nation-state began its historical
development and contact was established between the two nations. The study, however,
will deal primarily with American foreign policy toward Korea between 1945 and 1950.
Part One covers the period from 1945 to 1948 when an American military government
ruled Korea and explains how its policy and actions helped Korean rightists form South
Korea. The second part, which addresses the period from 1948 to 1950, describes the
establishment of this government and how Syngman Rhee tried to manipulate the local
situation to maximize aid from the United States, build Korea’s military power, and
facilitate an economic plan after the withdrawal of American army in 1948 to secure the10
survival of the Republic of Korea. The last chapter, especially, illustrates how Rhee, as a
leader of weak state, refused to accept American containment strategy as status quo, and
instead sought to reverse American regional policies and unify the Korean peninsula
through military force.
In other words, many pertinent questions remain outstanding: What was the
American military government’s original goal in Korea? How was American occupation
related to the goals of Korean nationalism? How did American policy affect the
formation of the Korean political party? Indeed, how was America’s Korean policy even
formulated? What disagreements, if any, existed between policy makers over the
essential features of American policy toward Korea? If there were controversies, what
were their contents and causes? Who or what department was responsible for American
policy? Who came up with the decision to withdraw the United States from Korea? What
were the activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Korea after the withdrawal of
the U.S. Armed forces? Why did the United States decide to intervene in the Korean War
so quickly in spite of its former decision to withdraw from the Korean peninsula? What
legacies did the American occupation policy leave to the Korean nation? What was the
foreign policy of Rhee’s government toward the United States? Much remains
unanswered. This study will attempt to provide some tentative answers to some of these
questions.
After liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Koreans faced problems
demanding immediate attention, such as what to do about foreign intervention in their
politics, the division of the peninsula, and how to construct a new polity. Yet, the
movement to build a nation-state after liberation of Japanese rule failed to create a11
unified, democratic, and independent Korea. With the assistance of former collaborators
with the Japanese and North Korean émigrés, American military authorities established
the Republic of Korea as an anti-communist bulwark. Actually, Koreans’ efforts to build
a modern nation-state were not new. They started in the late nineteen century but were
foiled by foreign imperial powers. Since then, the United States has joined in the concert.
In the process, it has tremendously impacted modern Korean history for good and ill.
Still, it should be noted that through this relationship Koreans clearly have suffered from
contradictions between U.S. moral claims used to justify its “Manifest Destiny” as
uplifting to all mankind and the reality that the United States, as a Great Power,
overwhelmingly has shaped its policy in terms of national interest and security, especially
during the heightened tension of the Cold War.
13
To be sure, confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States greatly
influenced the formation of the structure of North and South Korean politics, society, and
identity after liberation. This was the starting point for a new conflict between South and
North Korea as each struggled to legitimize its own government. The regions soon began
to follow separate paths; one followed a capitalist model, the other followed a
socialist/communist model. However, the creation of the Republic of Korea became the
most important factor separating the two regions. North Korea accused South Korean
politicians of taking the first step to create a divided nation and responded by declaring
13 The ideal of Manifest Destiny has been the ideological rhetoric that poses as the guiding principle of
American foreign policy since the middle of the nineteenth century. According to Frederick Merk,
historian who studied the origin of this idea of “Manifest Destiny,” and its impact upon the history of
American expansion, U.S. destiny ordained by God and its mission as a “Great Nation,” is to spread its
democracy and freedom. It was based on racism that Americans are superior race than non-Western
peoples. This crusading ideology became a moral backbone of U.S. expansionist foreign policy ever since
its inception. Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995).12
its own independence in September, 1948. South Korea responded to the accusation with
assertions that North Korea had been already following a “dependent” pro-Soviet course
earlier.
14
A close examination of circumstances in 1948 at the time of the founding of the
two Koreas, as Chapter 4 through 6 will show, is important to a proper understanding of
the political developments that led to the Korean War. In domestic terms, the Korean
War had a tremendous effect on the national consciousness of North and South Korea. It
confirmed that there were two distinct countries each with its own peculiar political,
social, and economic culture. But cause and effect are not always congruous.
Internationally, the Korean War intensified the Cold War competition between the Soviet
Union and the United States; thus, superpower interest in unification quickly waned. It is
worth noting that a better understanding of how great power interventions led to national
division and the Korean War might ultimately prove useful to those making policies
affecting any future reunification of Korea.
Statement of the Problem
While much valuable scholarship exists on the subject, too much of it is episodic
or overly broad in coverage. More detailed and systematic assessments of local context
and chronological development are in order. Diplomatic historians in Korea and the
United States, for instance, have not adequately covered the period 1948-1950, between
14 These disputes over who started to establish separated nation the Korean peninsula became important
points of contention between traditional and revisionist historians. Revisionists argue that Syngman Rhee
with the support of American military government took the initiative to establish separated government in
the South first. However, Russian archives that were recently opened by Russian Government contain
historical documents showing that North Korea by the order of Stalin started to establish separated
government in October 1945 or early 1946. Kathrlyn Weathesby found historical documents that support
argument. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and The Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950:
New Evidence From Russian Archieves,” Working Paper No. 8. (Washington, D.C.: Cold War
International History Project, 1993).13
the establishment of the Republic of Korea and the start of the Korean War. Very little
research has been done on Rhee’s foreign policy toward the U.S. between 1948 and 1950
probably, in large part, because of Korean antipathy for Syngman Rhee as a dictator. In
addition, American diplomatic historians who have been influenced by Bruce Cumings’
works during the 1980s in their approach to the study of U.S.-Korea relations also
describe Syngman Rhee as responsible for the origins of the partitioning of the Korean
peninsula. Cumings stresses that Rhee, with the help of General Hodge and his military
government officials, gained political hegemony in Korean politics, and established a
separate government that adopted hostile policies toward North Korea, and this agenda
eventually led to the War. Most previous studies, including Cumings’ works have
interpreted Rhee’s foreign policy through the lens of the Cold War. Yet, before rendering
such judgments as conclusive, it is imperative to more thoroughly investigate Korean
society before the War and to appreciate the perspective of Korean nationalism to thereby
better understand local communities and politics that sometimes aligned with the Cold
War template cast down upon them but often did not.
One problem historians will perennially confront is that government documents
usually reflect an ideological bias; nevertheless, these works remain essential sources for
any study of the United States occupation of Korea. These reports articulate the official
position of the State Department, the Headquarters of the United States Armed Forces in
Korea, and the Defense Department, and contain other first-hand testimony connected
with the occupation of both an official and personal nature. As a result of American
government officials’ ideological preconceptions, however, they often convey a skewed
interpretation of events in Korea. They were unable to understand the complexity of the14
political situation in Korea. The historian, therefore, must make determinations as to the
credibility and objectivity of these sources. To do so, however, more systematic and
comprehensive research into contemporaneous sources is needed.
Historiography
George M. McCune’s Korea Today
15 and Richard Robinson’s unpublished work
“Betrayal of the Nation,”
16 advance a traditional perspective found in most official
writings. For the most part, these books provide a rather balanced view of the events of
that time. Both authors observed American occupation policy first-hand as officers in the
military government in Korea. Each of them, though, offers a different perspective.
Espousing the traditional anti-communist and anti-Soviet view, McCune is primarily
concerned with blundering and confusion among American occupation and military
government officials. The 38
th parallel, according to McCune, was not intended to be a
permanent partition of Korea into two zones. Richard Robinson, an officer during the
occupation, advances a different critique of American occupation policy. Robinson
argues that the Soviet Union and the United States Joint Commission failed because the
United States manipulated the “freedom of expression” strategy to discredit Russians and
15 Gerorge M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). McCune was born in
North Korea, the son of a missionary, and worked as an advisor on Korean affairs in the US State
Department from before World War II. He also had experience working as a specialist on the Far East in
the OSS Division of Research and Analysis during World War II. McCune was the most well-informed
specialist on Korea at that time. However, his early death in 1948 deprived of the future historian an
outstanding authority on Korean history and politics. His widow, Evelyn McCune and his Ph. D. student,
Arthur L. Grey had completed one tenth of this book and published it in 1950 in memory of Professor
McCune. (Cited in Chung Yong-wook, “History of US Policy Regarding the Occupation of Korea (1945-
1948): Trends in Existing Research,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 7 (1994), 52.
16 Ibid. Richard Robinson worked in the G-2 Historical Section, Headquarters of the US Armed Forces in
Korea and participated in the writing of the “History of the US Armed Forces in Korea.” He was quite
critical of US occupation policy and the high-level elites in the Headquarters of the US Armed Forces in
Korea. While in Korea, he has secretly investigated and later unpublished his work containing his personal
experience and observation during in Korea and in the United States in 1960.15
to take the initiative in negotiations. Rather than overtly challenging the occupation
policy directed from Washington, these works criticize the United States dealings with
the Soviet Union, the implementation of the policy, and the officials involved in it. At
present, these sources, despite their differences, remain the best and most valuable books
contributing to our present understanding of the foreign policy of the United States in
Korea at the time.
Other studies also have done pioneering work. The American Military
Government in Korea (1951) by E. Grant Meade, an official of the United States Military
Government in Korea, covers the first year (October 1945- October 1946) of the
occupation and provides detailed descriptions of the activities of the US military
government in one province (Cholla Nam Do) based on the author’s experience, various
occupation internal reports, and interviews with other participants. This book contains
background and general information concerning the structure of the military government
and attempts to evaluate the civil affairs of local administration in Korea while American
foreign policy was implemented during this period.
Soon Sung Cho’s Korea in the World Politics, 1940-1950: An Evaluation of
American Responsibility (1967) is a comprehensive survey of the Korean position in the
world from 1940 to 1950 and deals with the role of the United States in Korean history
during those critical years. During this period, the failure of the allies to achieve the
unification of Korea led to its subsequent division, the emergence of two separate
political regimes, and ultimately the outbreak of Korean War in 1950. After studying the
memoirs of wartime negotiators, materials of the postwar occupation, and the United
Nations documents pertaining to Korea, Cho evaluates American responsibility with16
regard to its role in the trusteeship of Korea, the liberation and division of Korea between
the Soviet Union and the United States, and the Korean War. Cho argues that a lack of
information, inconsistencies, and inadequate preparations by the United States in
determining its proper role and relationship with Korea, were the primary reasons for the
ultimate division of the peninsula. He calls for more firmness and consistency from the
United States and argues that the United States could and should have done much more
than it did in its commitment in the south.
Gregory Henderson’s Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (1968) covers Korean
politics from the time of liberation to the 1960s. Henderson was a foreign diplomat and
is the most renowned Korean specialist after McCune. He asserts that Korean society
was homogenous and its politics were highly centralized. Therefore, he claims, the
center dominated society. Yet Korea failed to develop “meaningful middle groups” in
terms of interest groups and institutions. Based on his “theory of the vortex,” Henderson
argues that Korea lacked “intermediate groups, plural associations, viable political
parties, and a balance of power between center and locality.”
17
According to Henderson, political democratization of Korea failed because the
middle class was unable to close the gap between the central and provincial regions, as
well as the chasm separating the upper and lower classes. The occupation policy of the
United States, Henderson maintains, also failed because neither American policy makers
nor the military government authorities understood the “vortex-like political patterns” in
Korean society. Henderson’s work provides a theoretical explanation of the internal
factors behind modern Korean politics. Henderson suggests that the hope of a better
17 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968),
363.17
future for Korea depends on a less centralized and more pluralistic society. However, in
explaining his “vortex of politics” theory Henderson seems to have underrated the tragic
experiences of Koreans such as external invasion and influence, colonialism, and foreign
military occupation, treating them as secondary or rather unimportant factors.
Nevertheless, Henderson’s study made an important contribution to understanding
Korean politics and American political policy in Korea.
The 1970s was a watershed period in historiography. In that decade, revisionists,
spurred by the anti-Vietnam War movement and the Civil Rights movement, now
emerged as highly visible critics of the traditional perspective on the foreign policy of the
United States. Unlike earlier writers, the revisionists, based in part on access to new
material after the opening of secret documents, concluded that the United States bore
major responsibility not only for the origins of the Cold War, but also for the division of
Korea and the outbreak of the Korean War.
Even before then, however, the groundwork for this argument had been laid.
Renowned revisionist historian D.F. Fleming, in his work The Cold War and Its Origins
(1961), attempted a comprehensive survey of the Cold War. In it, Fleming argued that
the United States and its policy, rather than communism and the Soviet Union’s
aggression and expansion, brought about the Cold War. He provided a highly critical
account of the occupation and an interpretation of the Korean War that touts the logical
inconsistency of defending South Korea and then invading North Korea. Other
revisionists, such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolko in their The Politics of War and The Limits
of Power, argue that the United States emerged from the Second World War as the
military and economic super power. Anxious about political hegemony, military18
domination, and the spread of capitalism, American policy makers grossly exaggerated
the ideological danger of communism. According to Kolko, Russian foreign policy was
cautious, lacked a master plan, and was concerned largely with security and economic
recovery. Yet, after the war, American diplomacy opposed the forces of the left wing
everywhere in the world. The basic source of the world crisis, the Kolkos claim, was an
expansive American foreign policy’s interaction with decolonization, revolutionary
forces, and the quest for national autonomy appearing throughout the globe. Kolkos’
works are able to explain the foundation of the Cold War structure and United States
foreign policy in less than flattering terms with regard to America’s idealistic claims.
Since the Cold War was reputedly motivated by U. S. economic imperialism and
American expansionism after the end of the Second World War, revisionists naturally
argue the conflict was not inspired by the Soviet’s military aggressiveness and
ideological conflict. They also applied this framework and methodology to an
understanding of the specific nature of United States foreign policy in East Asia. These
works are significant to understand the background and the foundation of the Cold War
and United States foreign policy as well as the formulation and implementation of the
occupation policy in Korea but still left much to conjecture.
Thus, even though he accepted the Kolkos” main arguments, Bruce Cumings in
his outstanding work, The Origins of the Korea War: Liberation and the Emergence of
Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, offered a reinterpretation of the causes of the Korean War
in 1981. Unlike previous writings that focused on short term factors, Cumings argues
that the seeds of the Korean conflicts had roots deep in Japanese colonial rule as well as
in the wartime and immediate postwar Korean policy of the United States. Therefore, he19
emphasizes the importance of the nature of Korea’s domestic society which the Japanese
colonial legacy left as it passed under the American military government. After the war
ended, according to Cumings, leftists in Korea probably could have won control of the
peninsula in a matter of months. Korean society, he asserts, was ripe for a leftist social
revolution. Nonetheless, he also emphasizes that a significant numbers of leftists were
not communists, but rather moderate socialists.
According to Cumings, the left-right split, which emerged during the colonial
period, became a crucial source of the domestic power struggle. These divergent political
forces actively responded to the inconsistent American occupation policy with agendas of
their own. Faced with a social revolution in Korea, American occupation authorities
supported the rightists from the beginning. Cumings, through his insight about the
language, culture, and history of Korea, greatly contributed to an improved understanding
of postwar U.S. policy and offered a heightened level of research on the occupation
policy of the United States and modern Korean history.
Cumings also edited Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-
1953, (1983) which is a collection of essays by several scholars on U.S.-Korean relations
from 1943 to 1953. Drawing heavily on declassified U.S. government documents, the
authors present interesting new insights on various aspects of relations between the
United States and Korea during and after World War II. This book includes important
points about how Korea was divided, why the Korean War occurred, how U.S. decision
makers perceived South Korea before the Korean War, and how crucial decisions were
made during the war. These essays offered a better understanding of the background
behind the formulation of American occupation policy toward Korea.20
In Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (1985),
James Irving Matray surveys U.S. Korean policy from 1941 to 1950 from the perspective
of Washington officials. Matray begins with the period of World War II. Based on
declassified U.S. government documents, Matray shows how American policy abandoned
its supposedly traditional isolationism after 1945 and adopted globalism. At the same
time, American policy evolved from indifference to military intervention in Korea.
Matray analyzed America’ Korean policy in the context of the postwar international
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and viewed Korea as a ‘test
case’ of the U.S. containment of Soviet expansion in Asia.
This research contributes to the literature by exemplification of a case study in the
Third World. In particular, it demonstrates the significance of Korean nationalism in the
shaping of relations between the United States and Korea. Despite the efforts of some
scholars like Bruce Cumings to listen to the Korean voice, the Cold War has been the
main tune scholars, sometimes even Cumings, have heard when it comes to the story of
building a nation-state in Korea. In many previous works Cold War historians have
tended to neglect Korean nationalism and limited their focus to how U.S. policy makers
dealt with the Korean problem or why the U.S. supported South Korea in June, 1950.
The Cold War approach, while helpful in some ways, misses the essential continuity in
U.S. foreign policy toward Korea throughout the nineteenth century and the twentieth
century, given the context of East Asian history. Even Cumings, who criticized
American policy for failing to heed Korean desires to establish unity, independence, and
democracy, agrees with other scholars that American officials were “neither sinister nor
evil, only misguided [accent by author].” In his conclusion, Cumings notes that21
“American leaders, on all sides of the issues we have discussed, were not ill-intended, nor
were they conspirators, nor were they would-be exploiters….They were, however,
historically shaped by the experience of their own country and therefore had little to offer
a very different country, Korea.”
18 In other words, the United States emerged from the
Second World War with a willingness to use its power to recreate the world in its own
image, which it encased in an idealistic vision but which many nationalists saw as
blatantly self-serving. Cumings’ argument implies that democracy was not seen as a
viable option for a newly independent country like Korea, at least for the moment.
Unimpressed with revisionists’ monocausal emphasis on economic motives and
American capitalism, post-revisionist scholars argue that the revisionists “failed to
differentiate between competing domestic interests, and ignored both the influence of
legitimate national security concerns and the actions of other states on American
diplomacy.”
19 Post-revisionist historians focus on “the state as the principal actor, on
decision-making elites, on the strategic and geopolitical determinants of policy and on
such traditional notions as national security, national interest, and the balance of
power.”
20 One of the most influential post-revisionist articles, “The Emerging Post-
Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” written by John Lewis Gaddis,
argues that post-revisionist interpretation does not consider the drive for an economic
empire after the Second World War to be the primarily motivating force behind
American foreign policy. Gaddis holds the Soviet Union primarily responsible for
18 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 443-444.
19 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, “Introduction,” Explaining the History of American Foreign
Relations edited by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (Cambridge: The Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 5.
20 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, ibid., 5.22
starting in the Cold War but stresses the absence of any ideological blueprint in Stalin’s
mind.
21
According to Gaddis, post-revisionist historians argue that the United States did
not impose “its empire on unwilling clients, forcing them into military alliances and into
position of economic dependence against their will.”
22 They claim that U.S. mistakes
could be explained as the unfortunate by-product of an American effort to protect the free
world against Soviet imperialism.
23 In his article, “Empire by Invitation,” Gier
Lundestad argues that European countries requested American involvement in its affairs
and that the nature of the American empire differs fundamentally from earlier empires in
history, since it does not have an imperial intention to control others at least in an overt
manner.
24 Many post-revisionist historians, like Lundestad, maintain that “if American
leaders were empire builders” (as revisionist historians argue), “the empire grew by
invitation from abroad rather than from imperatives rooted in the American system.”
25
Such an argument, however, does not apply well to the case of Korea, especially since
1945. Cleary, it seems, the United States was not an “empire by invitation” in Korea.
Awash in oversimplified bipolar world views, American officials in the military
21 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,”
Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983), 171-190.
22 John Lewis Gaddis, ibid., 176.
23 Michael J. Hogan, “State of Art: An Introduction,” America in the World: The Historiography of
American Foreign Relations since 1941 edited by Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 5.
24 Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” The Cold
War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent edited by Charles S. Maier (New York: Markus Wiener
Publishing, Inc., 1991), 152.
25 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, ibid., 5.23
government incorrectly perceived Korean revolutionary nationalists and leftists as
monolithic and Soviet-directed, not as an autonomous force, and viewed postwar
indigenous radicalism and nationalism as equally threatening to American interests and
security.
This dissertation is divided in two parts. In the first part, it analyzes United
States’ policy toward the Korean peninsula from the late nineteenth century until the
efforts of the unification process by foreign powers failed in 1947. The first chapter
summarizes how and why the Americans initially contacted Korean people in the late
nineteenth century, how expectations about U. S. idealism were fostered, and why they
withdrew their legation from Korea in 1905. The second chapter describes the
relationship between Korea and the United States during the Second World War. The
third chapter relates the domestic political and social situation of South Korea and the
role of the United States military government. The fourth chapter deals with the Moscow
Conference and the United States-Soviet Union Joint Commissions.
The second part of the dissertation examines United States policy toward Korea
from 1948 until just prior to the Korean War. This section traces the trends and changes
in the politics and society of South Korea. The fifth chapter deals with the origins of the
establishment of the Korean government; in particular, the process of the Constitutional
Assembly and the election of the first President of Korea. The last chapter describes the
activities of the United States Advisory Group from 1948 to the Korean War. It also
revisits the question of the intrinsic nature of Syngman Rhee’s policy toward the United
States vis-à-vis America’s Korean policy and describes the development of the relations
between South and North Korea immediately before the Korean War.24
This study is important because it describes a time period dimly comprehended
and one which many historians ignore. Chronologically speaking, it emphasizes the
period from the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, to June of 1950 when
the Korean War began. This dissertation shows how American policy toward Korea
originated and evolved, and how Korean nationalism responded to it during and after
World War II. In addition, this investigation looks at how American policy changed from
the withdrawal in 1948 to the military involvement in 1950. Last, like several recent
revisionist studies, this work indicates that Korean leaders like Syngman Rhee in the
south and Kim Il Sung in the north had a capability to use their power base to pursue and
accomplish their own goals and serve their own purposes. For example, despite nearly
complete dependence on American military and economic assistance, Syngman Rhee’s
response to U.S. foreign policy toward Korea sought to reverse American regional
policies and unify the peninsula though military force. Kim Il Sung also succeed in
persuading the reluctant Stalin and Mao to become involved in the Korean conflict in
June 1950.
Although this study will focus on U.S. diplomacy toward Korea from 1945 to
1950, it will help to enhance our understanding of American foreign policy toward East
Asia as a whole, and thereby contribute to the broader study of U.S. commitment to
foreign policy and international relations. For example, the U.S. government and
American military officials currently face the task of nation-building in Iraq and
Afghanistan today. As a case study which exemplifies U.S. commitments in Korea,
Americans could learn a lesson about how to establish free and democratic countries for25
people elsewhere in the world. Specifically, Americans might gain insight into how to
deal with Arab nationalism in the Middle East.
As for primary sources, this study relies heavily on an extensive survey of
declassified historical records of the U.S. military government in Korea for the period
1945-1948 and State Department papers stored at the National Archives and Record
Administration in Maryland. These documents are especially valuable in describing the
role of American military authorities and its occupation policies, as well as how
occupation authorities viewed and responded to local conflict. Essential evidence
includes “History of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (HUSAFIK); U.S. military
intelligence reports: G-2 “Periodic Reports” (G-2 P/R) and G-2 “Weekly Summary” (G-2
W/S) of the United States Army Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the United
States Military Advisory Group in Korea; Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS);
and Summation; documents from the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
(UNTCOK). This dissertation also uses South Korean daily newspapers from 1945 to
1948 and the writings of numerous participants, both Koreans and Americans, in the
American occupation period. To gain a perception of events, this research looks as well
at North Korean documents seized by American forces during the Korean War and
presently housed in NARA. Secondary sources consulted include works written in both
the Korean and English languages.26
CHAPTER II
Early US Diplomacy Toward Korea
This chapter briefly reviews the nature of American foreign policy toward Korea
between 1882 and 1905. More narrowly, it addresses questions which relate to long-term
developments much later. For example, how did Koreans view foreign powers, in
particular, why did they see the United States as a “benevolent Great Power.” Why did
Korean efforts to build a nation-state on the model of western-style modernization fail?
How was autonomy then lost and a nationalist movement rejuvenated which sought to
restore an independent Korea. At the end of World War II, the peninsula was divided
into North and South. In order to more fully comprehend unification debates on the
Korean peninsula in the late 1940s, it is important to understand how Koreans earlier in
the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries perceived neighboring powers and the United States
in historical terms. In short, earlier experience helps explain subsequent actions and
reactions.
Korea has more than 4000 years of history and a size of 85,000 square miles
(approximately the size of Minnesota). The Korean peninsula stretches south for more
than 500 miles, while it spans 220 miles east and west at its widest point. In the north,
the Yalu and Tuman Rivers separate Korea from Manchuria and the port of Vladivostok,
Russia’s important naval base and vital outlet to the Pacific. Eastward, across the East27
Sea (the Sea of Japan), the Japanese islands flank the peninsula. To the west, the West
Sea (the Yellow Sea) divides Korea from China.
26
Historically, Korea was a homogeneous society with the same language and
national heritage. Koreans have achieved a highly developed culture in East Asia.
Geographically, Korea is surrounded by larger and stronger neighbors - China, Russia,
and Japan. The location of the Korean peninsula became a “bridge” between the power
of the continent represented by China and Russia and the power of the ocean represented
by Japan. Thus, Japan considered the Korean peninsula as either “a dagger pointed at the
heart of Japan” or “Japan’s steppingstone to the Asian mainland.” China, however,
regarded the peninsula as “a hammer ready to strike at the head of China.”
27 For Russia,
Korea was a “back gate that needed to be locked against intruders and to be opened
during any opportunity for expansion.”
28
Because of the geopolitical situation, its strategic importance, and the unfortunate
proximity to three great powers, Korea became a battleground for the venting of the rival
neighbors’ power struggles throughout most of its history.
29 Hans J. Morgenthau, a
realist historian, argues that the geopolitical circumstance of the Korean peninsular plays
an important factor in foreign policy with other neighbor countries. He states that:
From the thirteenth century to the decline of Chinese power in the nineteenth
century, Korea stood in a relationship of subservience to China as its suzerain and
26 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year
(Washington, D.C.,: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 1.
27 Ibid., 2; Soong Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American
Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 5.
28 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 2.
29 James Irving Matray, “The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Virginia, 1977), 15.28
accepted Chinese leadership in politics and culture. From the end of the sixteenth
century Japan, after it had invaded Korea without lasting success, opposed to the
claim of China its own claim to control of the country. Japan was able to make
good that claim as a result of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.
Then Japan was challenged in its control of Korea by Russia, and from 1896 on
the influence of Russia became dominant. The rivalry between Japan and Russia
for control of Korea ended with the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905.
30
From ancient times until the mid-nineteenth century, China, as a big neighbor
state, had an immense impact on Korea’s internal affairs. China’s suzerainty and
influence over the Korean peninsula was continued until 1895. The Yi Dynasty or
Choson, literally, “The Land of Morning Calm,” from the thirteenth century to the
seventeenth century, aside from several military attacks from outside, (the Mongols
1258-1316, Toyotomi Hydeyoshi 1592-1598, and the Manchu [Ching dynasty] 1626-
1636), almost completely closed its country from the rest of the world.
31
During the long period of isolation, Korea had a special relationship with China
known as the tributary system. The traditional relationship between China and Korea had
been based upon their “suzerain and vassal” system that accepted Chinese superiority in
the context of Chinese-centric world order. Through this relationship, while Koreans
made efforts to maintain independence, China strengthened her suzerainty over Korea
and would in turn protect the Koreans from threats emanating outside of the country.
32
30 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967), 171.
31 See more details about relation between China and Korea and the Korean view of the world, Kang Jong
Il, “A Power Politics Analysis of Korea’s Loss of Autonomy: Korean Internal and External Relations with
the United States, 1871-1905” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1997), 47-51.
32 Ibid.: Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887 (New York:
Humanities Press, 1970), 19-20.29
When Western imperial powers opened China after the Opium War (1839-1842),
these countries also soon began to appear on Korean shores seeking trade. Attempts by
the French in 1866, and the Americans in 1871, failed to open the peninsula known as
Chosen or the “Hermit Nation.” Finally Japan succeeded in opening Korea by the
Kangwha Treaty in 1876. This treaty with a foreign country was a first and represented
the beginning of a new era for Koreans. As the result of this treaty, Westerners
recognized Korea as an independent nation and Koreans abolished its tributary
relationship to China.
33
In the nineteenth century, the United States had a strong interest in trading with
the Far East. The United States government adopted the “Open Door” policy and in
effect demanded that Asian countries open their ports to American ships in order “to
obtain equal opportunity of commerce, and of the right of extraterritoriality, to secure the
protection of nationals”
34 Initially the American desire for trade focused on China and
Japan.
35 Later, Americans tried to expand their concerns for trade to Korea and also
wanted protection of American sailors shipwrecked along the Korean coastline. A
resolution introduced into the House of Representatives on February 15, 1845, called for
a mission to open Korea to trade and stated that, “While we cannot expect anything like
equal advantages from intercourse with Corea [sic], it seems desirable to included that
country along with Japan… as negotiations… may be dispatched with little additional
33 A detailed account of forced opening of Korea by Japan can be found in C. I. Eugene, Kim and Han Kyo
Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of
California Press, 1967), 207-18
34 Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt & Company,
1955), 363.
35 Sino-American diplomatic relations were established by the Treaty of Wanghsia signed on July, 1844;
Japanese-American diplomatic relations started by the Kanagawa Treaty on March 31, 1854.30
expense by the same ambassador.”
36 Secretary of State, William H. Seward, dispatched
the General Sherman, an American merchant ship, to open Korea in 1866. However,
while attempting to open Korea, the ship was destroyed, burned by Koreans, and the
entire crew was killed.
37
In the 1870’s, after having adopted the Open Door policy via “gunboat
diplomacy” after the General Sherman incident, the United States continued its effort to
open Korea. The Korean political leaders represented by Taewongun strongly
maintained their anti-Western policy and tried to close the Yi Dynasty. In April 1870,
President Ulysses S. Grant instructed Frederick F. Low, the American Minister in China,
to negotiate a shipwreck convention and a commercial treaty with Korea.
38 Grant
announced his message to the Congress on December 4, 1871:
Prompted by a desire to put an end to the barbarous treatment of our shipwrecked
sailors [the General Sherman case] on the Korean coast, I instructed our minister
at Peking to endeavor to conclude a convention with Korea for securing the safety
and humane treatment of such mariners. Admiral Rodgers was instructed to
accompany him with a sufficient force to protect him in case of need.
39
36 Department of States, “United States Policy Regarding Korea, Part I. 1834-1941,” Research Project No.
29, (May 1947) in United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834-1950, Department of State, the Division of
Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs (May 1947-December 1951), edited by the Institute of
Asian Culture Studies and Published by Hallym University. (Chunchon, Korea: Hallym University Press
1987), 1; According to the earliest document, first the encounter between the Koreans and Americans was
on January 30, 1853 when an American whale ship came to Pusan, Korea.
37 The recent and most comprehensive work on early U.S.-Korean relations can be found in Jongsuk Chay,
Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean- American Relations to 1910 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1990). For the General Sherman incident see, 17-26; Kim Won Mo, Kundae Han-Mi Kwan’ gyesa [The
Modern History of Korean-American Relations] (Seoul: Chorahak hwa hyonsilsa, 1992), 167-187; James
I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1985), 5; see details on the incident of the General Sherman, Kang Jong Il, Ph.D.
dissertation, 139-145.
38 Department of States, “United States Regarding Korea, Part I. 1834-1941,” 2; Fish to Low, April 20,
1870, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870: 334-35.
39 James D. Richardson, ed. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President 1789-1902 Vol.
VII. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1904), 145.31
Hoping to open Korea by force, several hundred Americans with six ships stormed
Kanghwa Island. However, the Korean government staunchly refused to talk to the
American expedition group and was not willing to open its doors. Although American
military power was superior, the American military expedition of 1871 failed in its
mission to make an official diplomatic relationship with Korea because of the staunch
resistance of the Korean government and its people. Moreover, during the military
incident between the two countries,
40 Korea had heavy casualties - about 350 dead and 20
wounded. Disappointed with the results of their efforts in Korea, the American force
returned to China on June 12.
41 Taewongun and his supporters promoted this incident to
strengthen Korean anti-Western feeling and decided to close Choson tightly.
In 1880, the Rutherford B. Hayes administration sent Commodore Robert Wilson
Shufeldt to Korea in order to make a commercial treaty. Although having Japanese
assistance, Shufeldt failed to achieve his goal. Finally, with the mediation of Chinese
Viceroy Li Hung-chang, in May 1882, the United States became the first Western nation
to recognize the Kingdom of Choson by signing the American-Korean Amity and
Commercial Treaty known as the Chemulpo Treaty.
42 Thus was started the official
relations between the two nations. However, with assistance from the United States the
Korean government’s desperate efforts to reform the systems and achieve self-
40 Some Korean historians like Kim Won Mo argue that this case was the first war between Korea and the
United States of America.
41 Kim Won Mo, The Modern History of Korean-American Relations, 394-402; Yur-bok Lee, Diplomatic
Relations, 19-33; Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 27-33.
42 For the US-Korean relations before 1882 and Shufeldt’s role in opening US-Korean diplomatic relations,
see, Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 17-59. Chay argues that “Commodore Shufeldt’s act of
opening Korea in 1882 was one of the most vivid examples of episodes in a well-defined pattern of global
gunboat diplomacy.”32
strengthening failed because of the interference and obstructionism of hindering by other
imperial neighbors that had greater political and military resources and their own
intentions for Korea. According to Robert T. Pollard, the treaty “set in motion the train
of circumstance which led first to the Sino-Japanese War, then to the Russo-Japanese
War, and finally to the annexation of Korea by force.”
43
The treaty consisted of fourteen articles. One of the articles promised, “If other
powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their
good office, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus
showing their friendly feelings.”
44 After this treaty, the Korean government decided to
make official relations with other Western countries—Britain on June 6, 1882, Russia on
July, 1884 and France on June 4, 1886. In addition, this 1882 treaty misled the Korean
government and people to expect too much American help in terms of ‘good office’ in
maintaining their independence from hostile neighbors. King Kojong approved the treaty
not only because “Korea looked to the United States as a kind of new elder brother that
would willingly offer good offices and other assistance in times of distress”
45 but also
because he hoped to strengthen his country by adopting western technology and its
military system. Therefore, Koreans regarded the United States as the most trustworthy
nation to guarantee Korean independence.
43 Robert T. Pollard, “American Relations with Korea, 1882-1895” Chinese Social and Political Science
Review 16 (October 1932), 425.
44 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company,
1954), 33; John Edward Wilz, “Did the United States betray Korea in 1905?” Pacific Historical Review, 54
(August 1985), 244.
45 Yur-bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg Von Mollendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi
Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 27.33
During the negotiation to open Korea, the Chinese Viceroy Li Hung-chang not
only attempted to retrieve traditional suzerainty lost by the Kangwha treaty of 1876, but
also hoped the treaty could be used to halt the growth of Japanese influence and Russian
expansion into Korean peninsula.
46 However, the United States steadfastly refused to
acknowledge the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea.
47 Basically the United States
considered Korea to be an independent state. In order to maintain the Open Door policy
in the Far East, Americans attempted to ban the complete domination of Korea by any
one imperial power. The Secretary of State wrote, “As far as we are concerned,
Corea[sic] is an independent sovereign power, with all the attendant rights, privileges,
duties and responsibilities; in her relations to China we have no desire to interfere unless
action should be taken prejudicial to the rights of the United States…”
48 Commodore
Shufeldt also contended that as long as Korea had sovereign power in dealing with its
own domestic and foreign affairs, the United States had the right to make a treaty with its
government. James Schnabel, a military historian, argues that this treaty was a golden
opportunity for Americans to establish a dominant influence in Korea:
The treaty could have given the United States overriding influence in Korea. But
when the Emperor sought an American foreign affairs adviser and Army military
advisers, the United States moved slowly. The matter dragged on for several
years. The American representative in Korea repeatedly appealed to Washington
for action. Although requested in 1884, military advisers reached Korea only in
1888.
49
46 Tyler Dennett, “American ‘Good Offices’ in Asia,” American Journal of International Law 16 (January
1922), 1-3; See also, Kim Won Mo, “Chungil jonjaeng-gi migukeui daihanjungchaek-I ilboneeui hankuk
chimryak-e kkichin younghyang,”[The Influence of US Policy toward Korea on the Japanese
Encroachment upon Korea during the Sino-Japanese War], in Hankuksa-yunkoohoei, chungiljonjaengkwa
hanikwankye [Sino-Japanese War and Korea-Japan Relations] (Seoul; Ilchokak, 1985), 146.
47 Kim and Han Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 21-28.
48 Department of States, “United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834-1941,” 5.
49 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 4.34
As such, the United States government did not concern itself much with expanding its
influence in Korea after the treaty. The United States tried to help the Korean
government maintain its independence as long as American government could remain
militarily uninvolved. The United States’ primary concern in opening Korea was to trade
with Koreans and to assure the future rescue of any American ship-wrecked crews.
According to American government documents, the major purpose of the treaty was to
permit “United States vessels in stress or in need of fuel to enter any port harbor of Korea
and United States citizens in Korea to receive the protection of local authorities.”
50 Only
a small number of businessmen and a handful of missionaries cared about expanding
their influence in Korea further.
Earlier, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Korean government vehemently
rejected Western overtures to open their country because Koreans knew that Western
nations hurt the pride of the Chinese people.
51 After the Koreans decided to open their
doors to Japan in 1876 and the United States in 1882, their government sought to open its
country to additional Western states in hopes of reducing Chinese and Japanese influence
on the peninsula. During this period, two important incidents altered the status of
international relations; one was the old Korean military mutiny in July 1882 (Imo
Kullan), and the other was the coup d’etat by the Progressive Party in December in 1884
(Kapsin Chongbyon).
50 Department of State, “United State Policy Regarding Korea, 1834-1941,” 8.
51 Since the Opium War (1839-42), Ching China was faced with western intrusions and domestic instability
until its reign ended in 1911. Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the
United States with References to China, Japan, and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Barnes
and Noble, Inc., 1922), 468-470.35
First, the old Korean military revolt, had occurred in July 23, 1882 because of the
conflict in Korean military system between the traditional old military units and the new
elite corps trained by the Japanese. The disgruntled military trainees, who were
frustrated by discriminatory treatment and having not received their salary for over one
year from the Korean government, attacked the prisons and the courts and killed the
Japanese training officer of the elite corps. The Taewongun’s military followers
participated in the riots in hopes that Taewongun could return to office. However, they
failed to accomplish their objective because Taewongun only took political power for a
few weeks before he was kidnapped by Chinese troops and taken to China.
After suppressing the mutiny, Chinese troops remained in Korea and interfered in
Korean domestic affairs. This action caused a confrontation between China and Japan. At
this juncture, the United States responded to the situation by dispatching their gunboat,
Monocasey, to protect American interests in Korea. Though Americans pledged strict
neutrality, the immediate and stronger response of the United States in regard to the
Korean crisis was to give some warning to China and Japan. Having the experience of
American ‘goodwill,’ the Korean king came to expect more of Americans’ role in
advacing Korean independence and modernization.
52 Unfortunately, this crisis also
provided a pretext for China and Japan to intervene in Korean domestic affairs and later
gave them a chance to clash for hegemony over the Korean peninsula.
Actually, the military mutiny was related to the internal power struggle between
the old generations known as the conservative groups, represented by Taewongun,
53 and
52 Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 63-64.
53 Some Korean scholars classified them as “seclusionists” or “isolationists”; Lee Ki Baik, A New History
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the new generations known as the Progressive Party that were supported by Queen Minbi
clans. While the conservative groups backed the policy of isolation against the opening
of Korea to Western countries, and espoused strong anti-foreign country slogans or the
doctrine of “defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy” (wijong ch’oksa),
54 the new
generations rallied under the Progressive Party, which had leaned toward pro-Japanese
stances, tried to challenge their government’s policy, and got ready for action.
In December 1884 political coup d’etat (Kapsin chongbyon) led by a conspiring
of young radical groups and pro-Japan reformists of the Progressive Party called for
drastic reforms of the government system. The conservative group crushed the coup
d’etat with the aid of Chinese intervention. As a result, China expanded its influence
over Korea.
When Chinese and Japanese forces were on the verge of a clash in Korea as a
result of the 1884 coup d’etat, the American government immediately dispatched ships to
reduce rising tension between China and Japan and to protect American lives and
national interests. Each time the two powers compromised their differences without
resort to arms.
55 Thus, King Kojong trusted the United States and the Korean
government asked the American government to help train and modernize their army. In
return, the Korean court granted several important concessions to American business.
56
54 Kang, Jong Il’s Ph.D. Dissertation, 8; Lee Ki Baik, ibid., 272.
55 Department of State, “United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834-1941,” 11; Dennett, Americans in
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56 To read more details, Kim Won Mo, The History of Korean-American Foreign Relation during 100 years
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A confidential letter of the American Minister in Korea to the Secretary of State on July
19, 1883 states:
On several occasions of late, I have received messengers direct from His Majesty
asking information and even advice upon minor matters. These questions have
pertained particularly to the methods of raising revenue in the United States. My
advice has also been sought in reference to the granting of special privilege for
mining in Korea. I fully appreciate the delicacy of such position and have on each
occasion replied guardedly and in general terms.
57
The last in this line of appeals for social and political reform started in May 1894.
The Tonghak Revolution appealed to peasants forced into abject poverty by an increasing
tax burden and exploitation by foreign countries. The Tonghaks denounced the
corruption of government and foreign intervention. The Tonghak, literally meaning,
“Eastern Learning,” against “Western Learning,” was anti-foreign and a counter-
movement against Christianity.
58 Their revolutionary movement demanded
comprehensive political and social reforms.
After the peasant revolt erupted, the beleaguered Korean government requested
Chinese troops to quell a peasant uprising led by the Tonghak religious group. When the
Chinese government dispatched troops to Korea, the Japanese government responded in
accordance with the treaty of Tientsin of 1885 that stipulated mutual notification between
China and Japan if they sent troops to Korea. Japan therefore also sent an army to the
Korean peninsula under the pretext of protecting their national security and property.
59 It
seems more probable that the Japanese government sought an opportunity to remove
57 George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the
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Chinese influence from Korea. Due to the contingent opportunity created by an internal
Korean incident, two neighboring countries, China and Japan, opted to fight a war for
control over strategic peninsula.
60 At this juncture, the Korean government tried to
prevent war in its backyard. Koreans requested the United States government adhere its
‘good offices’ pledge as stipulated in the 1882 treaty.
The Article I of the Korean-American treaty had stated:
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United
States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their
respective Governments. If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either
government, the other will exert their good office, on being informed of the case,
to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.
61
However, during the Sino-Japanese War, the United States officially avoided
involvement in Korean affairs under the pretext of a strictly impartial and neutral policy
in the region. Frankly, the United States did not exert much effort toward mediation of
the Korean problem, between China and Japan, because the American government
supported the Japanese in the balance of power struggle in the Far East. The United
States hoped that Japanese military power would halt Chinese intervention and Russian
expansion to Korea. After the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War, signified by
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, on April 12, 1895, Japanese supremacy was assured in the
Korean peninsula. The treaty ended traditional Chinese suzerainty over Korea.
Throughout the war, the United States regarded Japan as the most reliable power in the
60 Kim and Han Kyo Kim, p. 77; Chong Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 19-54.
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Far East.
62 By maintaining its impartial attitude and acknowledging of Korea as an
independent state, the United States, in practice, was supporting the Japanese position,
which, since the Korean-Japanese treaty of 1876, was that Korea was in fact free from all
control by China.
63
In the end, though, victory over China in 1895 did not give Japan a free hand in
Korea because Russia now began to challenge its new hegemony in Korea. Traditionally,
Russia was very concerned about the Korean situation even though Russians did not
often make contact with Korea. Russia made an incessant effort to seek the ice-free
harbors in Korea during the winter season, especially after its southward movement was
frustrated by Britain in Europe and Middle East. The Russian government thereafter
attempted to enhance its influence and promote its interests in Korea. At the same time,
the Korean king also began to rely on Russia in order to reduce Japanese influence and
gain Russian support instead of the United States for assistance. However, cooperation
between the Korean government and Russia was seriously challenged when Japanese
military personnel and civilians, disguised in clothes of Korean rioters, murdered the
Korean queen, Minbi, on October 8, 1895 because evidently she seemed to be plotting
against Japan. In a desperate effort to cope with the situation, the King escaped his
palace on February 11, 1896 and took refuge in the Russian legation for almost two
years.
64
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With the Korean king in their custody (Akwan p’ach’on), the Russians tried to
expand their influence in the peninsula. Threatened by this effort, Prince Yamagata
Aritomo suggested a plan of dividing Korea into spheres of influence along the 38
th
parallel in 1896. However, neither Japan nor Russia trusted each other and Russians
thought that they would be able to control the whole Korean peninsula someday. The
United States and Japan felt threatened by the enhanced Russian presence in Korean
officials when the Korean king appointed Kir A. Alexeieff as his advisor and head of the
Korean customs in October 1897.
65 Furthermore, Russia obtained twenty-five-year
leases from China in December 1897 on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur in the
Liaotung peninsula. Deprived of this territory by Russian’s action, Japanese leaders were
furious. From their perspective, Japan had acquired the Liaotung peninsular after the
victory over China. However, because of three European powers—Russia, France, and
Germany—Japan was forced to retrocede the Liaotung peninsular in 1895. By obtaining
harbors close to the Korean peninsula, Russians could have an enormous influence on
Korea’s situation. As a consequence, Japan’s position in Korea was directly threatened by
Russia in the Far East. Thus, the Japanese government began to prepare for a war with
Russia.
For the most part, the United States, along with Great Britain, accepted the
Japanese position toward Korea because they hoped thereby to check Russian expansion
into Manchuria and Korea.
66 Britain supported Japanese policy in the Far East because
its interests in China were also felt to be threatened by the Russian push toward
65 Kim Won Mo trans., Allen ui ilki [Allen’s Diary] (Seoul: Tan’guk University Press, 1991), 559.
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Manchuria. Eventually, the joint-interest of Britain and Japan in Manchuria and Korea
led to the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902 which helped
Japan to win the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. In the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance in
1905, the British government accepted Japan’s right to establish a protectorate in Korea
in return for a Japanese pledge of cooperation when it came to British interests in India.
In any case, Russo-Japanese rivalry for control of Manchuria and Korea by 1903 was a
disturbing factor in Far Eastern politics. In July of that year, Japan opened negotiations
with Russia for a political settlement. Japan suggested that while Russia possessed rights
in Manchuria, Russia in return should recognize that Japan had a similar mandate to
control Korea. Russia provided a counter-proposal that both countries establish a neutral
zone the north of 39
th parallel in Korea and neither Japan nor Russia were to introduce
troops.
67 After Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1903 failed to reduce rising tensions,
Japan decided to go to war with Russia over Korea.
68
Again, the Korean King Kojong was eager to seek United States mediation to stop
the war. Dr. Horace N. Allen, the first American missionary in Korea, a diplomat, and a
political advisor to the king, warned the American government that its interests could not
be protected by supporting Japanese aggressiveness.
69 He also wrote the Secretary of
State on April 14, 1904:
67 Department of States, “United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834-1941,” 22.
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All the matters (diplomatic pressure in regard to various concessions) are
naturally of serious concern to the Korean emperor. He falls back in his extreme
upon his old friendship with America. I may as well inform you that the Emperor
confidently expects that America will do something for him at the close of this
war, or when opportunity offers, to retain for him as much of his independence as
possible. He is inclined to give a very free and favorable translation to Article I
of our treaty of Jenchuan of 1882… I am obliged to assure his Majesty that the
condition of Korea is borne in mind by the United States Government, who will
use their good office when occasion occurs.
70
In practice, United States policy toward Korea avoided direct involvement and
pledged strict neutrality.
71 Washington instructed its diplomats in Korea not to interfere
in the country’s internal affairs. The Secretary of State wrote the American minister to
caution all Americans in Korea not to express any anti-Japanese opinions:
You should … inform all Americans resident in Korea that they should strictly
refrain from any expression of opinion, or from giving advice concerning the
internal management of the country, or from any intermeddling in political
questions; that if they do so it is at their own risk and peril; that neither you nor
the Government of the United States can approve of such action on their part or
perhaps be able to adequately protect them should they disregard this advice.
They should strictly confine themselves to their missionary work, whether it be
teaching in schools, preaching the gospel, or attending to the sick, for which they
went to the country.
72
Despite Allen’s effort to reverse Washington’s policy, the United States remained neutral
with regard to Korean affairs.
73 According to Dennett, “The Korean Government was in
the position of an incompetent defective not yet committed to guardianship. The United
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States was her only disinterested friend—but had no intention of becoming her
guardian.”
74 The United States, in the end, chose to halt Russian expansion in Korean
peninsula by supporting Japanese adventurism in the Far East.
In addition, it also should be noted that the United States in the late nineteenth
century, was a growing imperial power itself—rather newly arrived. The United States
purchased Alaska in 1867 as the “drawbridge between America and Asia”
75 and acquired
Hawaii in 1878 as “a rendezvous for the Pacific Navy, and a resort for merchant ships.”
76
However, after the United States obtained the Philippines in 1898, the diplomatic
situation changed drastically in terms of its imperialistic interests. Furthermore,
President Theodore Roosevelt’s policy of realism called for a balance of power in the Far
East, one in which Japan would check the influence of Russia. Roosevelt, moreover,
instructed Secretary of State John Hay not to interfere in Korean affairs. He told Hay
“We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan… They could not strike one
blow in their own defense… Japan ought to have a protectorate over Korea… While I
should hope to see Manchuria restored to China.”
77 For Roosevelt, the Japanese had
proved themselves an exceptional race among Asian countries by adopting Western
74 Donnett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 495.
75 Walter LaFeber, New Empire (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), 29.
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systems and ways. The Koreans, on the other hand, were “the rotten product of a
decayed Oriental civilization,” in the words of the elder George Kennan.
78
The Russo-Japanese War began in Korea on February 10, 1904. From the
beginning of the war, the United States showed a lack of interest in what happened to
Korea. Secretary of War William H. Taft went to Japan, and negotiated a secret
agreement with Prime Minister Taro Katsura. They approved a protocol, the Taft-
Katsura Memorandum, on July 29, 1905 in which the United States agreed to allow Japan
a free hand in Korea. In return, Japan approved the American domination of the
Philippines.
79 In a memorandum Katsura disavowed any aggressive Japanese designs
against the Philippines and emphasized Japan’s resolve that “a complete solution of the
peninsular (Korean) question should be made as the logical consequence of the war.”
Taft expressed the view that “the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over
Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the
consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to
permanent peace in the East.”
80
The Korean Emperor Kojong,
81 appealed to the United States. The emperor asked
his personal friend, professor H. B. Hulbert, to deliver his letter to President Roosevelt.
The Emperor concluded his letter:
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Ever since 1883 the United States and Korea have been in friendly treaty
relations. Korea has received many proofs of the good will and the sympathy of
the American Government and people. The American representatives have
always shown themselves to be in sympathy with the welfare and progress of
Korea. Many teachers have been sent from America who have done much for the
uplift of our people. But we have not made the progress that we ought. This is
due partly to the political machinations of foreign powers and partly to our
mistakes… It is now apparent that Japan proposes… to declare protectorate over
our country, in direct contravention of her sworn promise in the agreement of
1904. It has been said that sentiment should have no place in such affairs; but we
believe, sir, that sentiment is the moving force in all human affairs and that
kindness, sympathy, and generosity are still working between nations and
between individuals. We beg of your’s [sic] to bring to bear upon this question the
same breadth of mind and the same calmness of judgment that have characterized
your course hitherto, and, having weighed the matter, to render us what aid you
can consistently in this our time of national danger.
82
Unfortunately, King Kojong’s expectation that “the United States will help us” received
a negative response from the American government. The United States were prepared
early in 1905 to wash its hands of Korea completely. Tyler Dennett explains why
Roosevelt supported the Japanese control of Korea against Russian control. “If left to
herself after the war Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of entering into any
agreements or treaties with other Powers, thus resuscitating the same international
complications as existed before the war.”
83 Importantly, Roosevelt felt Japan maintained
a balance of power in East Asia that included checking Russia’s expansion into the
region.
84
On September 5, 1905, Russia signed the Treaty of Portsmouth officially ending
the Russo-Japanese War under the auspices of President Theodore Roosevelt. The war
ended Russian interference in Korea and also guaranteed Japanese suzerainty over Korea.
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In November 1905, Korea was made a Japanese protectorate, and a Resident-General in
Seoul was established. At the same time, the American government cabled its legation in
Seoul to leave Korea. The United States was the first nation to terminate its legation in
Seoul.
85 In protest, the Korean Emperor sent another secret mission to the Hague Peace
Conference in 1907 to plead the Korean cause to world, but his effort was in vain because
Japan interfered. With tacit approval of the United States, Japan showed no qualms about
swallowing Korea in the next five years. In 1910, the Japanese officially annexed Korea.
In Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950, Soon Sung Cho maintains that the United States
was a friendly relations with Korea from 1882 to 1902 and even championed its
sovereignty and territorial integrity, but then abandoned Korea in 1905 in its most
desperate moment.
86
International power politics forced Koreans to give up their sovereignty and
territorial integrity as well as much of their culture and way of life. Due to poor political
leadership, Koreans failed to transform Choson to a modern nation state.
87 As a result,
Korea became the pawn in the bitter rivalry between the world’s major powers-China,
Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Koreans did not sufficiently
understand or begin to prepare for the imperialistic situation and implications of
international power politics. Russia’s advance into Manchuria and Korea presented
Japan with a very serious challenge. For Japan, Korea was a bridge of conquest to
advance into Manchuria and China. The American government, as long as their interests
85 Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
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and her people were secure, accepted Japanese hegemony in order to keep order and
peace in East Asia.
After Japanese annexation of Korea, the disbanded soldiers and patriotic people
formed the “Righteous Army” (uibyong) to resist Japanese rule.
88 George McCune
describes Korea’s fight against Japanese colonialism, “The independence movement
began on the day that Korea lost its independence and never ceased to exist both as an
organized movement and as a dominant spiritual force in the life of the Korean people.”
89
Although no Westerners supported Koreans’ quest for justice, the Koreans bitterly
resisted the hated Japanese:
Between 1905 and 1910, uprisings and rebellions erupted frequently throughout
Korea. Japan crushed them with efficient savagery. The Koreans had few
weapons, and Japan was a powerful merciless nation. According to Japanese
statistics, 14,566 Korean “rebels” were killed between July 1907 and December
1908.
90
After the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea became a ‘forgotten nation’ among
Americans until 1943. In the modern history of Korea, the United States was the first
Western country to open official diplomatic relations with Korea in 1882. Also, the
United States was the first foreign nation to end twenty-three years of diplomatic
relations when the American government decided to withdraw its legation from Korea in
November 1905.
91 During this period, King Kojong hoped to strengthen his country by
accepting western-style modernization. However, Kojong’s determined efforts failed to
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achieve reform and self-strength because of his poor leadership, misconception of U.S.
intentions, and the external pressure of imperial rivalry in the region.
This chapter shows that Koreans regarded the United States as a “benevolent
Great Power,” one not interested in territorial acquisitions in Korea. They generally
believed that the United States could help Koreans, including the Korean king, to
maintain their sovereignty and build a modern nation-state. However, King Kojong
failed to achieve his goals because of countervailing external pressures from imperial
rivals in the region, his own poor leadership, and misconceptions about U. S. intentions.
In particular, the king’s perception of the United States as a “benevolent Great Power”
misled many Koreans and himself, thereby prohibiting a real appreciation for the nature
of international power politics and its emphasis on pursuit of national self-interest.
Actually, the U. S. policy of realism in East Asia called for a balance of power to
check the influence of Russia and proffered paternalistic views of Koreans, compared to
the Japanese, whom Americans perceived as an exceptional race among Asian peoples.
The combined impact proved a hindrance to Korean efforts to transform Chosun into a
modern nation-state. Eventually, it led Korea to become a pawn in bitter imperial and
later Cold War rivalries. This earlier experience, nonetheless, foreshadowed what was to
come and indirectly helped to shape those outcomes. Many Koreans still remembered
America as an altruistic friend whereas others were disquieted by historical evidence that




This chapter describes the Korean nationalist movement for independence, its
attempts to obtain recognition of the Korean Provisional Government from the United
States government, and how the U.S. government responded. It also investigates the
development of American policy on the postwar status of Korea in terms of wartime
pledges. This chapter confirms that idealistic U. S. rhetoric and paternalistic attitudes
toward Korea often served as a cloak for the pursuit of self-interest. Obviously, U.S. aid
to the Korean Provisional Government had limits but did it have to be so meager?
Moreover, Americans fumbled away opportunities to develop a specific plan of
trusteeship, with a result that Korean self-determination was, in the short run,
subordinated to U. S. economic and security concerns. Furthermore, the postwar Korean
peninsula was divided along the 38
th parallel.
The Second World War officially began when the German army invaded Poland
in September 1939. The escalation of this global conflict and hopes for a positive
outcome forced U.S. officials and military planners to begin formulating plans for a
postwar world. As early as December 27, 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
established a “committee on problems of peace and reconstruction” within the50
Department of State to study postwar problems.
92 Later, the Advisory Committee
on Problems of Foreign Relations was established to “survey the basic principles which
underline a desirable world order to be evolved after the termination of present hostilities,
with primary reference to the best interests of the United States.”
93 In response to the
increasing significance of preparing and planning for a postwar world, the Advisory
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, under Secretary of State Hull’s chairmanship, was
established in December 1941.
94 The committee consisted of highly qualified public
officials, including the top officials of the State Department and individuals from the
private sector.
95 The outbreak of World War II led American leaders to reconsider their
policy toward Asia and also ended the policy of American “indifference” toward Korea.
96
The United States contingency policy for postwar settlement was based upon the
hope that a possibility of cooperation with wartime allies, especially the Soviet Union,
could be extended into the postwar period. Yet behind the cooperative diplomacy of the
Grand Alliance, each nation—America, Great Britain, Russia, and China—each would
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pursue its own national interest and security.
97 Thinking in terms of “World Policeman”
or “four police states” in the postwar international order, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
contrived a plan known as the “international trusteeship” to ease the conversion of
liberated colonies in the post-war period into fully independent states.
98 Roosevelt
believed that before complete independence and self-governance, colonial peoples would
need a certain period of tutelage in order to develop systems of self-government and be
able to conduct their own affairs. Roosevelt wrote after he met Churchill on August
1941:
Trusteeship is based on the principle of unselfish service. For a time at least there
are many minor children among the peoples of the world who need trustees in
their relations with other nations and peoples, just as there are many adult nations
or peoples which must be led back into a spirit of good conduct.
99
Roosevelt was convinced that his idea of trusteeship would work to protect
American economic interests and security against inroads from European colonial
empires and also it might prevent political problems in the colonial areas after World War
II.
100 Roosevelt hoped to dismantle the colonial system and open American access to
97 According to Daniel Yergin, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy as a traditional Great Power pursued
efforts to aggrandize historic Russian goals such as spheres of influence and secret treaties rather than to
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colonial areas for economic resources after the war.
101 Churchill opposed Roosevelt’s
ideas and Washington policymakers could not agree, even after several wartime
conferences, how to apply specific international trusteeships to the prospective former
colonial states. Furthermore, the idea of trusteeship for Korea not only contributed to a
deepening ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, but
also intensified ideological division in Korean politics at the time.
102 Because of
ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the cleavage
between the former allies began to widen as the Cold War intensified. As a result, the
hope and possibility of unification of Korea grew dimmer.
From the time of the American government’s decision to withdraw its legation in
1905 until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Korea was a
“forgotten nation” to American policymakers. However, because of its geographical and
strategic position, Korea continued to draw in its strong neighbors and remained a
battleground in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
103 During the Japanese
colonial period, the issue of Korean independence was not a primary concern in East Asia
for the American government, however, the war which erupted against Japan after Pearl
Harbor not only forced a re-consideration of American policy toward Asia in general, but
also changed the American attitude about Korea’s situation. U.S. policy makers re-
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examined their diplomatic initiatives in that field. Their actions marked an end to the
period of indifference in American policy toward Korea.
104
In the Atlantic Charter agreed on certain war aims of August 14, 1941, President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill proclaimed that all colonial people had a right to
choose their own form of government as a term of “self-determination.”
105 American
policy makers, however, determined to base policy on Korea foremost more upon the
imperatives of broader East Asian strategic concerning rather than the aspirations and
hopes of the Koreans themselves.
106 American policy makers always considered Korean
issues as of secondary among their concerns. They did not agonize much over the
problem of Korean independence.
After Japan annexed Korea in 1910, many Koreans emigrated abroad, particularly
to China, Russia, and the United States, where they engaged in an independent movement
in the hope of liberating their country. During 1919, a Korean movement known as the
March First Independence movement (inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen
Points Pronouncement calling for self-determination of the people and the dismantlement
of all colonial systems) failed. Next, however, a group of Korean expatriates in Shanghai
formed the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). Syngman Rhee led the Korean
Provisional Government. He became the first President in 1919, petitioned the Wilson
administration to support Korean independence at the Paris Peace Conference in January
104 James I. Matray, “An End to Indifference,” Diplomatic History 2, (1978): 181-196.
105 For the text of the Atlantic Charter, see United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1941, 1: General, The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1958), 367-69. Hereafter cited as FRUS, followed by the year and volume; Department of State
Bulletin, August 16, 1941: 125.
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1919, and tried to maneuver the State Department into recognizing the KPG and
supporting independent Korea.
107 Yet, the United States government, despite its lofty
rhetoric, did nothing.
After failing to gain international support for their cause, the Korean
independence movement fell into a slump during the 1920s. Korean patriot groups faced
serious factional struggles and financial difficulties. In addition, the United States did not
alter its non-recognition policy toward the Korean independence movement. The State
Department continued to discourage American citizens in Korea and the Far East from
supporting such aspirations. The leaders within the Korean Provisional Government
since the failure of March First Independence movement differed in their strategies to
fight against Japanese aggression and to achieve Korean Independence. One group,
under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, emphasized a peaceful diplomatic demonstration
to attract the attention of the American people to Korea’s claim for independence. A
dissenting group, led by Yi Tong-hui, favored military action against Japanese
aggression. Yet another group, under the leadership of An Chang-ho, accepted a long-
range plan to help the Koreans’ economic and self-strength power.
108 Tactical
disagreements among Korean pro-independence activists disconnected the independence
movement within Korea. The allies, meanwhile, limited themselves to general statements
of support these Korean aspirations.
Afterwards, the various groups comprising the Korean independence movement
remained splintered until the close of WWII. Furthermore, much earlier, the Russian
107 For further background, see Chong Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism; Robert T. Oliver,
Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth.
108 Chong Sik Lee, ibid., 135-6.55
Revolution in 1917 also had a tremendous residual impact on the cause of Korean
independence and contributed to the waning of the KPG. The formation of a Communist
Party of Korea in Shanghai, a year after the birth of the Korean Provisional Government,
opened a fissure between the conservative nationalists and radicals of the independence
movement that was to plague the movement for the next twenty-five years.
109 In the
1920s, many of the Korean independent movement groups in Korea, Japan, Manchuria,
and Siberia joined the Communist movement. Especially after 1931, and due to heavy
reliance on the support of the Chinese Nationalist government, the KPG represented only
the conservative nationalist camp and lost its power or influence within moderate leftist
or socialist groups. In 1941 the KPG moved from Shanghai to Chungking, the last
wartime capital of the Chiang Kai-shek’s government, and thereafter had little reach of
power to influence Korean independence activities much.
110
After Syngman Rhee left China in 1921, the Korean Provisional Government,
under the leadership of Kim Ku, established links with the Chinese Nationalist
Government. After following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Korean
independence movement became revitalized. Korean exiles joined China’s anti-Japanese
guerrilla operations in northern China and Manchuria. The Korean Provisional
Government moved with the Kuomintang Government to Chungking, and the Chinese
government declared war on Japan in 1937. When the Japanese began their long
expected takeover of China in the 1930s, many Korean exiles looked to China for help.
During the 1930s, the Nationalist Government and the Korean government-in-exile
109 The best account of Korean Communism is Dae Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-
1948 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Robert Scalapino and Chong Sik
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cooperated in opposing the Japanese aggression. In the early stage of the war, the
Chinese government reestablished its former influence over its neighbors by supporting a
Korean exile organization in Chungking led by Kim Ku. However, the outbreak of war
between China and Japan did not change the official American policy toward the Korean
independence movement. Throughout the 1930s, the United States government
continued to ignore the Korean cause and remained apathetic about Korean
independence.
The Korean expatriate organizations in Chungking and Washington both rejoiced
at the news of the Japanese Pearl Harbor for the expected anti-Japanese ramifications
attack on December 7, 1941, and hailed American entry into the Pacific War. These
Koreans were convinced that an eventual American victory would destroy Japan’s empire
and Korea would resume—after thirty-six years of Japanese control—a sovereign state.
At the same time, Korean leaders were confident of their ability to govern the peninsula.
After the Pacific War began, Kim Ku with his followers, and Rhee with his American
friends, saw an opportunity to gain American support for their cause and badgered the
American government for recognition of KPG. Thus, after Pearl Harbor, the Korean
Provisional Government at Chungking sent a letter Clarence E. Gauss, the United States
Ambassador in China, seeking recognition and assistance. On December 17, 1941, when
Gauss transmitted the letter to the State Department, he suggested the United States
government should consider the use of Korean exiles in China to fight against the
Japanese in East Asia.
111 Rhee arranged for the provisional government in Chungking to
send a formal declaration of war against Japan to present to President Roosevelt. Rhee
111 United States Department of State, FRUS, 1942, 1: General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East,
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felt confident that American recognition would soon follow, but the Americans treated
Rhee with “careful circumspection.”
112
The Chinese also had hailed American entry into the Pacific War. Chinese
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who faced serious problems of internal corruption yet
neglect to implement any viable reform endeavor, desired America’s assistance to defeat
Japan and renew dreams of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. Fearing the appearance of a
Russian-sponsored Korean exile group in Siberia, the Kuomintang government
championed Kim Ku’s organization in Chungking. Chiang Kai-shek requested American
recognition of the Korean Provisional Government “without delay.” However, the State
Department hesitated to endorse the suggestion. It seemed preferable to the United States
to ignore the problems of Korea until postwar allied conferences could decide its fate.
On December 10, 1941, the State Department set forth the official American
policy toward the activities of exile groups in the United States who fought to liberate
their homelands from Axis powers. The State Department expressed its concern about
the “free movements of exile groups” in the United States and adopted a very cautious
approach of not recognizing any particular exile organization.
113 This policy also applied
to Korean exiles. So far as the United States was concerned, Korean aspirations had to be
considered in relation to the nationalist movements of other dependent peoples in Asia,
112 Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 175. Details on the strenuous efforts of the Korean provisional government to
gain its recognition from the United States can be found in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1942;
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known as the “Fighting French,” which was led by General Charles de Gaulle.” Department of State,
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European governments-in-exile, and “free movements” that were actively resisting
subjugation by the Axis powers. The State Department expressed a “sympathetic
interest” in Korean exile organizations, guerrilla groups, and other resistance movements,
but refused to extend any form of recognition to them as representative of the Korean
people, “formal or informal.”
114
On December 22, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull cabled Ambassador C. E.
Gauss in China (Chungking) to instruct him to make “very discreet inquires” in regard to
the Kuomintang’s attitude toward the Korean Provisional Government. Hull also wanted
to know the organization and strength of KPG and the extent of its contact with people in
Korea.
115 Ambassador Gauss reported to Secretary Hull the information about the
Korean Provisional Government in Chungking and its links with Chiang’s regime. The
report of Ambassador Gauss was mostly negative. Gauss contended that during the past
decade the Chinese government had given Kim Ku a great deal of assistance in
reestablishing traditional influence over Korea. However, despite Chinese aid, the
Korean Provisional Government showed little strength and feeble organization. In
addition, most of these nationalist leaders had left Korea years earlier and had not been in
contact for the time with the Korean people at home. In addition, many leaders of the
independence movement in Korea were in prison.
116 Therefore, the present outlook of
the Chinese government was not optimistic.
114 United States Department of States, Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1941: 519-520.
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By early 1942, United States officials now expressed fears that American support
for Korean independence might lead the Japanese to retaliate against Americans in Asia.
Nonetheless, Korean exiles diligently persisted in efforts to advance the cause of
independence and obtain recognition of their provisional government. On February 12,
1942, acting Secretary of State Summer Welles asked U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain,
John G. Winant, to inform the British Government that the State Department despite
appeals by groups in China and the United States, would not contemplate the recognition
of Korea, even though the American government remained “sympathetic to the plight of
the Korean people under Japanese domination and …anxious…to strengthen Korean
resistance and opposition to Japan.”
117
On March 2, 1942, acting Secretary Welles stated his views regarding Korean
nationalist activities. He replied that he viewed such movements with “utmost
sympathy.”
118 However, Stanley K. Hornbeck, special advisor on political affairs in the
Department of State, also warned of the potential danger of the premature recognition.
119
Korean exiles received courteous treatment from most Americans but found them usually
unwilling to translate sympathy into action in favor of a future independent Korea. The
British Foreign Office indicated that their government supported the United States’
position. The Department of State transmitted the American and British views to Gauss
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at Chungking for his use in discussing the Korean problem with the Chinese Government.
Ambassador Gauss continued to lace his reports with negativity when it came to the KPG
and stressed that the Chinese Foreign Office had clearly indicated that it was “not yet
prepared to accord recognition to the Korean Provisional Government”
120 Displeased
with this response, Rhee on March 24, 1942 sent a letter to the Secretary of State pointing
out that the department was evading the issue of Korean recognition and added that “the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea is the sole representative of the Korean
people… and regards itself … not as a free movement in any sense whatever of that
phrase, but as the only governmental agency of Korea that is in existence.”
121
The politics of expatriate Koreans presented a picture of confuse and inefficiency
to those in the U.S. Government from whom they sought recognition. Obviously,
Syngman Rhee had an inside track with the American government. In some way, he was
almost more American than Korean. He had left his homeland for the United States forty
years before to earn a Ph.D. at Princeton, where Woodrow Wilson served as his thesis
director. He also founded his own exile organization. Rhee set up the Korean
Commission in Washington in 1919, and became the chairman of the Commission as part
of a nationalist movement to plead the Korean cause. However, he failed to obtain a
hearing for Korean independence at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922. Rhee’s
close ties and influence with the government of the United States did not come without a
great deal of effort on his part. He also arranged for two of his American admirers, John
Staggers and Jay Jerome Williams, to get in touch with American missionaries driven out
120 Wells to Gauss, March 20, 1942, FRUS, 1942, 1: 862-864; Gauss to Hull, tel. 285, Mar. 28, 1942, China
(Washington, 1956), 731.
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of Korea by the Japanese in 1940-1941 and to ask them whom the Korean people
believed to be their leader. On March 6, 1942, the Reverend Frederick Brown Harris,
minister of the Foundry Methodist Church in Washington, who along with Staggers and
Williams was a trustee of the Korean-American Council, addressed a long letter to
President Roosevelt. In their letter, they asked for immediate recognition of the
provisional government and military aid. They got no answer.
122
At this juncture, the Chinese Government suggested that the United States should
recognize Kim Ku’s organization and publicly promise independence for Korea after the
war.
123 In March 28, 1942, Sun Fo, the son of the late Sun Yat-sen and President of the
Chinese Legislative Yuan, urged the United States to call for Korean independence and
recognize the Korean Provisional Government immediately.
124 Acting Secretary Welles
urgently cabled the embassy in Chungking for its views, and Gauss replied that the
embassy believed that Sun Fo had spoken as an individual. The Ambassador added that,
“It is not believed, however, that his influence in party councils is commensurate with his
position or that declarations by him are necessarily reorganized by the Chinese
Government responsible officials.”
125 This was difficult to believe because Chiang
probably would not permit Sun Fo to act on his own. Thus, Welles suggested
122 United States Department of State, FRUS, 1942, 1; 866-868.
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organization of a Korean fighting force, along with recognition of any KGP, be
postponed until a “more propitious time”
126
In an effort to advance Kim Ku rather than give support to the exiled leader Rhee,
the Chinese government now initiated a move toward recognition of the KGP. For
instance, on April 6, 1942, the Supreme National Defense Council accepted a proposal
that had been submitted by Sun Fo which called for immediate recognition of the Korean
Provisional Government by the Chinese Government.
127 Again Welles urged restraint
and cabled, “Please inform the Chinese vice Minister urgently that we hope that, before
the Chinese Government takes any definitive action with regard to the question of
recognition of a Provisional Government of Korea, it will be so good as to make available
to us its views and conclusions in this matter.”
128 The Americans seemingly could not
convey adequately to the Chinese their unwillingness to recognize a provisional
government located at the remote capital of Nationalist China. Four days later, Gauss
informed Welles that the Chinese Government would keep the United States informed of
any contemplated action.
129
All of these maneuvers formed part of what seems to have been Chiang’s plan to
gain leadership of the expatriates. The Chinese government kept confronting the State
Department with the Korean issue. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to recognize KPG “without
delay” dispelling any suspicion that China had any territorial ambition regarding





130 Such a move would demonstrate that the Chinese government respected the
principles of the Atlantic Charter.
131 Ultimately, Chiang requested the United States
government’s views on the KPG. The US government responded and suggested Chiang
delay Chinese recognition of KPG until “some more favorable time.”
132
On April 18, 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent Ambassador Gauss a
telegram and explained that “this whole question of Korean independence and
recognition of Korean government” had many complications and “delicate aspects.”
133
Hull did not wish to dictate to the Chinese, but he felt it would be appropriate for the
United States to point out the difference between advocating the independence of Korea
and according recognition to any particular group as the provisional government of
Korea. The United States would not accept recognition of the KPG, not only because it
lacked the power to unify various groups interested in Korean independence. American
diplomats also warned about the unrepresentative character of the Korean exiles and their
lack of connection with the people at home.
134 Shortly thereafter, Gauss informed
Washington that the Chinese government had agreed to delay recognition of KPG. Early
in the war, American government policy toward the Korean Provisional Government did
not regard it as a representative government and delayed any political decision about the
future of Korea. President Roosevelt believed that Korea would not become an
130 Gauss to Hull, April 10, 1942, FRUS, 1942 1: 869; Gauss to Hull, April 18, 1942, ibid., 872-873.
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independent country immediately after the war because of incapacity in terms of self-
government. In a crucial memorandum on February 20, 1942, William R. Langdon, the
officer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and later political adviser to General Hodge,
proposed that the State Department implement an international trusteeship for postwar
Korea. He pointed out that most Koreans were suffering from poverty, illiteracy, political
inexperience, and economic backwardness. Langdon believed that the Koreans were not
ready for granting an early independence and concluded that “for a generation at least
Korea would have to protected, guided, and aided to modern statehood by the great
powers.”
135
On February 23, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the first time,
mentioned the Korean situation in one of his famous fireside chats on the radio.
Roosevelt described a Korean experience of enslavement under Japanese rule which
should be stopped. He also related the promise of national self-determination articulated
in the Atlantic Charter to the whole world.
136 Yet Roosevelt did not grant official
recognition to the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking. He believed that the
United States must consider the views of Korean’s neighboring countries that also had a
crucial interest in the peninsula. In addition, Roosevelt worried that any initiative the
135 James Irving Matray, “The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950,” (Ph.D.
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United States took in recognizing the KPG would possible cause Soviet assistance to
groups competing with the KPG to escalate, too.
137
On December 18, 1942, Roosevelt sent a letter to Chiang, actually written by
Owen Lattimore, political advisor to Chiang 1941-1942, which said, “After this war we
shall have to think of China, America, Britain, and Russia as the ‘four big policemen’ of
the world… it would be undesirable to attempt to exclude Russia from such problems as
the independence of Korea.”
138 Nevertheless, Roosevelt counted heavily on China to
play a key role in a postwar settlement in the world. He believed that China would act as
one of “four policemen” in world affairs, especially in Asia. Also, President Roosevelt
emphasized Allied cooperation, especially the role of Russia, in winning the war.
Although the Soviet Union was not yet at war with Japan, Roosevelt believed that the
United States must consult with the Soviet Union on the Korean question in terms of “a
policy of cooperation.” If only the Chinese government recognized the KPG, then the
possibility might arise that the Soviets might support other groups with more
communistic leanings.
139 This would create tension among the Allies that U.S. wanted to
discourage.
Despite the wartime coalition against the Axis powers, the United States as early
as 1942 expressed concern about the Soviet sponsored Korean puppet government.
Nonetheless, the United States sought to maintain a unified front with the Soviet Union
on Korean policy. By late 1942, American policy makers now concluded Korea should
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be independent after the war. However, because of the Korean people’s inexperience in
self-government, they first should be placed under a temporary international trusteeship.
In 1943, when the Allied powers engaged in some discussion of a post-war arrangement,
Secretary of State Hull proposed an American draft entitled “A Declaration by the United
Nations on National Independence,” which emphasized the rapid realization of Korean
independence through an Allied trusteeship.
140 Hull maintained that colonial peoples
should be given the opportunity for study and experience in the political and economic
fields.
141
Roosevelt first discussed the trusteeship idea with British Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden on his visit to the White House on March 27, 1943. Roosevelt suggested
that Korea be placed under a trusteeship with China, the United States, and one or two
other countries.
142 At first, the British were reluctant to accept trusteeship. While
Roosevelt emphasized this idea in connection with small nations, deprived of
independence by force, Roosevelt, at the same time, had to be concerned about promoting
the trusteeship idea without alienating their American allies.
In April 1943, the State Department prepared an “International Trusteeship Draft”
stating the objective and sketching the machinery for establishing the trusteeship. Stating
that the goal was self-government, the Department suggested that Korea be temporarily
140 FRUS, 1943, 1: 747-9.
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administered by a council composed of China, Russia, and the United States.
143
However, the Koreans and the Chinese did not hesitate to raise the specter of the
possibility of Russian hordes overrunning the Korean peninsula. In January 1943, for
example, Rhee emphasized to Hull of Russia’s ambitions in Korea. Failure to recognize
the provisional government, he emphasized, would “inevitably result in the creation of a
communist state.” In May of that year Rhee wrote the President that “now we have
reports indicating Russia’s aim to establish a Soviet Republic of Korea… At the time it
should be borne in mind that the danger of Russian expansion in the Far East, so feared
and dreaded by the United States forty years ago, has not entirely disappeared.”
144 In
December 1943, Rhee claimed that Russia would use Korean divisions, trained as a part
of the Soviet Far Eastern forces, to invade Korea and establish a communist republic.
Rhee’s solution was recognition of the provisional government with himself as its head.
The Chinese likewise issued warnings against Russian intentions. Indeed, the Chinese
desired the American Government to equip an army of 50,000 Koreans to counter the
Soviet armed Koreans in Siberia.
145
At the Cairo Conference (November 22 - 26, 1943), Allied leaders, Roosevelt,
Chiang Kai-shek, and Churchill, agreed territories lost to Japan, including Formosa,
Manchuria, and the Pescadores, should return to control of the Chinese government. In
the meeting, Roosevelt in part wanted to bolster the prestige of Chiang’s regime and
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discuss the post-war status of Asia. For the first time, these leaders openly proclaimed
support for Korean independence.
146
Yet the Americans at Cairo remained cautious about any involvement in the
internal political problems of Korea and accepted the wording of the British draft for
Korean independence rather than insist on an alternative version. This statement proved
to be extremely vague; no one was willing or able to state exactly when and how, after
liberation, Korea would receive independence.
147 Actually, the American draft of the
conference communiqué, composed by Harry Hopkins, remarked that “we are mindful of
the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan and are determined that that
country, ‘at the earliest possible moment’ after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free
and independent country.” This draft was then amended by Roosevelt to replace the
words “earliest possible” with “proper.”
148 The British draft, written in Churchill’s hand,
stated that “the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”
149
The phrase, “in due course” was subject to varying interpretations. The New York Times
editorialized that the phrase “must mean that Korea will be under some kind of
protectorate, possibly that of China, until she can be made self-governing.”
150 Secretary
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of State Hull later wrote in his memoirs that he thought the phrase “in due course” was
unwise and unfortunate because the Korean people wanted their independence
immediately after Japan’s defeat.
151 This qualifying phrase disturbed Korean leaders.
The American Ambassador at Chungking reported that the Koreans indicated strong fears
about Chinese intentions regarding post-war affairs, in view of the rumor that Korea was
to be placed under a Chinese mandate, and that they were attempting to obtain an
interpretation of “in due course” from the Chinese Foreign Office.
152
After the Cairo conference, the United States government viewed the political
future of Korea either partly or totally as an American responsibility. In order to fulfill
pledges, Roosevelt brought the matter to the Teheran Conference (November 28-
December 1, 1943) and discussed with Stalin the possibility of imposing a “trusteeship”
on Korea before the nation would attain full-fledged independence. Although he could
make no commitment to the Far Eastern problems, Stalin explained that he thoroughly
approved of the Cairo Declaration and all its contents.
153 He also remarked, “It was right
that Korea should be independent and the Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores
Islands should be returned to China.”
154 At the Teheran Conference, Stalin gave
Roosevelt a general promise that the Russians would fight the Japanese after the Germans
had been defeated.
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After his discussing about Korea with Chiang and Stalin at the Cairo and Teheran
conferences, Roosevelt seemed to have been confidence that the United States would
control the Pacific theater after the war. With regard to the Korea problem, Roosevelt
agreed with Stalin that it should be placed under a 40-year trusteeship.
155 He explained
that the American experience in the Philippines showed that newly liberated colonial
peoples in Asia, especially in Korea and Indochina, would need a certain period of
training in self-governance to survive in the post-war world.
156 The idea of trusteeship
over Korea appears to originate from Roosevelt’s personal idealism about peaceful
postwar and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. When
Roosevelt wrote in September, 1941:
Trusteeship is based on the principle of unselfish service. For a time at least there
are many minor children among the peoples of the world who need trustees in
their relations with other nations and peoples, just as there are many adult nations
or peoples which must be led back into a spirit of good conduct.
157
However, it seems Roosevelt had little idea how much Koreans opposed the idea of
trusteeship and did not really understand the hopes and aspiration of these people to be
independent. Also, Roosevelt overlooked prior experience, such as three years of bloody
insurrection between Filipino patriots and Americans after the Spanish American War.
158
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Alarmed by the phase, “in due course,” the Korean response was immediate.
Rhee and Kim Ku denounced the communiqué, and Korean organizations in the United
States and Hawaii protested to Congress. Syngman Rhee telegraphed asking Roosevelt
and the State Department to clarify the Cairo Declaration “by guaranteeing territorial
integrity and political and administrative sovereignty [of Korea] immediately upon the
defeat of Japan.”
159 Rhee received no answer.
160 In the provisional government at
Chungking many Koreans translated the English phrase—which had no exact equivalent
in the Korean language—“in due course” as “immediately” or “within a few days.” Soon
thousands of copies of the Declaration were smuggled in from China and circulated
throughout the peninsula. Knowledge of this erroneous translation, which raised Korean
hopes that they had been promised almost immediate independence and self-government
after liberation, did not reach the State Department until the first American forces landed
in Korea almost two years later.
161
After the Cairo meeting, the State Department took a more serious look at the
Korean problem and began to work out specific plans for the Korean trusteeship. On
February 18, 1944, the War and Navy Departments asked the State Department for
advice about a plan to introduce the possibility of military government in Korea.
Planners needed to know the extent of military responsibility for civil affairs in Korea
colonies from the postwar threats of revolutionary nationalist movements were that often headed by
communists.
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and whether these obligations would be shared with other Allies in the event of an
American occupation.
By May, based on a series of papers by the Interdivisional Area Committee on the
Far East, the State Department planners proposed that within whatever Korean territory
was occupied in the course of combat operations, or after the general capitulation of
Japan, an inter-allied military government should be established to consist of troops
drawn from China, Great Britain, and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union if it
entered the Pacific War against Japan. The Department looked forward to centralized—
not zonal—administration. With respect to any future occupation forces, it seemed
“politically advisable” to include contingents from the four Great Powers. There should
be “substantial representation” for the United States, but under no circumstances should
America undertake to handle the Korean occupation alone.
162
The army of occupation would be organized quickly, integrating the four national
commands. Nor would an occupation be a short affair. The department warned that a
military government might have to rule in Korea for a “considerable duration.” The
committee pointed out that there were 35,000 Korean troops recruited from Siberia or in
guerrilla units the Japanese drove out of northern Korea and Manchuria. The Soviet
Union trained them thoroughly and indoctrinated them with Soviet ideology to function
as an active revolutionary faction in postwar Korea. These potential communist
guerrillas vastly outnumbered those under the KPG supported by the Chinese Nationalist
government. Therefore, fearing Communist domination of a liberated Korea, the State
162 Leonard Hoag, American Military Government in Korea: War Policy and the First Year of Occupation,
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Department suggested joint occupation by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. If the Soviets occupied
Korea alone, “the United States might consider such a development as a threat to future
security in the Pacific.”
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In May 1944, Gauss reported a conversation with Cho So-ang, the Foreign
Minister, of the Korean Provisional Government. Cho sought clarification of the Cairo
Declaration as it pertained to the recognition of his government. With respect to
clarification, Gauss stated as his personal reaction that the “military phase of expelling
the Japanese from Korea must come first, followed by preparation for civil government
and in due course independence.” Concerning recognition, Gauss indicated his view that
the Korean provisional government was not a government-in-exile “but rather a Korean
independence movement.”
164 In a memorandum of May 4, 1944, the Department’s
Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East summarized the dilemma of the United
States over Korea by warning that an independent but weak Korea would again become
subject to international pressure and intrigue, making it highly desirable that some form
of interim supervisory organ be established.
165 American policy makers did not want sole
responsibility for the postwar status of Korea.
166 In June 1944, the Korean Provisional
Government appealed to Roosevelt. Kim Ku requested recognition so that his
government could “co-ordinate the movement for our national liberation with the present
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and immediate operations of the Allied armies in Eastern Asia.”
167 Syngman Rhee
continued to urge recognition of the Korean provisional government upon American
officials. In August 1944 he wrote to the President:
Our word from Your Excellency to the proper United States authorities will
include Korea among all the Allied nations that are fighting against the enemies
of civilization and that will prove to the Korean people the fact that the great
President of the United States is a true friend of Korean independence.
168
In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned to the Secretary of State that,
“Whether or not Russia enters the war in the Pacific, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in
a dominant position on continental northeast Asia in so far as military power is
concerned.”
169 The JCS suggested that the best course was to have the USSR enter the
war promptly, thus shortening it, while delaying the discussion of territorial trusteeship
until the war was over.
At the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) the Korean question again
resurfaced in discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin. The State Department prepared
a briefing paper before the conference. It stated:
It is view of the Department that the problems of Korea are of such an
international character that with the completion of military operations in Korea,
(1) there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of
occupation and military government in Korea; (2) such representation should be
by those countries which have a real interest in the future status of Korea, such as
the United States, Great Britain, and China and the Soviet Union if it has entered
the war in the Pacific; (3) the representation of other states should not be so large
as to reduce the proportionate strength of the United States to a point where its
effectiveness would be weakened… it is the Department’s tentative opinion that
(1) an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for
167 Kim Ku to Roosevelt, June 17, 1944, enclosed in Gauss to Hull, no. 2798, June 21, 1944; in US
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Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or
independently of it; and that (2) the United States, Great Britain, China and the
Soviet Union should be included in any such administration
170
State Department officials emphasized the necessity for a trusteeship and military
occupation of Korea. These policy makers thought that the military occupation of Korea
by any single power might have serious political repercussions. In aforementioned paper,
the Department expressed its desire that an early agreement be reached “on the question
of whether an international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so
what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended
period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean
independence.”
171 Unfortunately, Department policy makers had not yet formulated a
specific time frame for a supervisory authority or trusteeship. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
opposed further discussions of trusteeships at this point because it would adversely affect
relations with Russia.
172 The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that, with Russian help, it
would take eighteen months after the defeat of Germany and cost at least five hundred
thousand American casualties to subdue the Japanese.
173 Because of his illness,
Roosevelt did not consult with the State Department officials before the Yalta
meetings.
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During the conference, President Roosevelt explained to Stalin that Korea, much
like the Philippines, might need twenty to thirty years of trusteeship to be independent.
Stalin replied, “The shorter the period the better.”
175 Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that
multi-national military occupation was necessary and foreign troops would not be
permanently stationed in Korea. Roosevelt also suggested that it was unnecessary to
invite the British to participate in the Korean trusteeship. However, Stalin quickly
responded that the British “would most certainly be offended,” and warned that Churchill
“might kill us” if not included.
176
Even so these leaders did not reach an agreement on the issue of Korea at the
Yalta Conference. However, Stalin did promise to enter the Pacific War against Japan.
Roosevelt and Churchill also recognized and accepted the rights Russia held before the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and a traditional Russian interest in the future status of
postwar Korea.
177 The United States then began to work out the details of the
international trusteeship. On May 21, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State sent a
memorandum to James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy, recommending the establishment of
a four power trusteeship to last five years. He emphasized the necessity of utilizing
capable local Koreans in the administration and that all foreign troops should be removed
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except for a token force not to exceed 5,000 men from each of the four powers at the time
of the establishment of the trusteeship.
178
President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. The new inexperienced president,
Harry S. Truman, as Vice-President, had not been informed of the previous negotiations
between the United States and its allies regarding post-war issues. Because of his
inexperience and unpreparedness in foreign policy, Truman was left on his own to
determine how to define Roosevelt’s post-war ideals so that he could carry on
consistently with a predetermined American post-war policy.
179 Truman needed to better
understand Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy especially with respect to the various
problems facing China and Korea. To effectuate that design, Truman sent Harry Hopkins
on May 28, 1945, to confer with Stalin, with the special mission to reaffirm the Eastern
Asian agreements and the matter of trusteeship for Korea. This task had been made
difficult because Soviet-American relations had significantly deteriorated after the Yalta
Conference because of growing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in
response to Hopkins’ inquiries, Stalin “fully agreed with the desirability of a four-power
trusteeship for Korea.”
180 Despite this understanding, however, no formal agreement was
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reached among four powers for a trusteeship administration for Korea before the
surrender of Japan.
181
As World War II drew to an end, Roosevelt’s advisors warned Truman of Stalin’s
intentions in Eastern Europe and East Asia and called for a harder line against the
Russians.
182 The prospects of post-war cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
United States grew dim as the Soviets’ intentions in Europe and East Asia became more
and more obvious. Also, the possibility of a successful trusteeship for Korea became
increasingly doubtful. Therefore, the essential goal of forming the trusteeship changed.
No longer was its foremost design the independence of Korea. It now served the purpose
of building a bulwark in Korea against the communism in East Asia as a whole.
During the Sino-Soviet negotiations in July of 1945, Ambassador Harriman
cabled President Truman about the Chinese government’s anxiety towards the Korean
question. He related that the Chinese Foreign Minister, T.V. Soong argued that, “The
independence of Korea is of importance to the Chinese strategic location.” According to
Harriman, Soong also expressed the fear of the Chinese that, “even with a four power
trusteeship the Soviets will obtain domination of Korean affairs,” because “the Russians
have two Korean divisions trained in Siberia”
183 Despite this warning, most advisors
believed that the Yalta accord remained a satisfactory basis for Asian diplomacy and that
the joint trusteeship would somehow materialize on the basis of postwar cooperation.
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Meanwhile, expatriate Koreans seemed unhappy about Yalta and accused the
United States government of secretly handing Korea over to the Soviet Union. In his
appeal for recognition of the Korean provisional government, Rhee, on February 5, 1945,
warned of Russian ambitions regarding Korea:
The Chinese government which showed no anxiety in this respect six months ago,
is now willing to take the lead in recognition the Korean provisional government
provided the United States would follow suit. I hope the United States
government would feel free to cooperate with China regarding the recognition of
Korea. The Chinese government would not move without an understanding with
the Soviet Department. If the State Department gives China a tacit understanding
that it will cooperate, China will formally recognize the de jure status of the
Republic of Korea.
185
Rhee telegraphed Senators Owen Brewster, Walter F. George, and Congressman Clare E.
Hoffman that Truman had learned of a secret agreement at Yalta to turn Korea over to
Russia. The agreement, Rhee alleged, signed by the United States, Britain, and Russia,
declared that Korea would remain under Soviet influence after the war’s end.
Emphasized the Soviet Union expansionism into the Korean peninsula, Rhee warned
Ambassador Gauss that the Soviet Union would use the Korean divisions in its Far
Eastern Army to set up a pro-Soviet government in Korea unless the United States
recognized the KPG. Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., refused to discuss the
matter.
The State Department did reply by urging Rhee to cease annoying the U.S.
government. Truman denied the existence of any secret Yalta agreement and reiterated
the U.S. position by emphasizing that:
185 Rhee to Grew, Feb. 5, 1945; in US Department of State, RG 59, decimal file, 895.01/2-545.80
The United Nations which are represented at the San Francisco Conference all
have legally constituted governing authorities, whereas the “Korean Provisional
Government” …has never had administrative authority over any part of Korea nor
can it be considered representative of the Korean people of today. Its following
among exiled Koreans is limited. [We will not] …compromise the right of the
Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government
which they may wish to establish …This connection carries no implication
whatsoever of a lack of sympathy for the people of Korea and their aspirations for
freedom.
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He concluded by referring to Rhee and other individuals interested in the welfare of
Korea and pointed to Rhee’s claim to official status.
Undaunted, Rhee also repeated his claim of the existence of a secret agreement.
He said, “an American of unimpeachable reputation” had been his source of information.
He also wondered why Soviet authorities had remained “ominously silent,” and why
Churchill had declared that not all of the topics discussed at Yalta were for public
consideration. Finally, Rhee charged that Korea was a perpetual victim of secret
diplomacy. He wrote that he had the support of the Korean people, that he represented
many shades of opinion, and that he enjoyed de facto recognition from both China and
France. Yet, Rhee still feared that the Korean people would not succeed in obtaining
independence.
Numerous unfortunate complications arose over the postwar government of
Korea. Especially difficult to resolve was the unrepresentative character of the Korean
exiles and their lack of connection with their homeland. The State Department knew that
the exiles would not, perhaps could not, admit that the expatriates had lost touch with the
political climate in Korea or the need for a radical solution to postwar reconstruction.
Joseph C. Grew, acting secretary of state, explained there undoubtedly would be
186 U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1945, 6: The British Commonwealth, The Far East (Washington, D.C.:
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“considerable confusion and chaos in the political, economic, and social affairs of Korea
when Japanese rule ends. With the liberation of Korea, he predicted, tenant farmers
would “undoubtedly expect sweeping agrarian reforms and may take definite steps to
destroy control of the landlords, both Japanese and Koreans.”
187 The exiles, he said, did
not represent such radical views. Indeed, the Korean situation demanded radical reforms,
especially when it came to land distribution. At the time, three of every four Korean
farmers were tenants on farms of three or four acres. Between one-third and three-
quarters of their produce went to the landlord, with the remainder the farmer paid
expenses including taxes and irrigation costs. By late winter-early spring, whole
communities of peasants were reduced to eating root and bark. Many landlords and
merchants, moreover, were in league with the Japanese.
In the post-war era, new elites revitalized Korean culture and politics. Neither
Rhee nor Kim Ku, likewise a conservative, was capable of understanding the need for
radical change nor could they see its international ramifications. American officials
understood the relation between change and Soviet power. Grew even felt that the
economic and political situation in Korea was conducive to the adoption of communist
ideology though most Koreans feared Russia. He warned “The activities of a Russian-
sponsored socialist regime in Korea might easily receive popular support.”
As the time approached for the Potsdam Conference, American policy makers
believed there should be a “detailed discussion” of a postwar trusteeship for Korea and
felt the idea of trusteeship seemed the best device to prevent Soviet domination.
Assuming that the Soviets wished an agreement, the State Department prepared a series
187 U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1945, 6: The British Commonwealth, The Far East, 561.82
of briefing papers for the forthcoming Potsdam Conference. State Department officials
not only sought Soviet agreement at the conference on joint action for the trusteeship, but
also sought Soviet adherence to the Cairo Declaration. By doing so, American leaders
still hoped to prevent Soviet domination by establishing a “friendly” government in
Korea.
188 The State Department concluded Allied leaders should decide whether an
“interim international supervisory administration” should be established for Korea, and if
so, what powers should be represented.
Truman first met Stalin at the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 7, 1945).
Along with Churchill, the three Allied leaders discussed how to deal with European
problems created by the German surrender and how to conduct the war effort against
Japan. While discussing the issue of international trusteeship on July 22, Stalin remarked
that the Korean question merited discussion. However, Churchill interrupted and refused
to discuss the trusteeship for Korea, “We can exchange views on any subject but at the
end we have had only an interesting discussion.” Later that day Molotov tried to raise the
question of Korea, with a similar result. At the end, Allied leaders failed to reach any
specific agreement regarding Korea.
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On July 24, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George C. Marshall and the Soviet
Chiefs of Staff, General Alexi I. Antonov met to prepare for Soviet entry into the Pacific
War and to discuss a military plan for the Pacific War.
190 Clearly, it seems, the Soviet
188 Choi Sang Yong, American Military Government and Korean Nationalism, 41.
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Union did not have specific designs on Korea before the Potsdam Conference because of
their preoccupation with the Manchurian question. General Antonov himself explicitly
stated that the primary interest of Russia was the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula.
191
Upon this premise, American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff reached an agreement to
synchronize efforts against Japan. The line delineating the Soviet area of operation ran
from the northern tip of Japan across extreme northern Korea. At this meeting, the
American military planners made a fatal mistake. General Antonov asked General
Marshall about the possibility of a joint Soviet-U.S. offensive against Korea. Failing to
realize the real motive behind this question, General Marshall replied that Americans did
not have a plan to invade Korea.
192
It is, therefore, evident that the Russians were fully informed by the American
head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself that the United States had virtually no plan for
Korea at all. When the Soviets decided to participate in the Pacific War, the Allied
Chiefs of Staff agreed that there should be a line of demarcation in the general area of
Korea between American and Soviet air and sea operations. According to the United
States proposal: “the air operational line ran through the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and
touched the Korean coast at Seishin, then turned north and west to Changchun in
Manchuria, and the sea operational line through the Sea of Japan terminated on the
Korean coast at 38
th north latitude—the first appearance of this parallel in the United
States-Soviet conversation.”
193 But there was no discussion of a plan for military
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occupation of Korea by land forces. Moreover, in spite of a Soviet request, there was no
further discussion of Korean trusteeship at Potsdam.
194 The Allied leaders may have
thought that they would have time later to discuss Korea. At that present time it was not
a main concern at that time.
The United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
respectively on August 6 and 9. The Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August
8
th. On the 10
th, the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Ultimatum and
announced its surrender on the 15
th.
195 For United States policymakers, the collapse of
the Japanese came much earlier than expected. On August 10
th, two days after the Soviet
Army entered in the Pacific War, the Soviets advanced to Korea and occupied the Najin
port. The Soviets also began to push farther down the Korean peninsula. American
military planners then suddenly realized that Korea, if dominated by the Soviet Union,
would become a great menace to the security of Japan. Fearing the occupation of the
whole Korean peninsular by Russia, American policymakers began to consider a possible
division of a country with the Russians as a “temporary military expediency.”
196
General MacArthur’s main concern was the occupation of Japan; for him
leaving the Korean question was an afterthought. United States military leaders realized
that unilateral occupation of Japan and Korea was impossible so the United States moved
quickly to ensure at least partial control over the peninsula. During a midnight meeting
on August 10-11, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes instructed the State-War-Navy
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Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)
197 to make decisions concerning Japan’s surrender,
prepare a plan for occupation of Korea by the Americans and the Soviets, and to ensure
American forces receive the surrender “as far north as practicable.”
198
American Ambassador Averill Harriman, Reparation Commissioner Edwin
Pauley, and other American policymakers made the suggestion that the United States
should occupy Korea as far north as possible to check Russian expansion.
199 However,
the United States lacked military forces in the immediate area to occupy the northern part
of Korea. At that time Russian troops were rapidly advancing into the peninsula through
Manchuria. Dean Rusk argued that, “the military view was that if our proposals for
receiving surrender greatly overreached our probable military capabilities, there would be
little likelihood of Soviet acceptance.”
200 Therefore, the War Department had no choice
but to compromise the wishes of the State Department and acknowledge the limits of
their military capability in that area.
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Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel, III and Dean Rusk, chief of the Policy Planning
Section of the War Department, were assigned by Assistant Secretary of War John J.
McCloy to make a proposal for a Korean occupation. They worked at drawing a division
line between US and Soviet forces taking the Japanese surrender. Harmonizing political
desires and military capability, they proposed a dividing line along the 38
th parallel.
Although it was unlikely American troops could reach the line, they thought that it was
important to include Seoul, the capital of Korea, and the port of Inchon in the American
zone.
201 Military planners proposed the 38
th parallel as a dividing line because it cut
Korean peninsula in half and gave the Korea’s capital, Seoul, to the zone of the United
States.
202
On August 11, the War Department submitted the plan to divide Korea on the 38
th
parallel to the Department of State. It provided for the surrender of Japanese forces north
of the thirty-eight parallel to the Soviet commander and those of south of that line to
American forces. The 38
th parallel was specified in General Order No. 1 as the dividing
line for receiving the Japanese surrender.
203 Army authorities, faced with the scarcity of
units immediately available and with difficult time and logistical space factors (the
nearest American forces were on Okinawa), recommended the 38
th parallel, even though
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it was farther north than could be realistically reached by United States forces in the
event of Soviet disagreement.
This recommendation took account of the political importance of including Seoul,
the Korean capital, in the area of responsibility of American troops.
204 Little thought
seems to have been given to the impression a division of Korea along the 38
th parallel
would have on the Korean people themselves. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War the
Russian Czarist Government proposed to the Japanese Government that a neutral zone be
created in Korea north of the 39
th parallel into which neither Russia nor Japan would
introduce troops.
205 In any case, the draft plan was reviewed and approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee in August 14, 1945. It
stated:
The parallel 38
th north has been selected in Korea since this gives to United
States forces the port and communications area of Keijo (Seoul) and a sufficient
portion of Korea so that parts of it might be apportioned to the Chinese and the
British in case some sort of quadripartite administration eventuates.
206
The plan was immediately approved by President Truman on August 15, 1945.
The decision to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38
th parallel was “collective and
approved by every appropriate and responsible authority within the government.”
207 The
JCS telegraphed the draft to Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), General
Douglas MacArthur, who was charged with receiving the Japanese surrender, in Manila
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on August 15, 1945, at the time when the Japanese government declared its unconditional
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. In the meantime, when Truman communicated
with Stalin on August 11, 1945, he proposed that General MacArthur be designated
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept the Japanese surrender. Also, as
previously noted, the Japanese forces in Korea north of 38
th parallel were to surrender to
the Soviet Commander, while Japanese soldiers in the South were to surrender to the
American Commander.
208
Stalin accepted the American proposal on August 16, only objecting to a portion
of General Order No. 1 which provided that the Japanese forces in the southernmost
Kurile Islands surrender to the United States command.
209 He suggested that Japanese
forces in the northern half of Hokkaido, one of the four main islands of Japan, surrender
to the Soviet command.
210 It does not appear that the Allies were consulted while
General Order No.1 was being prepared in Washington. The President only sent it to the
British Prime Minister on August 15, 1945.
211 Rusk later recalled that he was surprised
that Stalin accepted the American proposal.
212
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Why had the Russians accepted the American proposals when the Soviet Army
could have swallowed up the whole peninsula? First, the Soviet leaders were reluctant to
arouse the suspicions of the American leaders concerning their ambition in Eastern
Europe and Manchuria. Second, Stalin also had concerns about sharing the military
occupation of Japan; he merely suggested that the Soviets occupy the northern part of
Hokkaido Island when he replied to General Order No. 1.
213 Last, Soviet leaders
believed that Soviet-supported Korean troops would eventually dominate the entire
Korean peninsula, if not, they certainly could exert power in parts of the northern area.
For Stalin, Korea was not the top priority in his agenda. The Soviet Union accepted the
38
th parallel because they wanted to maintain Allied cooperation.
214
As far as the United States was concerned, a division of Korea was no more than
a “military expediency” to accept the surrender of Japanese troops. President Truman
later admitted in his memoirs that the division of Korea was done on the assumption that
“a trusteeship phase” for the Korean people before independence would materialize in a
spirit of cooperation with Communist Russia. From the perspective of the Russian side,
the 38th parallel satisfied the traditional Russian interest in the peninsula.
215 It was
remarkably similar to the one proposed by Russia in 1903 in an attempt to prevent the
213 Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 439-441.
214 Cho, 55-56; Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951 (London: Oxford University Press,
1953), 156; Arthur L., Jr., Grey, ibid., 482-487.
215 According to Henry Chung, the Russians of the late nineteenth century fixed the 38
th parallel as “the
minimum limit of their expansion on the Asiatic mainland.” This implies Russian intentions for control of
at least all of North China including Dairen and Port Arthur, and all of Manchuria and northern Korea.
Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington, D. C.: The Korea Pacific Press, 1947), 23.90
Russo-Japanese War.
216 However, Gregory Henderson, who later served in the US
Embassy in Seoul from 1947 to 1954, argued that the 38
th parallel was not a military
decision, but a political one.
217 The American policymakers had been aware of the danger
of communist expansion in the Far East. However, they did not know how to deal with
yet-unknown Soviet intentions.
218
During the war, there are indications that American policy makers gave serious
attention to rising nationalism among colonial peoples. They believed that the people and
their circumstances in colonial areas made them receptive to communism as the war
ended. Given this context, contradictions in American foreign policy seemingly started at
the very beginning of the postwar era. On one hand, American leaders were aware of the
danger of Communist expansion in Asia. But on the other hand, they clung to the hope
of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Korea was chosen as one
of the testing grounds to reconstruct the postwar international order between the two
super powers without considering the desires of the Korean people. President Roosevelt
envisioned a system that relied heavily on an international organization to keep the peace
and order under the auspice of the “four police states.” Apparently, American policy
makers did not foresee that division of the country would in 1950 lead to the bloody
216 Rusk later told Cumings in an interview for a Thames television documentary, that he and Bonesteel
were unaware of the historical irony of their decision in Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 121;
217 Harry S. Truman Library, Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Area, 1943-1955
during April 10-11, 1970 (Independence, 1970), 8.
218 Revisionist scholars argue that American policy for Korean liberation was full of contradictions and
ambiguity, lacking detailed, concrete preparation for postwar Korea. See, for example, Cumings, The
Origins of the Korean War, 113; Carl Berger, The Korean Knot: A Military and Political History, 49. Gye
Dong Kim has come to argue differently. According to Kim, Colonel Rusk and other military planners
were actively engaged in forming “a positive policy” for Korea in early August 1945. Thus, the Americans
initially had a concrete plan to occupy Korea and to set up a military government. Gye Dong Kim, Western
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Korean War. Under-Secretary of State Webb summarized American short-sightedness
on the Korean question. In testifying before Congress in 1947, Webb said:
The question of considering the viability of the economy or the feasibility of the
arrangement from the standpoint of occupation…did not enter into the
consideration. I believe it is fair to say that our authorities at that time felt that
there would certainly not be the kind difficulty we have encountered in unifying
the country.
219
In sum, American idealism, as espoused in Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points,
called for national self-determination and inspired the Korean March First independence
movement in 1919. In the end, though, it failed to gain international support. Korean
nationalists associated with the independence movement did establish the Korean
Provisional Government in China in 1919 and looked to the United States for moral
support and official recognition of the KMG. Different stances on anti-colonial
nationalism, after the March First independence movement, produced antagonism
between the Korean left and right. This rivalry set limits on the course of state formation
in postwar years. At the same time, at least until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Korea remained virtually a “forgotten nation” among U. S. policymakers.
Later, during several wartime conferences, Roosevelt and American policy
makers now exhibited renewed concern for the Korean situation and rising Korean
nationalism. After the war ended, given America’s aspirations to world leadership, these
concerns heightened. Within this context, contradictions existed between U. S. idealism,
as represented by Roosevelt’s trusteeship plan and the apparent need to pursue economic
self-interest and security. In any case, a refurbished American foreign policy towards
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Korea started at the very beginning of the postwar era. On the one hand, American
policy makers were aware of the threat of Soviet expansion in Asia. On the other hand,
they clung to the hope of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately,
Korea was chosen as a “testing ground” to reconstruct the postwar international order
between the two superpowers and, in this case, that meant going forward without
considering the desires and hopes of the Korean people. Policy makers in Washington
instead chose at the end of the war to pursue a plan of zonal occupation for Korea along
the 38
th parallel. By this partition, as a political calculation, Americans sought to
expedite the surrender of Japanese solders in the South and also limit Soviet influence in
Korea altogether. The Korean people became a matter of secondary or tertiary
importance.93
CHAPTER IV
Liberation and Military Occupation of Korea
This chapter investigates the struggle between Koreans and Americans over the
process of building a new nation-state in Korea. It shows how the involvement of the
foreign powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—should be considered as an
“empire not by invitation;” actually, in Korea, it precipitated and fueled conflicts between
left and right. This antagonism between left and right, in turn, set limits on the course of
postwar formation of the state. Awash in an oversimplified bipolar worldview and
influenced by paternalistic views, American policy makers in Washington and military
officials in Seoul naively perceived Korean revolutionary nationalists and leftists as
monolithic and Soviet-directed. From the beginning, General Hodge and American
military authorities tried to build up the strength of the rightists as their allies in Korea in
order to achieve their goals as the top priority. In order to understand the political
process for unification in the south and north in more comprehensive and comparative
fashion, this chapter also briefly examine the role of the Soviet Union in the
establishment of the North Korean regime during the period 1945-1950 and proffer
answers to such questions as the following: What were the objectives of the Soviet
Union in Korea? How did the Soviet Union carry out their plans to attain their objectives
in North Korea? Did the actions of the United States and Soviet Union follow a similar
or different trajectory?94
For Koreans, the victory of the Allied Powers and the end of Japanese colonial rule
triggered a political explosion within their society. On August 15, 1945, when the people
of Korea heard about the unconditional surrender of the Japanese emperor, they believed
that the time had finally come to re-establish Korea as a free and independent nation. In
anticipation of liberation, the Korean people were overwhelmed by joy and excitement.
One eyewitness later recounted:
Every street, every road, every alley is packed with people, waving flags, singing,
shouting, greeting each other, everyone. Noises and sounds of all kinds fill the
air—drums, bugles, whistles, buckets, pots, and pans, bells…the whole town is
exploding with ecstasy, vibrating the hot air.
220
They had been awaiting the day of independence for thirty-six-years since Japan
annexed Korea in 1910, and now celebrated the end of Japanese occupation. Koreans
were determined to destroy all vestiges of Japanese colonial rule and to carry out
democratic reforms such as land policy.
221 However, at another level, as Kim Ku
described “rather than joyous news, the surrender of Japan was like the collapse of the
sky for me,”
222 because Koreans did not contribute to the liberation of their homeland;
from the beginning, quite contrary to the indigenous people’s expectation, the de-
colonization in Korea resulted in a country divided along the 38
th parallel and that
decision was made by the superpowers. This division was caused by in part to the
strategic importance the Soviets placed on Korea, and unpreparedness on the part of the
220 Richard Kim, Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood (New York: Praeger, 1970), 164-165. Cited
in Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2003), 47.
221 Choi Sang Yong, American Military Government and Korean Nationalism, 73.
222 Kim Ku, Paekpom Ilchi: The Autobiography of Kim Ku, annotated by Do Jin Soon (Seoul: Dolbegae,
1997), 399.95
Americans. When the Americans landed in Korea in early September 1945, the leaders
and people of Korea welcomed occupation forces as liberators rather than as occupiers.
Koreans expected the Americans to leave as soon as their mission was completed. By
1948, however, their mission had failed to establish a unified, democratic, and
independent Korean government.
The Americans not only neglected the desires and hopes of the Korean people in
order to maintain order and stability, but also failed to unify Korea as a bulwark against
communism. As a result, Korea was divided into two areas along the line of the 38
th
parallel. Each became increasingly hostile to the other; one was a democratic and
capitalist country, sponsored by the United States of America, and the other was a
communist country supported by the Soviet Union. Although only recently liberated
from Japanese colonial rule at the end of the Second World War, Korea became a victim
of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Few leaders of the
Korean independence movement anticipated a division of the country would lead to the
bloody war that erupted in 1950.
In his Korea in the World Politics, Soon Sung Cho traces the origin of the
partition plan of the Korean peninsula by the foreign powers.
223 Traditional historians’
arguments are based in large part upon “the theory of military expediency.” They
understand that the U.S. government divided the Korean peninsula along the 38
th parallel
223 Cho, Korea in the World Politics, 47-50. According to Cho, the idea of the division of the Korean
peninsula by foreign countries can be traced the way back to the late sixteenth century. In 1592, Toyotomi
Hideyoshi proposed that the southern four provinces of Korea be ceded to Japan, while leaving the
remaining northern four provinces to the King of Chosun; in 1894, when a clash between Chinese and
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to expedite receiving the surrender of Japanese troops. However, revisionist historians,
who instead embrace a “theory of political intention,” argue that U.S. policy makers
proposed the 38
th line to the Soviet Union because they wanted to block the influence and
expansion of the Soviet Union in Korea as the Cold War took shape. For example,
President Truman wrote in his memoirs that the division of the Korean peninsula was
based upon the spirit of cooperation between U.S. and U.S.S.R to establish a joint
trusteeship throughout the Korean peninsula. There was no thought of a permanent
partition.
224 However, Max Hastings instead emphasizes a political intention scenario,
arguing that the reason Stalin accepted the 38
th parallel is:
If Moscow had declined the American plan and occupied all Korea, it is unlikely
that the Americans could or would have forced a major diplomatic issue. To
neither side, at this period, did the peninsula seem to possess any inherent value,
except as a testing ground of mutual intentions... Beside the fates and boundaries
of great nations that were now being decided, Korea counted for little.
225
Stalin probably adopted his position in the hope of participating in the occupation
of Japan as a quid pro quo.
226 Soon Sung Cho claims that the American proposal of the
38
th parallel was motivated by a desire to prevent Soviet occupation of the entire Korean
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peninsular because such a Soviet occupation would have posed a great threat to Japanese
security and the American military government in Japan.
227
The 38
th parallel, in short, arbitrarily divided the Korean peninsula. While the
south, American-occupied area, contained 45 percent (37,000 square miles) of the total
area on the peninsula and 21 million people, the north covered 55 percent (48,000 square
miles) of the peninsula and 9 million people in the Soviet zone. The division of Korea by
the Soviet Union and the United States also damaged to the local economy because the
two areas previously had been heavily interdependent on each other. This artificial
boundary line separated agricultural South Korea and industrial North Korea, with its
abundant natural resources, especially coal.
228 86 percent of heavy industrial production
was concentrated in north, whereas 75 percent of light industry was in the south.
229 64
percent of rice production and 63 percent of other grains were grown in the south.
230
This division of the country’s economy wrought almost catastrophic results. There are
some discernible differences in geography and the economics of north and south,
however Korea was a historically and culturally a single entity prior to its division in
1945.
Immediately after World War II ended, the world’s two superpowers-the United
States and the Soviet Union- dominated a new world order. Their power and ability to
227 Cho, Korea in World Politics, 56.
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influence not only the course of world events, but also the destiny of the Korean
peninsula was immense. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, allied leaders, American
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China, promised that Koreans would be liberated from
Japanese rule. They declared that, “mindful of the enslavement of the Korea … in due
course Korea shall be free and independent.” That statement marked a significant turning
point in American policy toward Korea because before then it was an all but “forgotten
country” by the Americans, at least until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December
7, 1941. Many Koreans believed that the victory of the Allied powers over the Japanese
empire might give them a chance to build Korea into an independent state.
Even though President Roosevelt avowed a belief in self-determination for all
colonial people, he also came to advocate trusteeship
231 for them after war ended. He
believed that colonial people, including Koreans, lacked ability and experience for self-
rule, and therefore need a period of tutelage before their independence. The American
government tried to execute this policy in Korea until the summer of 1947. However,
American government was confronted with not only strong opposition to trusteeship from
the Koreans but also from the Soviet Union. Washington changed its policy and worked
to establish the South Korean government. Finally, Korea was divided into North and
South Korea in 1948.
Many people wondered why Korea eventually was divided into two areas while
Austria, another liberated nation after the war, was not. Instead Austria became a unified
231 See more details about the trusteeship idea of Franklin D. Roosevelt: William George Morris, “The
Korean Trusteeship, 1941-1947, The United State, Russia, and the Cold War” (Ph. D. dissertation: The
University of Texas at Austin, 1974).99
and independent country in 1955 after foreign troops withdrew. The first and most
important reason for this divergent path was its geographical location. Austria did not
border the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union could afford to be more flexible
with regard to the future of Austria. Also, political parties in Austria were moderate in
orientation and could work together to achieve unified country. Austria did not have a
recent colonial experience that caused division along political and therefore ideological
lines and therefore could emerge relatively unscathed by the Cold War.
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It is usually said that the unconditional surrender of Japan came much earlier than
American policymakers had expected. However, American military planners already
were preparing for the possibility of an abrupt collapse of Japan in the aftermath of
atomic attack. On June 14, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur and
Chester W. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet Commander, to be ready for Japan’s imminent
premature surrender and to formulate plans for an early occupation of Japan.
233 Historian
Marc S. Gallicchio argues that after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, American army changed its plans to occupy Japan and Korea. Furthermore,
the American military leaders anticipated a quick Japanese surrender to occur before
August 15, 1945 at which time the Soviets were expected to enter the war.
234 As soon as
the Japanese leaderships capitulated though, the Soviet Union and the United State came
to Korea and divided the peninsula into two areas—north and south—to expedite the
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Japanese surrender. In the south, General Joseph Stilwell’s 10
th Army was supposed to
occupy Korea. However, because of the objection of Chiang Kai-shek, General John R.
Hodge, the commander of the United States XX IV Corps of the Eighth Army, and his
troops in Okinawa, received orders from General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers (SCAP), to go to Korea and accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in
the area south of the 38
th parallel line. General Stilwell was very disappointed by his
government’s decision and expressed his bitter feelings, “So they [Chiang Kai-shek and
Chinese] cut my throat once more.”
235
MacArthur’s order was prescribed in General Order No. 1:
Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the
determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the
Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the
instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights.
In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance is required…..
All power of government over the territory Korea south of 38
th north latitude and
the people thereof, will be for the present exercised under my authority.
236
General Hodge, a native of Golconda, Illinois, had a distinguished combat record
in the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Leyte, and the Philippine Islands during the Pacific War. He
was a great soldier in battle but not fitted to lead the military occupation and
administration of Korea.
237 Gregory Henderson claims that “General Hodge was very
possibly the first man in history selected to wield executive powers over a nation of
235 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1971), 521.
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Department of the Army, 1962), 7.101
nearly twenty million on the basis of shipping time.”
238 General Hodge was assigned by
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to carry out the following missions:
(1) Take the Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the
terms of the surrender, and remove Japanese imperialism from Korea; (2) maintain order,
establish an effective government along democratic lines and rebuild a sound economy as
a basis for Korean independence; (3) train Koreans in handling their own affairs and
prepare [them] to govern [themselves] as a free and independent nation.
239
While General Hodge was waiting for formal orders to enter Korea, in order to
find out the situation there before the American occupation forces landed, he contacted
the Japanese colonial authorities in Korea at the end of August. In response, the Japanese
sent distorted information that misled the Americans about the situation conditions in the
region. The Japanese claimed that many of the prominent Leftist leaders were
Communists and that they caused civil disorder in Korea. They also stated that Leftist
activists, including Yo Un-hyong and the People’s Committee, were under the influence
of the Soviet Union and viewed them as a threat to Hodge’s military government.
240
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However, that information was not accurate. Actually, many Koreans considered
Leftists, not so much in ideological terms but as the leaders of the anti-Japanese
resistance movement. Some Leftists adopted Marxist ideas during the Japanese colonial
period and moved closer to the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution and the
establishment of Peoples Republic of the China. Richard Robinson, an American
Military Government officer in South Korea, argues that “all political groups in
opposition to the Japanese, both left and right, accepted this Communist leadership.”
241
Dae Sook Suh, a Korean historian, described how communist resistance to the
Japanese influenced the Koreans:
[The Korean Communists] succeeded in wresting control of the Korean revolution
from the Nationalists; they planted a deep core of Communist influence among
the Korean people, particularly the students, youth groups, laborers, and peasants.
Their fortitude and, at times, obstinate determination to succeed had a profound
influence on Korean intellectuals and writers. To the older Koreans, who had
groveled so long before seemingly endless foreign suppression, communism
seemed a new hope or a magic torch… For Koreans in general, the sacrifices of
the Communists, if not the idea of communism, made a strong appeal, far stronger
than any occasional bomb-throwing exercise of the Nationalists. The haggard
appearance of Communists suffering from torture, their stern and disciplined
attitude toward the common enemy of all Koreans, had a far-reaching effect on
the people.
242
It is fair to say that the Korean communists that fought against the Japanese gained a
powerful influence among many Korean people. However, it is not correct to contend
that all leftists were driven foremost by Communist ideology. As one Korean put it,
“Many had leftist mouths and rightist stomachs.”
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When the Japanese government was about to accept the Allied ultimatum, its
colonial authorities in Korea were aware that the collapse of Japan was imminent and that
surrender to the Allied powers was only a few days away. Given this desperate situation,
they sought help from Korean leaders in maintaining order and guaranteeing Japanese
lives and property. In return, the Japanese promised Korean leaders authority to govern
their land. Japanese Governor General Abe Nobuyuki ordered Endo Ryusaku, the
Governor-General’s Security for Political Affairs, to contact Yo Un-hyong in the early
morning on August 15.
Yo Un-hyong, a well-known, moderate Leftist leader and gifted orator, had been
one of the original founders of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai in 1919.
Yo had a remarkable career as an Asian revolutionary and had met Lenin and Trotsky in
Moscow in 1921.
244 He had been closely associated with the left-wing movement of the
Korean nationals in China since the early 1920’s. He had traveled extensively for the
cause of Korean independence until 1929, when he was sent back to prison by the
Japanese secret police. After he served a three-year prison term, he became the publisher
of the prestigious daily in Seoul, Chung-Ang Ilbo, and remained an important leader of
the underground nationalist movement. Yo had the respect of many Koreans because he
source, the Right was usually the “have” people and the Left was the “have-not” people. See Public
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244 Yo’s views were a mixture of socialism, Christianity, and Wilsonian democracy. Although he always
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was imprisoned many times for the independence movement.
245 Colonel Brainard
Prescott, the civil administrator in December 1945, indicated that Yo “is regarded as
more truly representative of a majority of the Korean people, inclined toward
‘liberalism,’ than such ‘elder statesmen’ as Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sic and Syngman
Rhee.”
246 On August 10, 1944, believing that the defeat of Japan was imminent, Yo had
organized an underground secret group named the Korean Independence League (the
Choson Konguk tongmaeng known as Konmaeng for short) to prepare for eventual
Korean independence.
247
With the request of Japanese help, Yo laid down five conditions on August 15 for
his consideration of the Japanese offer. He demanded the transfer to himself of major
governmental functions to preserve law and order. Specifically, his demands called for
an:
(1) immediate release of all political and economic prisoners;
(2) noninterference in his activities for national reconstruction;
(3) freedom to organize the student and youth corps;
(4) free organization of labor unions by the working class;
(5) and a guarantee of three months supply of food and grains.
248
Japanese leaders accepted Yo’s conditions at that same day. On the next day, Yo and his
followers organized a ruling committee known as the Committee for the Preparation of
245 Robinson asserted that with Yo’s death “died the hope of Korean liberalism.” See Robinson, ibid., 44-
45.
246 Colonel Brainard E. Prescott’s Remarks on Korea, January 5, 1946; in US Department of States, RG 59,
decimal file, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-546.
247 Cho, ibid., 66.
248 Cited in Cho, ibid., 67; Cumings, The Origins, 71.105
Korean Independence (CPKI or the Choson konguk chunbi wiwonhoe)
249 which included
both Nationalists and Socialists. It seems that there are two basic factions in the CPKI:
One faction consisted of Yo and his Konmaeng adherents, and was largely
noncommunist; the other group was made up mostly of communists.
250 The latter cohort
was led by Park Hon-young,
251 the most influential Communist leader in the South. Yo
became Chairman and Ahn Chae-hong, one of the remaining moderates, was named
Vice-Chairman. The CPKI functioned as a central government and organized a People’s
Committee (Inmin wiwonhoe)
252 and Peace Preservation Corps (Chiandae) throughout
the Korean peninsula. By the end of August, 145 People’s Committees were organized in
the south in spite of the lack of coordination with the CPKI.
Why did the Japanese even approach a left-wing Korean leader?
253 There was a
rumor at that time that Russians would occupy Seoul, the capital, within a few days and
249 For the activities and organization of the CPKI, see Cumings, The Origins, 71-81; Seo Chung Sok,
Hanguk hyondae minjok undong youn’gu (A Study of the Modern Korean National Movement) (Seoul:
Yoksa pip’yongsa, 1991), 195-230.
250 Cumings, ibid., 79. Cumings categorizes the “communists” into two groups: the former group
consisted of people who were participated in the communist party with socialist or Marxist beliefs; the
latter group was made up of anyone who worked on behalf of the poor or opposed those in power (in
postwar south Korea). When Cumings mentioned the communists, he tried to restrict his usage to the
former group.
251 Immediately after liberation, Park Hon-young, and his followers controlled the People’s Committee
throughout the country. During the Japanese colonial period, Park participated in the independence
movement in Korea. He was captured by the Japanese police and was in prison several times. He was a
very popular leader before Korea was liberated in August 1945. Because of his popularity and the
dominant influence of his Korean Communist Party, the People’s Committees quickly leaned toward the
communists.
252 The outstanding work on the People’s Committees in the central and local areas is Bruce Cumings, The
Origins, I, chapter 3 and 8.
253 According to Eric Van Ree, Japanese had contacted three prominent Korean politicians on August 14:
right-wing Song Chin-u, moderate rightist An Chae-hong and leftist Yo Un-hyong.106
eventually seize all of Korea.
254 Assuming that the Soviets would ultimately control the
local situation, Yo tried to exclude extreme right-wing nationalist leaders and then
include communists. Prior to American troops landing in Korea in early September, the
law and order of the south Korea was relatively well maintained by a de facto governing
body, the ‘People’s Committee’ in each province, even though anti-Japanese feeling ran
so high. No groups or organizations challenged the People’s Committee’s authority or
popularity. In addition, the Provincial People’s Committees continued to perform
primary government functions until late October.
On September 6, 1945, the CPKI called a “People’s Legislative Assembly”
meeting in Seoul of approximately one thousand delegates who represented various
groups and professions throughout the country. This Assembly, two days before the
Americans arrived, declared itself the Korean People’s Republic (KPR or Choson Inmin
Konghwaguk)
255 and claimed jurisdiction over the whole peninsula.
256 The Korean
People’s Republic appointed cabinet members and made Syngman Rhee its president.
However, various cabinet members could not fill their posts because many exiled leaders
were not in Korea; most of vice-ministries, moreover, were filled by the communists.
257
The main reason for hasty action to establish the KPR was the impending arrival of
American occupation forces. The CPKI leaders wanted to establish the KPR, “both to
show that Koreans could run their own affairs and to forestall either a prolonged
254 Cho, ibid., 67.
255 Robert A. Scalapino and Chong Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1: 236-41.
256 See views of the traditional and revisionists historians including Bruce Cumings; Hodge’s rough
treatment of the KPR has been criticized by some revisionist historians.
257 On September 8 the KPR published a list of the cabinet members.107
American tutelage or the installation in power of other Koreans who might gain
American favor.”
258
Actually, the KPR, as a “governing body,” already had assumed “authority on
such matters as the issuance of transportation licenses and the regulation of agriculture
and [had been] infiltrating its people into industrial, educational and police activities.”
259
As its main program, the KPR advocated the establishment of a politically and
economically independent state, the elimination of Japanese collaborators, the realization
of democracy based on fundamental human rights, social and economic reforms, and
close cooperation with friendly nations to maintain international peace.
260
However, news that the Americans would occupy southern Korea profoundly
impacted the developing political situation in the south. While leftist groups now
realized that they needed to expand and consolidate the base of the DPKI, rightists that
had been severely weakened after liberation no longer tried to cooperate with the CPKI.
Wielding much wealth and influence, rightists established their own organizations. On
September 4, they held a meeting to develop a democratic political party. Four days
later, they published first a leaflet entitled “Down with the KPR” (Inmin kong-hwakuk
tado), and on September 16, The Korean Democratic Party (KDP or Hanguk minju-dang)
was officially established. According to American sources, these landlords and
258 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 84.
259 Memorandum of conversation, July 2, 1946, in United States Department of State; in US Department of
States, RG 59, decimal file, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7-0246.
260 Cho, ibid., 69.108
businessmen were “openly charged by Koreans with collaboration under Japanese
occupation of Korea.”
261
American troops finally landed in Korea on September 8, 1945. After General
Hodge and his troops arrived, he declared that “United States policy prohibits official
recognition or utilization for political purposes of any so-called Korean provisional
government or other political organization by United States Forces.”
262 The United
States had no intention of recognizing the de facto government of the Korean People’s
Republic. However, Richard Robinson argues that the KPR had been “controlled by the
non-communist Left and [there had been] a sincere effort on the part of Yo and others to
establish a democratic government both on the local and national levels.”
263
The postwar situation of Korea, in which a de facto government existed as well as
a partition of the land by two foreign powers, did not present itself as an easy task for
Hodge. Moreover, Hodge complained that he had not received “a single policy directive
from Washington.”
264 He even asked for an immediate directive on Korea.
265 However,
he did not receive any response until October. In addition, there were only a few men
trained in civil affairs and there was no expert on Korea. Above all, from the beginning
of the occupation, many Americans had an ethnocentric view of Koreans. General Hodge
261 Colonel Brainard E. Prscott’s remarks on Korea, January 5, 1946; RG 59, decimal file, 740.00119
Control (Korea)/1-546; See more details about the rightist national movement including the KDP since the
1920s. Choi Sang Yong, American Military Government and Korean Nationalism, 143-155.
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263 Richard Robinson, Betrayal of a Nation, 49.
264 Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 225; see also, Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and
American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960: A Personal Narrative, (Seoul: Panmun Book Company Ltd,
1978), 16.
265 Steintorf to Secretary of State, August, 26, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6: 1041; Richard E. Lauterbach, Danger
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himself once described Koreans as “the same breed of cat” as the Japanese.
266 Hodge
also believed that Korea, as part of the Japanese empire, was our enemy. As Mark Gayn
argues, that “we [Americans] were not an army of liberation…From the first day, we’ve
behaved as enemies of the Korean people.”
267
Furthermore, it was extremely difficult for Hodge and his staff to understand the
political conditions in South Korea. Most of the Americans thought that the Korean
People’s Republic in Seoul, the People’s Committees in local areas, and social
organizations such as labor unions and the nationwide farmers association, could not be
trusted because Americans felt that these groups were under the strong influence of the
Left. The Leftists, in turn, were thought to be controlled by the Soviet Union and
therefore posed a serious threat to American military government and American
interests.
268
At the outset, the American occupation authorities made a serious blunder. The
day after the surrender ceremony, Hodge announced that the existing Japanese Governor-
General Abe Nobuyuki, along with other high-ranking Japanese officials, would be
retained in office temporarily in order to facilitate the administration of the military
government and the orderly takeover of the civil government.
269 However, he initially
relied upon some 70,000 Japanese officials for maintaining law and order, a decision that
created serious resistance and anger among Koreans. Expecting an immediate expulsion
266 Cumings, The Origins, 138.
267 Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), 428.
268 See details about the attitude of the American Military Government toward the KPR, People’s
Committee and social organizations during the early military occupation. Choi Sang Yong, American
Military Government and Korean Nationalism, 94-99.
269 Cho, ibid., 64-65.110
of all Japanese after liberation, the Koreans felt that they could not “continue to live
under Japanese rule even though the government is directly controlled by the U.S.
occupation force.”
270 One editorial asserted that Koreans would rather be governed by
“some chiefs from Borneo” than by Abe Nobuyuki and alleged that it was the Japanese
who should be celebrating the American arrival.
271 Joseph C. Goulden argues that:
His[Hodge’s] first blunder came the first day of occupation. The Japanese
commander, after surrendering, asked for authority to keep Japanese police armed
to protect his troops and the 600,000 Japanese civilians in Korea from reprisals.
Already Korean street mobs were throwing rocks and garbage at the hated
foreigners who had occupied their country.
272
The State Department instructed General Hodge to remove immediately all of
Japanese officials and Korean collaborationists with them. The New York Times reported
that “the State Department…disclaimed any part in military orders leaving the Japanese
in office temporarily…It was evidently a decision by the local theater commander.”
273
The State Department sent a message to General MacArthur:
For political reasons it is advisable that you should remove from office
immediately Governor-General Abe, Chiefs of all bureaus of the Government-
General, provincial governors and provincial police chiefs. You should
furthermore proceed as rapidly as possible with the removal of other Japanese and
collaborationist Korean administrators.
274
On September 12, 1945, Major General A. V. Arnold was appointed the military
governor of South Korea. Two days later, all Japanese bureau chiefs were removed from
their offices in the American military government and gradually replaced by Americans
270 G-2 “Periodic Report,” no. 2, September 10-11, 1945, in United States Army; RG 407, Entry 368,
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271 Seoul Shinmun, September 10, 1945; quoted in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 138.
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and Koreans. However, until January 1946, as many as 60 Japanese remained in high
ranking positions. General Hodge started his duty of the occupation through the
“Military Government.”
275 “Despite ignorance of their duties and their lack of
background,” the American military government “was charged with the execution of vital
American policies.”
276
Even though General Hodge was an experienced battlefield commander during
the Pacific War, he failed to understand Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiment or appreciate
their numerous political factions. In the absence of any directive from Washington,
Hodge’s initial decision to retain high Japanese officials might suggest that he merely
followed MacArthur’s example in the transition that occurred in Japan. This action, in
any case, reduced the possibility of a power vacuum and revolution in Korea.
277
During the initial period of American occupation, the American military
government adopted a position of “neutrality” in local political struggles but “it was no
secret that the military government favored the Right as its ally of anti-Communist
groups and was anxious for the parties of the right to acquire strong popular support.”
278
William Landon, the State Department political advisor to Hodge in Korea, mentioned
that the disorders were “the normal birth pains of a new nation or that they reflect an
275 New York Times, September 14, 1945, 3.
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awakening sense of individual rights against oppressive authority, fancied or real.”
279
Despite American intentions to create order and stability, the Korean people began to
view the occupation with suspicion and alarm. Koreans expected immediate
independence and bitterly resented the arbitrary division of their country into two zones
of military occupation.
Describing the situation of South Korea as a “powder-keg ready to explode at the
application of a spark,” American military authorities turned to the KDP, whom they
viewed as the most reliable group in Korea to easy the situation. On September 15, 1945,
H. Merrell Benninghoff, political advisor to General Hodge, reported the Korean political
situation to Washington:
The most encouraging single factor in the political situation is the presence in
Seoul of several hundred conservatives among the older and better educated
Koreans. Although many of them have served with the Japanese, that stigma
ought eventually to disappear. Such persons favor the return of the “Provisional
Government” and although they may not constitute a majority they are probably
the largest single group.
280
Beninghoff suggested to the State Department that Hodge needed a more efficient staff
and that the Korean Provisional Government should be returned to Korea to provide
conditions in which rightist and conservative groups could flourish. Benninghoff also
requested that the State Department furnish detailed information on future American
policy in Korea.
281
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On September 29, 1945, in his report to the State Department, Benninghoff
claimed that the south was politically polarized into two distinct groups. One group was
conservative and democratic. It consisted of the professional and educational leaders
who were trained academically in the United States or in American missionary
institutions in Korea or Japan. This group tried to emulate the Western democracies.
They desired an early return of Syngman Rhee and the Provisional Government at
Chungking. The other group was the radical group under the leadership of the
Communists.
282
Beninghoff argued that America should seek to cooperate with the KDP because
he felt that they were the largest and most influential group. He maintained the KDP
could form a bulwark against Communism. Benninghoff described the Communists, as
follows:
Communists advocate the seizure now of Japanese properties and may be a threat
to law and order. It is probable that well-trained agitators are attempting to bring
about chaos in our area so as to cause the Koreans to repudiate the United States
in favor of Soviet “freedom” and control. Southern Korea is fertile ground for
such activities because USAFIK lacks sufficient troops to expand its area of
control rapidly.
283
In order to expand their influence within the military government and to destroy
the KPR, the KDP leaders informed the American military government officers that the
KPR was “a group of pro-Japanese collaborating Koreans and that Yo Un-hyong was
“well-known to the Korean peoples as [a] pro-Japanese collaborator and politician.”
284
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They also described them as communists. Because of this distorted information about the
KPR, the American military leaders, including Hodge, were immediately hostile to the
KPR from the beginning of American occupation in Korea. As a result, Yo Un-hyong
and KPR leaders did not succeed in meeting with General Hodge until early October.
The KPR issued a statement on October 5, 1945, and claimed that:
The government of the People’s Republic of Korea is the government of the
people, by the people and for the people. It stands for all classes. It has nothing
to do with communist’s dictatorship or capitalists’ hegemony; it represents the
will of the Korean people and is supported by them. Therefore, American
authority should let the People’s Republic of Korea take over all the
administrative organs as well as economic establishments.
285
On October 10, Hodge reasserted that the American military government was the “only
legal government in Korea south of 38
th parallel.”
286
In order to soften the constantly increasing Korean antagonism against the
military government, General Hodge appointed a Korean Advisory Council of eleven
prominent Koreans to assist the American military government on October 5.
Benninghoff stated:
On October 5
th Major General Arnold, Military Governor, appointed an Advisory
Council composed of 11 carefully chosen prominent Koreans including educators,
lawyers, businessmen, “patriots” as well as the leaders of the two leading political
groups (Left Wing or Radical and Conservative). General Arnold told them that
they were selected to give him advice on Korean matters on an honest non-
partisan basis, having in mind only the good of the country and not personal or
party gain. The 11 men accepted appointment on that basis and in secret session
chose one of their number, Kig [Kim] Sung Soo by name, to act as chairman.
287
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However, the members of the Advisory Council except Yo Un-hyong were KDP
leaders or Rightists. One of its members was Cho Man-sik, a famous Christian
nationalist, in North Korea. From the beginning, Yo, the only representative chosen from
the Left, did not participate in the meeting. Benninghoff admited that, “so far the public
announcement concerning the creation of the Council has not received much public
reaction or comment in the press, perhaps because of similar council under Japanese
auspices recently dissolved was regarded as a gathering of collaborationists.”
288 The
official History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea (HUSAFIK) states that the
Advisory Council “never exerted much of an influence on anybody and certainly did not
live up to the hopes of those who created it.”
289
Nonetheless, through this Council, the KPD expanded their influence to appoint
people to military government positions. In his dissertation Lee Won-sul states that the
Americans eventually filled 170,000 positions with Koreans.
290 The occupation
authorities selected the appointees from either former Japanese Government-General
employees or members of the Korean Democratic Party. Therefore, many of them were
collaborators during the Japanese colonial period. According to Bruce Cumings, some
75,000 Koreans were either retained or newly appointed in the military government in the
last three months of 1945.
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These examples of American favoritism toward KDP leaders resulted in criticism
and protest from Koreans, as well as from some Americans in the military government
and in Washington. However, William Langdon responded to this criticism in the
following manner.
How were we to know who was who among this unfamiliar people? For practical
purposes we had to hire persons who spoke English, and it so happened that
these persons and their friends came largely from moneyed classes because
English had been a luxury among Koreans.
292
However, Cumings argues that there were many leftist leaders who could speak English
such as Yo Un-hyong, who was a graduate of Wooster College in Ohio.
293 This decision
by the military government produced a bad image of the AMG among the Korean people
as an “interpreters’ government.” E. Grant Meade, an official historian in the military
government, described these interpreters in the American Military Government that
The Koreans who had attractive homes, who could entertain generously, who
could speak English and talk of Western culture, were, of course, the wealthy
class. Usually wealth in Korea in 1945-46, if it did not mean acquiescence to the
Japanese regime or actual cooperation with it, did indicate a desire to preserve
the existing social, political, and economical order with a minimum of change.
Large land holdings were the most common form of wealth. Consequently the
Americans were influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by a conservative
landlord group whose point of view did not always make for the greatest good for
the greatest number, even though it was patriotic according to their own
lights. Many of the real patriots, those whose resistance to the Japanese had been
consistent and lasting, barred by the language barrier, by obscurity and relative
poverty, were usually disregarded or discredited.
294
The council was supposed to advise on political and economic matters and to
build up in the Korean consciousness a feeling of participating democracy in their
292 Langdon to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1945; in FRUS, 1945, 6: 1135. Cited in Cumings,
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government. Yet Hodge also emphasized that the American military government under
General A. V. Arnold was the sole authority south of 38
th parallel that was designed to
keep peace and order.
295 As a result, the American military authorities favorable to the
Right led to the rise of Korean conservatives in local politics. Arthur Bunce, Hodge’s
economic advisor, admitted that “we have accepted the advice of the Rightists and
allowed them to obtain a dominant position through appointments in the government.”
296
On October 10, after Benninghoff assessed the Korean political situation, he
reported to his superior George Atcheson, MacArthur’s acting political advisor in Japan.
Benninghoff came to the conclusion in his report that while the radical group [KPR] in
South Korea was receiving “support and direction from the Soviet Union,” the
conservative group, which is less aggressive than KPR, represented “the thought of the
majority of thinking Koreans.” He assumed that latter group was willing to cooperate
with the American military government.
297 Thus, alarmed by reports of Benninghoff,
Atcheson recommended the State Department give up its policy of political aloofness in
Korean political situations, and bring Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku back to Korea because
their popularity and legitimacy could aid the American effort.
298 Atcheson’s
recommendation that United States government become more actively involved in
Korean politics revised the previous American policy of not favoring any one group or
leader.
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On October 25, Secretary of State Byrnes replied to Atcheson’s recommendation
and expressed that he still had a hope of working with the Soviets to preserve the postwar
order and peace.
299 Hodge disagreed and wanted to fight against the communists in
Korea. Hodge believed that KPG leaders such as Rhee and Kim Ku should be returned to
Korea to use these rightist leaders as figureheads for the occupation. Hodge’s views were
transmitted, through MacArthur, to the Army of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in
Washington.
300
The State Department, however, hesitated believing that any acts of favoritism
toward the KPG would encourage the Soviet Union to take a similar action and would
jeopardize the success of negotiations regarding the unification of Korea. Therefore,
John Carter Vincent, the director of the State Department Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
opposed the idea of Atcheson to use the KPG in Korea. There existed crucial differences
between the Department of State and the American military government towards the
policy of Korea. These different attitudes and views were also reflected in the
negotiations with the Soviets during the period of occupation.
On October 17, 1945, for the first time, General Hodge received the initial Korean
policy directive from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in the form of a
“Basic Initial Directive.” It explained that “Korea should be developed progressively
from the interim period of civil affairs administration to a period of trusteeship, and
finally to the establishment of a free and independent nation. In order to achieve this
goal, the directive stressed that the military government would require the elimination of
299 Byrnes to acting political advisor in Japan, October 25, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6: 1104.
300 Hodge to MacArthur, November 2, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6, 1106; MacArthur to Army Chief of Staff
Marshall, November 5, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6: 1112.119
all traces of Japanese control over Korea and recommended that Japanese and Korean
collaborationists only be used in “exceptional circumstance” and on a temporary basis.
Also, the directive warned Hodge not to expand official recognition to “any self-styled
Korean provisional government or similar political organization.”
301
The State Department had tried to prevent the return of Syngman Rhee and other
prominent Korean exile leaders to Korea because they were fiery advocates of immediate
independence.
302 The State Department considered Rhee an unreliable troublemaker and
refused to grant him a passport. However, at the recommendations of Generals
MacArthur and Hodge, and with the assistance of Preston Goodfellow, a high-ranking
official in the Office of Strategic Services during the war,
303 Rhee was allowed to return
to Korea on October 16 and the other exiled leaders from China returned to Korea on
November 23, 1945. General MacArthur supported Rhee, one of the most popular exiled
leaders, and instructed Hodge to treat Rhee as the national hero.
304 Unfortunately, when
the Korean exile leaders returned home, they had to sign an affidavit that they would
return home as individuals, not as a government officials. “Outright support of any one
political group presently outside Korea is not contemplated,” Acting Secretary of State
Dean Acheson said, “but because of the chaotic conditions within Korea, elements having
constructive ability and willing to work within the framework of military government are
301 The initial Korean policy directive is printed in FRUS, 1945, 6: 1073-91.
302 Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 210-13; Henderson, Korea, 128.
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encouraged to enter, and might be transported by airplanes controlled by the Army when
space is available.”
305
Actually, during the period of occupation, MacArthur often displayed a marked
indifference toward Korea. When Hodge frequently sought MacArthur’s opinions on
Korean affairs, MacArthur responded to his requests with brief and vague words.
MacArthur, for instance, advised Hodge to “Use your own best judgment as to what
action should be taken. I am not sufficiently familiar with local situation to advise you
intelligently but I will support whatever decision you may take in this matter.”
306 Thus,
MacArthur remained largely inattentive to Korean affairs and did not visit these before
the Korean Government had been established in 1948.
307
Soon after his return, on October 23
rd, Rhee organized the Central Council for the
Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (Taehan toklip choksong chungang hyopui-
hoe) (CCRRKI). He asked all political parties and social organizations under his
leadership to adopt his slogan, (top’o nok’o mungchija) “Let’s unite unconditionally” and
“Let’s punish the pro-Japanese national traitors after independence.” On October 20, at
the welcoming ceremony for the occupation forces, Rhee denounced the Soviet Union
and its policies in the north. He also refused to join the KPR. For decades after he left
Korea, Rhee displayed an attitude of an ardent anti-communist.
308 Therefore, leftist
leaders such as Yo Un-hyong and communist Park Hon-young soon left the CCRRKI
because they could not accept Rhee’s “unity” slogan that was supposed to embrace pro-
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Japanese Koreans, who, in their eyes, were national traitors. Rhee thereby lost a chance
to unify all parties and social organizations under his leadership. Rhee’s CCRRKI
instead became a conservative organization by December 1945.
As time went by, the KPR’s power and influence increased. Hodge received
information from occupation troops in the provinces in September that showed the KPR
to be “organized into a government at all levels,” whereas the KDP was “poorly
organized or unorganized in most areas.”
309 In order to uproot the formidable Leftist
groups, Major General Archibald Arnold, the military government governor, published a
statement against the KPR to the newspapers on October 10
th. Archibald claimed that the
KPR was “entirely without any authority, power or reality.” He stated that the leaders of
KPR were “so foolish as to think they can take to themselves and exercise any of the
legitimate functions of the Government of Korea.”
310 The official History of the U.S.
Armed Forces in Korea (HUSAFIK) stated “the de facto government was soon to bring it
into sharp conflict with American Military Government.”
311 American opposition to the
KPR caused serious damage to American prestige and influence among Koreans.
Actually, from the beginning, the conflict between the American military government
and the KPR led to an ideological battlefield in the politics of Korea. General Hodge
later confessed that “Flatly stated, one of our missions was to break down this
309 Cumings, ibid., 193
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Communist government [the KPR] outside of any directives and without benefit of
backing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the States Department.”
312
In recognition of the strong opposition of the American military authority to these
committees, many of the non-Communist leaders were eventually dismissed from them.
The American military government ultimately did achieve success in suppressing the
People’s Committees and the KPR. As a result, on November 11, Yo Un-hyong and his
supporters organized the People’s Party (Inmindang) in order to establish a political
organization that would be acceptable to the Americans. The American military
government understood that the People’s Party consented to Hodge’s demand that the
KPR should drop its claims to being a government and call itself a political party. At the
same time the People’s Party “would include within its membership most of the members
of the people’s committee which were acting as local government units under the
[KPR].”
313
The national meeting of People’s Committee representatives (Chonguk inmin
wiwonhoe taehoe) took place from November 20-22 in Seoul. Approximately 1,000
representatives from the all over the country met in response to Hodge’s demand that the
KPR drop the word konghwaguk (“republic) from its title and reorganize as a political
party. Younger and more radical groups refused to change the name of the party. Hodge
sent a cable to General MacArthur to warn about KPR strength:
This political party is the most powerful Communist-backed group in Korea and
had some connections with Soviet politics. Included also consideration number
312 Leonard C. Hoag, American Military Government in Korea: War Policy and the First Year of
Occupation, 1941-1946, 312; Cited in Cumings, The Origins, 194.
313 HUSAFIK, vol. 2. ch. 1, 13. Richard Robinson thought the party was at first a more tractable middle-
of-the-road organization. However, the Americans’ continued difficulties with Yo in early 1946 convinced
them it was just another communist front camp.123
of Leftists, not true Communists… [their claim to be a government] gained them
many followers among the uneducated and laboring classes, and has fostered
radical actions in the provinces under the guise of orders from the Korean
People’s Republic.
314
MacArthur replied to Hodge’s cable and advised Hodge to rely on his own best
judgment. On December 12, 1945, Hodge’s statement was the final blow to the KPR:
I feel it necessary to the public understanding to announce that… the Korean
People’s Republic is not in any sense a “government,” and is not authorized to
act in any capacity as such. The only functioning government, in Southern Korea
is the Military Government of Korea… Therefore, in order to eliminate further
misunderstanding and cloaked disorders, I have today directed my occupation
forces and the Military Government of Korea that the activities of any political
organization in any attempted operations as a government are to be treated as
unlawful activities, and that necessary steps will be taken at once to insure that
no political organization operates in any way as a government in any portion of
the American occupied area without specific authority of the Allied Powers.
315
E. Grant Meade indicated that “by suppressing the KPR and by identifying
themselves with a minority group, the Americans distressed and antagonized the Korean
people.” The American military authorities lost “not only a major part of Korean
friendships, but also the respect of some who once held the United States in high
regard.”
316 When the year 1945 ended, American military authority had effectively
destroyed the KPR. In February 1946 the Left created new coalition, the Democratic
People’s Front (DPF or Minjujuui minjok chosun), a united movement which included all
leftists, including the leftist faction of the Korean Provisional Government led by Kim
Won-bong. The DPF programs were similar to those of the KPR. Actually, it was the
direct successor of the KPR. Moreover, Edgar Snow, an American journalist, reported
314 Hodge to MacArthur , November 25, 1945; FRUS, 1945, 6: 1133-34.
315 HUSAFIK, vol. 2, ch. 2, pp. 35-38.
316 E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 235.124
that the membership of the DPF “unquestionably constituted the only large political
organization in the country.”
317
During November and December 1945, KPR affiliated mass organizations, such
as labor unions and farmers’ unions, held national meetings in Seoul, and became objects
of suppression at the hands of the occupation authorities. Unlike other officials in the
military government, Stewart Meacham, Hodge’s labor advisor, had a different
assessment of the situation and argued that “for a short period Chonp’yong [sic] was in
almost complete control of those plants which had been Japanese-owned.”
318 Labor
unions (nodong chohap or Chonp’yong) had success in unifying numerous unions into
one body, the National Council of Korean Labor Union (Chosun nodong chohap chonguk
pyongui-how), in November. Chongp’yong was the only labor organization in the south
until mid-1946 and remained the strongest union until after the October people’s riots in
1948.
319 Many Americans within the military government recognized that Chonp’yong
was representative of Korean workers and largely reformist in character. One
memorandum on “Labor Section Policy” stated:
The Worker’s Committees, which have in many cases taken affairs into their own
hands by throwing out the Jap owners, can be better controlled through regularly-
constituted unions than by outright suppression. The policy of Military
Government [should be] to foster truly representative unions and thus weed out
leaders who are irresponsible agitators with only a vague program of kicking out
317 Edgar Snow, “We Meet Russia In Korea,” Saturday Evening Post vol. 218, (March 30, 1946), 117;
William Langdon later reported: “Democratic People’s Front consisting of a number of youths, women,
labor unions, and farmers’ alliance and two small splinter parties in addition to the People’s party and the
Communists. It cannot be denied that the front is supported by a large number of genuinely patriotic
Koreans with progressive leanings whose participation in Korean politics would be most desirable.”;
Langdon to the Secretary of State, May 24, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 8: 687-88.
318 Stewart Meacham, Labor Department, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea, Korean Labor Report, Seoul,
1947, 10.
319 Ibid., 22.125
former owners and no positive plan to open up the plants… [The Americans
should not] jump to conclusions that every worker’s Committee is communist-
dominated… most of the so-called Communist groups have turned out to be pretty
mild.
320
Unfortunately, many American military authorities still regarded these Korean reformists
as revolutionaries who threatened American interests and security.
The American military government systematically suppressed the local People’s
Committees because these groups supported the KPR. The Americans also arrested
numerous leaders of the People’s Committee and reinstalled rightist Koreans in the local
communities to serve American interests:
A tactical unit occupying a community was to expel the former head of the local
government, if he was a Japanese, but retain him as an advisor if necessary.
Other Japanese were to be replaced by Koreans as soon as possible. If the head
of the government was a Korean [pro-Japanese], he was to be retained until a
suitable replacement could be found. If a political party [the KPR] had expelled
the former officials and taken over the government, the officials put in by the
party were to be arrested and suitable substitutes appointed.
321
What was the object of United States Korean policy? Was the establishment of
democratic, unified and independent nation their only objective? America was not
necessarily ready to grant Korean independence at the risk of sacrificing own national
interests. American authorities viewed the Korean People’s Republic in Seoul and
People’s Committee as a front organization for communist activity allied with the
Russians. They also thought that many social organizations such as the labor unions and
farmers association were influenced by the Communists.
320 “Labor Section Policy,” unsigned memorandum, Bureau of Mining and Industry, November 16, 1945; in
XXIV Corps Historical File. See also Meacham, Labor Report, passim; Cited in Cumings’ The Origins,
199.
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As such, the American military government wanted to keep South Korea out of
the hands of the Soviet Union. General Christ, G-5 for General MacArthur, wrote that
one of the principal missions of military government in Korea was to provide for “a
bulwark against communism.”
322 Later, after he traveled to Korea in 1946, Edwin
Pauley, advisor to President Truman, expressed his opinion that “Communism in Korea
could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world.”
323 Impressed
by the report of Pauley, President Truman declared Korea was “an ideological
battleground upon which [America’s] entire success in Asia may depend”
324 George
McCune also maintained that this development was unfortunate because Korea was
proving to be ‘testing ground’ of American postwar policies in the Far East.
325
Therefore, unless the American military authorities changed their policy to suppress the
leftists in the South, Koreans’ hope to build a unified and democratic in their country
might fail.
During three months of occupation of South Korea, the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) maintained the same policy that General Hodge
should try to attain the “maximum possible coordination with the Soviet Commander.”
To implement Washington’s policy, the American military government sought to
322 Meade, ibid., 52.
323 Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley to President Truman, June 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 8: 706-709; For the
Commission’s investigation of northern Korea, see McCune, Korea Today, 214-15 and Charles Armstrong,
The North Korean Revolution, 45.
324 President Truman to Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, July 16, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 8: 713-714; Charles
M. Dobb produced one of the most cogent views on Truman’s policy toward postwar Korea. He argues
that the Truman administration reacted to a different and confusing Korean case by avoiding reality,
simplifying complexity, and creating a “symbol of postwar contention.” Charles M. Dobb, the Unwanted
Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State
University Press, 1981).
325 George M. McCune, “Occupation Politics in Korea, Far Eastern Survey 15 (February 13, 1946), 33.127
eliminate the zonal occupation as soon as possible to solve the problems of South
Korea.
326 The economic situation in South Korea became very critical. First, AMG’s
free market policy, especially, its rice policy, destroyed the economy of South Korea
because of uncontrollable inflation.
327 Secondly, during the several weeks before the
American occupation forces landed in Korea in early September, the Japanese colonial
authority already exacerbated the inflation problem printed about three billion yen against
an estimated five billion yen in circulation on August 15, 1945.
328
From the beginning of the occupation, General Hodge tried to discuss with
General Chistiakov practical problems including the reintegration of communications, the
economic unification of the two zones, and the problems of currency. The economic
disaster of North and South Korea under the dual occupation of foreign troops was a
severe hardship for the Koreans and made it difficult for occupation authorities to prepare
for the future independence of Korea. Therefore, Hodge believed that it was a first and
crucial step for the social and economic unification of Korea to solve the problems
through a liaison with the Soviet commander. Eventually, such cooperation between the
two commanders in the two separate zones might lead to a centralized administration of
all Korea. However, the Soviet occupation authorities in the north persistently rebuffed
Hodge’s efforts. Not only did the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United
326 Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for the Far East, October, 20, 22, and 24,
FRUS, 1945, 6; 1094-1103.
327 See more details about the economic policy of the American Military Government, Kim Jinwung,
“American Policy and Korean Independence” (Ph.D. dissertation, 1983) 135-148; Lee, Sangmin, “The
Political Economy of Occupation: United States Foreign Economic Policy in Korea, 1945-1949,” (Ph.D.
dissertation, 1991), 55-65 and 226-254; Cumings, The Origins, 203-204.
328 The Japanese stopped the printing of money “due to a shortage of paper.” Department of Army
Headquarters, Far East Command, History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea, vol 1, ch 3, 22-23;
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States deteriorate, but any possible solution through negotiations between the two
commanders in the local areas stalemated. The temporary line of the 38
th parallel became
a “closed border” and international barrier.
329
When he reported to Secretary of State Byrnes in November, Ambassador
Harriman in Moscow pointed out that the Soviet Union historically compared Korea to
“Europe’s Finland, Poland, and Rumania—a springboard for attack on the USSR,”
therefore, the Russians “may be expected to seek predominant influence in Korea.”
According to Harriman, Stalin believed that an international trusteeship by four powers
would not guarantee Soviet domination because Korea had divided into two zones.
330
Harriman assumed that Stalin would try to build North Korea as a “friendly neighbor” to
the Soviet Union after they withdrew.
In his report on “Conditions in Korea,” issued after three months of occupation,
General Hodge explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the dual occupation of Korea
between the Soviet Union and the United States created an impossible condition to
establish a sound economy and prepare Korea for future independence. “The Korean
people blamed the United States for the partition of their country and [there] is growing
resentment against the Americans in the South.” He further reported that Korean people
vehemently opposed the idea of trusteeship and claimed that it might be wise to give up
the scheme.
331 Hodge believed that the situation in the South Korea was becoming an
329 U.S. Department of State, The Record on Korean Unification 1943-1960 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1960), 4-5; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, 52-60; Carl Berger, The Korean
Knot, 56; Beloff, Soviet Policy, 159.
330 Harriman to Secretary of State, November 9 and 12, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6: 1119, 1121-22.
331 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 318; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: The
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extremely fertile breeding ground for Communism. Thus, General Hodge strongly
recommended that the United States should reach an agreement with the Soviet Union for
simultaneous withdrawal of American and Russian troops and leave “Korea to its own
devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self purification.”
332
In opposing Hodge’s ideas, American policy makers decided to carry out the
establishment of the Korean trusteeship by the four major powers. They believed that
only a trusteeship of the four powers could bring about not only a free and independent
Korea but also prevent ultimate Soviet domination of it. Finally, the United States
government initiated discussions on the Korean problem at the Moscow Conference of
Foreign Ministers in December 1945.
North Korea under the Soviet Occupation
As previously noted, with the defeat of the Japanese, the Korean peninsula was
divided into two halves along the 38
th parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union.
While the American military government ruled in the south after early September in
1945, the north was occupied by the Soviet Union, which arrived almost one month
earlier than American troops in this crucial period. During the initial period of the
occupation of the Soviets they did not have a well-organized plan for North Korea.
Beginning a different pattern of the nation-building,
333 the Soviet Union was much better
informed about Korean politics and culture than the United States in the south. First,
there were several hundred thousand Korean people in the Soviet Union and there were
332 MacArthur for Hodge to Join Chief of Staff, December 16, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6: 1144-48.
333 Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea, 86.130
approximately ten to thirty thousand Korean exiles, who were well indoctrinated and
trained as communists by the Soviet Union, and returned to North Korea in 1945.
334 The
second group that the Soviets worked with was the “Kapsan” faction, guerilla fighters
against the Japanese, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, a thirty-three-year old partisan
leader.
335 They included several hundred native Koreans who had participated in anti-
Japanese guerilla activities in Manchuria and stayed in the Soviet Union during the early
1940s. The last group was the “Yenan” faction, Koreans who had fought alongside of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led by Mu Chong and the Kim Tu-bong.
336
After the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the Soviet military
operation against the Japanese army in Korea began on August 10, 1945.
337 The Soviet
army crossed the Soviet-Korean border on the night of August 11-12 and landed in
Wonsan on August 21.
338 On August 24, 1945, the Soviet XXV Army under Colonel
General Ivan M. Chistiakov, a veteran of Stalingrad, entered Pyongyang, the capital of
334 Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, 4-11; Glenn D. Paige, Korean People’s
Democratic Republic (Stanford, California; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), 57;
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336 Simmons, Stranined Alliance, 23.
337 United States Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover,
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 12.
338 Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 62 and 90. See more
details on the Soviet military operation in North Korea. Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 62-67;
Armstrong, The North Korea Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2003), 205.131
the present North Korea.




When the Russians entered northern Korea, they found that the People’s
Committees, the provincial branches of the Committee for Preparation of Korean
Independence (CPKI), like in the south, already existed.
341 In particular, the CPKI in the
South Pyong’an Providence under the leadership of Cho Man-sik, a Christian moderate
nationalist, was very strong and popular organization.
342 On August 22, the Soviets
established a new organization, the South P’yongan People’s Political Committee (inmin
chongch’i wiwonhoe), after merging of Cho Man-sik’s South P’yongan CPKI and the
P’yongyang city CPKI branch.
343 Actually, as Cumings argues, the Soviets recognized
the People’s Committee as “governing bodies,” from the provincial level to the township
level, to seize administrative power in the north which were recognized by the Central
People’s Committee in Seoul headed by Yo before the establishment of the People’s
Republic of Korea (PRK).
344 During the year 1945, these committees in the north
recognized Seoul as the political center. Once the People’s Republic of Korea was
339 Henry Chung, The Russian Came to Korea (Washington, D.C.: The Korean Pacific Press, 1047), 40-41.
340 Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 66.
341 According to Van Ree, except in North Hamgyong, People’s Committees in North Korea were
established as a ‘spontaneous base’ and were nationalist-oriented. See Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One
Zone, 89; Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 52-53.
342 Other provincial CPKI branches were also organized throughout North Korea from August 15 to 17.
Cumings, The Origins, 391.
343 Ibid., 392.
344 Ibid.132
established, the People’s Committee of North Korea placed itself under its authority
(PRK) and became a local government unit in the north after September 6.
345
Unlike the American military government which governed directly in South
Korea, the Soviet occupation authorities formally recognized local committees and gave
them administrative power to govern themselves without a military government.
346
However, it is noteworthy that Soviet occupation authorities still retained indirect control
and closely supervised political events in North Korea.
347 According to George McCune,
“the political officers attached to the Russian Command exercised final authority on all
matters.”
348 During the initial period of occupation, the Russians initially supported
Cho’s committees and wanted to form them to contain equal numbers of Communists and
nationalists in coalition in North Korea.
349 Thus, they believed that Kim Il Sung as Cho
Man-sik, who was from the same province as Cho Man-sik and came from a Christian
family, was the right person to co-operate with Cho.
350 Immediately after the Soviet
Army invaded Korea, the Soviets organized komendaturas, or bureaus of the local
commanders, to disarm and establish local order in the North Korea.
351
345 Ibid.
346 William Stueck makes a mistake in saying that “each of the occupiers set up a military government in its
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By the end of September 1945, the Russians had established their authority over
the whole of North Korea. The two occupation authorities showed different attitudes in
their approach to the Koreans at the beginning of their occupation. While the American
troops expressed their view that Koreans were incapable of governing the state when they
entered in the south, the Soviets assured Koreans in the north that the Soviets troops were
present in north in order to help Koreans to rule their government themselves during a
temporary period until a smooth transfer of power was completed. Furthermore, after the
Soviets completed removal of Japanese collaborators from the positions of power and
replaced them with nationalists and Communists who fought against the Japanese, the
Koreans accepted the Soviets as the decisive force in the “liberation” of North Korea
from the yoke of Japanese colonial rule.
352
When he arrived in North Korea, Soviet commander Colonel General Ivan M.
Chistiakov announced:
Korean people! Remember that you have future happiness in your own hands.
You have attained liberty and independence. Now everything is up to you. The
Soviet Army will provide the Korean people with all conditions for the free and
creative ventures you are bound to embark on. Koreans must make themselves
the creators of their own happiness.
353
It may be useful at this juncture to summarize some of the basic differences
between Soviet and American policy in Korea during the first year. First of all, the
Russians did not establish a military government.
354 The Soviet Union ruled their zone of
occupation through the recognition and utilization of the People’s Republic of Korea and
352 U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, Far Eastern Series
103, Publication 7118, January, 1961: 2-5.
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People’s Committee in the local areas. On the other hand, the Americans not only
established an American military government but also insisted that the military
government was the only “legitimate government” in the south. Therefore, the military
government did not recognize the KPR. These different approaches to the situation of the
Korean people by the two powers did not mean that the Soviets and the Americans would
give up their interests in order to establish a unified, independent, and democratic Korean
government. Actually, even though the Russians came with a background knowledge
about local context, the Soviets did not have a detailed plan of policy in Korea at the
beginning of the occupation.
355 They intended to build ‘a friendly neighbor’ in the north
to prevent future aggression against the Soviet Union.
356 According to Kathryn
Weathersby, Soviet occupation authorities created Soviet-style institutions in North
Korea.
357 However, the Soviets wanted to avoid conflict with the Americans over Korea
because their primary concern in Asia was a resurgent Japan.
358
On August 27, 1945, South Pyong’an People’s Political Committee of North
Korea was created and on September 2, the same type of People’s Committee was also
355 Traditional historians argue that the Soviets had a master plan in which North Korea should be
transferred into the Communist country when they entered. However, some Korean scholars deny that the
Soviet Union had a specific plan early in their occupation of the north. In Communism in Korea, Scalapino
and Lee argue that “the Soviet Command probably did not arrive in Korea with any fully worked out
political plan or precise time-table. It is more likely that the Russians, like the Americans, came to Korea
with nothing more specific in mind than such basic principles as the importance of seeing a ‘friendly
regime’ established there.” Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea I, 337-338. Simmons, The Strained
Alliance, 25. Van Ree, 95; Armstrong, 41. Recently, some Korean scholars supported this argument by
studying the Soviet secret documents which were opened in Russia in the 1990s. See Kvan So Ki (Ki
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diss., Far Eastern Institute, Russian Academy of Science, 1997) and Khun Su Zhon (Chon Hyonsu),
“Socioeconomic Transformation in Postliberation North Korea, 1945-1948” (Ph.D. diss., Moscow State
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created in three other provinces in the north. However, it was the Soviet Civil
Administration led by Major General Romanyenko and his political advisors that actually
controlled the affairs of the People’s Committee in each province.
359 On October 8,
1945, the Soviet Command called a meeting of representatives of the five provincial
People’s Committees, later reorganized into the “Temporary Five Provinces People’s
Committee,” (Imsi odo inmin wiwonhoe) and then on November, 19, into “the Five
Provinces Administrative Bureau,” (Puk Choson o-do haengjongguk) as a liaison organ
in the administration of the five provinces in North Korea, with Soviet advisors for each
of the ten departments. The Russian representative in the department worked at the
provincial people’s committees as a Soviet advisor.
360 It was replaced by the North
Korean Provisional People’s Committee in February 1946. It then served as a basis for
the establishment of a central government of North Korea. At this time Stalin planned to
set up a separate government in the north apart from that in the south.
361 After the
creation of Committee, the Communists moved rapidly to consolidate control over the
governing organs which had become subordinate to the central People’s Committee.
While the Soviet military authorities constructed the administrative organization,
they also focused political concern on the development of the Korean Communist Party.
On October 10
th, the Soviet command called a Conference of the North Korean Five
359 For a study of Russian control of North Korea, see U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case
Study in the Technique of Takeover; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People’s Democratic Republic. Cited in
Hakjoon Kim, Unification Policy of South and North Korea, 1945-1991: A Comparative Study (Seoul:
Seoul National University Press, 1978), 33.
360 Van Ree, 104; Armstrong, 53.
361 It should be noted that unlike the revisionist historians, including Bruce Cumings argues, it was Stalin
who had a plan that built a separate government earlier than the Americans and Syngman Rhee in the
Korean peninsular.136
Provinces Party Representatives. As a result of this conference, the “North Korean
Branch of the Korean Communist Party” was established on October 13. However, most
of the domestic Communists objected to this move because there was a pre-existing
original Korean Communist Party in Seoul. On October 23, although Park Hon-yong,
chairman of the Korean Communist Party, with headquarters in Seoul, and his followers
objected to the Soviet plan by arguing the communist principle, namely, “one party, one
country,” later they agreed to the extension of a separate North Korean Branch.
362 While
the Soviets sponsored that move and the reorganization of the Korean Communist Party,
they secured control over it through the agency of Soviet-Koreans who joined and
overwhelmed the domestic Communists.
363
Not until October 14, 1945 that did Kim Il Sung make a public appearance after
he returned from the Soviet Union in August.
364 While Cho Man-sik organized the
Choson Democratic Party on November 3, Kim Il Sung became the First Secretary of the
North Korean Branch of the Korean Communist Party on December 17, 1945.
365 On
February 9, 1946, the “Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea” was established
to replace the “Executive Committee” as the central executive body.
366 On August 28,
1946, Kim Il Sung and his followers merged the North Korean Branch of the Korean
Communist Party and the New People’s Party, which was organized by the Yenan faction
362 Dae-sook Suh, “North Korea: Emergence of an Elite Group,” in Richard F. Staar, ed., Aspects of
Modern Communism (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1965), 324. I believe
that from this moment Kim Il Sung and the communists in the north had a initiative to control the leftists in
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in March 1946, into a single party, “North Korean Workers’ Party.” Although Kim Tu-
bong was elected chairman and Kim Il Sung and Chu Yong Ha became vice-chairmen of
the new party, the real power was in the hands of Kim Il Sung who had support from the
Soviets.
Following the announcement of the Moscow Agreement on trusteeship, Cho
Man-sik refused to accept this decision and submitted his resignation in protest. The
Soviets arrested him.
367 Most of Cho’s nationalist followers were forced to flee to South
Korea. After the nationalists were eliminated from power, such as in the provincial and
district committees, the political parties, and social organizations, the Communists now
controlled all of the institutions in North Korea. The first local elections in November,
held in provincial, city, country, and district People’s Committees (local governmental
units) of the North Korean Provincial People’s Committee (the central government of
North Korea) elected many supporters of Kim. Therefore, Kim Il Sung was able to
increase his power both within the Workers’ Party and the governmental units of North
Korea.
One of significant reforms that Kim’s groups under took was land reform on
March 5, 1946. As of 1946, between 6 and 7 percent of the farmers owned 54 percent of
the cultivated land, some 51.5 percent of farmers owned only 5.4 percent, and 41.5
percent of farmers were tenants who owned no land.
368 Although the landlords of North
Korea were not as politically powerful as their counterparts in the South, the landholding
367 For detailed information on trusteeship and the resistance of Cho, see Van Ree, 136-38 and 142-43.
368 Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation—A History of the Korean People (New
Jersey: Hollym International Corp., 1996), 337.138
pattern was still highly inequitable.
369 According to Andrew J. Grajdanzev, 25.8 percent
of the rural population had owned land in North Korea in 1945, while 22.4 percent were
part owners and part tenants, 44.9 percent were tenants, 5.4 percent were squatters, and
1.5 percent were farm laborers.
370
Land Confiscated in North Korean Land Reform in 1946
Owners Amount of Land (in Chongbo)*
Japanese 100,797
Collaborators 21,718
Landlords owning more than 5 chongbo 285,692
Landlords renting all their land 538,067
Landlords renting parts of their land 239,650
Religious organizations 14,401
Total Confiscated 1,000,325
*One chongbo equals approximately 2.45 acres, cited in Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea,
96.
Redistribution of the land is estimated to have benefited more than 70 percent of the rural
population, or about 50 percent of the total population of North Korea, and to have
involved more than 50 percent of the cultivable acreage.
371 Some 2.4 million acres were
given to 724,522 farm households, free of charge; each household receiving 3.2 acres of
369 See land distribution statistics in North Korea as of 1938, in Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Korea Divided,”
Far Eastern Survey 16 (October 10, 1945), 282; re-cited in Joungwon Kim, 95.
370 Joungwon Kim, 96.
371 United States Department of State, Techniques of Takeover, 56.139
farmland.
372 The land reform in the North was far swifter and more peaceful than in the
South because many of the Korean landlords moved down to the south and there was no
strong contingent of landed elites in the North.
373
Land distribution in North Korean Land Reform
Category No. of Households Amount of Land Received
Landless peasants 407,307 583,304 chongbo
Smallholding peasants 255,993 336,039 chongbo
Agricultural laborers 5,540 14,855 chongbo
Landlords moved to 3,911 9,622 chongbo
other counties
Cited in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 416.
Land reform had important effects upon the politics and society of North Korea. The
reform eliminated strong oppositional organization and at the same time gained strong
supporters for the Communist Party in the North. As Cumings described the land reform,
it left the new regime with a “vast reservoir of popular goodwill.”
374
During the period from 1945 to 1948, there was significant change in North
Korea. Unlike their American counterparts in the south, Kim Il Sung and his Communist
Party enjoyed the full support of the Soviet Union. Although Kim Il Sung was
handpicked by the Soviet military authorities, he maneuvered politically to establish and
consolidate his leadership. He and his followers later changed its title to “North Korea
Workers’ Party” by August 1946 and eliminated collaborators, religious groups, and the
372 Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, 337.
373 Joungwon Kim, 96; Cumings, The Origins, I, 417; Armstrong, 81.
374 Cumings, The Origins, I, 417.140
nationalists to consolidate their political power. In mid-February 1947, the General
Congress of People’s Committees met in Pyongyang, and established the North Korean
People’s Assembly. Over the course of the three years, the official count of refugees to
the south from the north numbered more than one and one-half million people and by
1950 the number was estimated at two million.
375 Out of an estimated population in
North Korea in 1945 of 9,170,000, émigrés represented more than a 20 percent of the
total. However, Kim’s group was still not dominant in the politics of North Korea.
Kim’s followers still not entirely depended upon the support of Soviet-Koreans, and were
challenged by some 22,000 Korean Communists of the Yenan faction who entered North
Korea via Manchuria at the end of 1945 and who belonged to the North China Korean
Independence League under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.
In sum, before the Americans arrived in Korea, and at the initial stage of
liberation, Koreans established the Korean People’s Republic, a de facto government,
which enjoyed overwhelming support among the majority of Korean people, showing
that Koreans did have a desire and capability to rule their own affairs. If General Hodge
and military government authorities at the beginning of their occupation in the south had
accepted or recognized the leadership of Yo and the People’s Committee, later the
Korean People’s Republic, the future of Korea might have played out differently and
perhaps have been more analogous to what happened in Austria or elsewhere.
Yet, the insurgency of Korean revolutionary nationalism was considered a threat
to U. S. interests, so military occupation authorities denied the existence of the Korean
People’s Republic and made some of the most important decisions without local input
375 United States Department of State, Techniques of Takeover, 8.141
during the first months of the occupation. In order to create an anti-communist bulwark
in the south, Hodge became “a premature Cold War Warrior” and helped the rightists to
gain political hegemony in Korea at the very beginning of military occupation. In the
process, Hodge lost credibility as a political leader because of his leaning towards the
rightists and his status quo policy that delayed progressive reforms in Korea. As Koreans
remembered from their earlier experience decades before in their relations with the
United States, Americans had previously betrayed Koreans’ expectations and hope for
American aid to build a democratic and independent Korean government. Now, it
seemed, they were prepared to do so again.
In the north, the Soviet authorities did not prepare much for their occupation of
Korea and did not have a well-organized or specific plan when they arrived. Unlike the
American government in the south, however, Soviet occupation authorities were much
better informed about Korean politics and ruled the region in more indirect ways. The
Russians wanted to build a non-hostile regime in Korea after liberation. Unlike in
Eastern Europe, Stalin gave up the sovietization of North Korea and intended to establish
a regime from the beginning of military occupation in collusion with both Communists
and Nationalists. Thus, Russian military authorities recognized the People’s Committee
and cooperated with Koreans to restore order and administrative power while the Soviets
also strengthened the leftists and created Soviet-style institutions in North Korea. Had
these coalition groups led by Cho Man-sik kept up their initiatives until the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Joint Commission, there would have been an opportunity to make the interim provisional
government a vehicle through which to facilitate negotiations about the unification of142
north and south. The Cold War context helped derail that chance. At the same time,
though, the two superpowers did not act simply as mirror-images of each other.143
CHAPTER V
The Moscow Conference and the Joint Commission
This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union each had a
distinct mindset at the meeting of the Moscow Conference and how Korean nationalists,
especially rightists, responded to the decisions of the superpowers. The outcome of the
Moscow Conference was shocking to the Koreans who had anticipated immediate
independence. This historical event became a turning point not only in the history of
Korean politics but also for the Cold War in East Asia overall. As for Koreans, deep-
rooted domestic political and factional struggles stirred by the Moscow Agreement fueled
divisions within the nation. Due to vehement resistance of rightists in the south and a
lukewarm attitude among officials of the American military government, the decisions
reached in the Moscow Agreement could not be fulfilled in Korea. This result, in turn,
further illustrated that the relationship between the two superpowers was deteriorating.
The hope for a unified Korea anytime soon was also fading away. At the same time,
though, Korean leaders were not utterly powerless and subservient to superpower
agendas.144
On December 16, 1945, the Allied foreign ministers, Ernest Bevin of the United
Kingdom, V. M. Molotov of the Soviet Union, and James F. Byrnes of the United States,
had met in Moscow to discuss postwar problems such as peace settlements, atomic
energy, and Far Eastern issues. At this conference, the Foreign Ministers made decisions
affecting the future of Korea, including an expression of commitment to Korean
unification through a trusteeship. This formal agreement was included in the official
documents.
376 Previously, during the World War II, the Allied leaders had made
agreement about Korea only through informal and verbal means, such as their acceptance
of trusteeship in the Wartime Conferences. They had not made any specific plan
regarding the timetable in postwar Korea that would establish a free and independent
state, “in due course,” after the war ended.
At the first session of the Moscow Conference on December 16
th, Secretary of
State Byrnes proposed as among other things, “the creation of a united administration for
Korea as a prelude to the establishment of an independent Korean government.”
377 The
following day, Byrnes introduced the American draft proposal for Korea. It called for
immediate action to abolish the separate zones of military occupation to be replaced with
a unified administration under the American and Soviet commanders. This new
arrangement would deal with any problems arising from the divided state of Korea,
including the areas of commodity exchange, resumption of trade and transportation,
376 Cho, Korea in World Politics, 100.
377 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 111; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 318-319; Berger, The
Korean Knot, 58.145
coastal shipping issues, and settlement of displaced persons.
378 Byrnes proposal specified
that the unified administration authority should exercise its power and function through a
High Commissioner and an Executive Council composed of one representative from each
of the states. The council would organize a “popularly elected Korean legislature.”
379
Byrnes proposed that this administration allow the use of Koreans as much as practical in
the government as administrators, consultants, and advisors.
380 He also suggested that
the establishment of a four power trusteeship become a requirement prior to Korean
independence. Korean independence would be granted within five years, but the
trusteeship could postpone it for another five years if necessary.
381 British Foreign
Minister Bevin agreed with Byrnes’ proposal while Molotov asked for time to study it.
382
On December 20, Foreign Minister Molotov submitted the Soviet proposals:
establishment of a provisional Korean government, a four power trusteeship to last for
five years, and creation of a Joint Commission to assist in forming the provisional Korean
government.
383 This commission would assist in establishing a provisional, democratic
Korean government in consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social
organizations. In other words, the Joint Commission, along with same involvement
378 Choi Sang Yong, American Military Government and Korean Nationalism, 179.
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December 17, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 2: 642-643; Truman, ibid., 318-319; Byrnes, ibid,, 221-222.
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among the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, would work out the
proposals for a provisional government and submit them for joint approval to the
governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, and China. The Soviet proposal also suggested that within two weeks the
United States and Soviet commanders meet to consider urgent problems in both zones of
occupation and to work out a means of permanent coordination.
384
At the meeting on December 21
st, three representatives accepted the final
communiqué of the Moscow conference with a few minor changes. Thus, the Soviet
proposal, which appeared to represent the American viewpoint, became the basis for the
Moscow decision on Korea.
385
1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state,
the creating of conditions for developing the country on democratic
principles and the earliest speediest possible liquidation of the disastrous
results of the prolonged Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set
up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the
necessary steps for developing of the industry, transport, and agriculture of
Korea and the national culture of the Korea people.
2. In order to assist in the formation of a provisional Korean government and
with a view to the preliminary elaboration of appropriate measures, there shall be
established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States
command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in Northern Korea. In
preparing their proposals, the Commission shall consult with Korean democratic
parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the
Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United
States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint
Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the
provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic
384 Berger, ibid.; Cho, ibid., 101.
385 United States Delegation Minutes of an informal meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow,
December 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 2: 716-717.147
organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the
political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of
democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence
of Korea.
The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation
with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the
Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power
trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern
Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in
administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern
Korean and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the
representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be
convened within a period of two weeks.
386
On December 27, 1945, the foreign ministers released the final Moscow
communiqué.
387 To wit: first, the conference proposed the establishment of a
“provisional Korean government.” Second, the trusteeship was to be exercised, not by a
four power administrative body, but by a provisional Korean government. Third, it
provided for a four power trusteeship that would last up to five years for Korea, involving
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, China, and the United States.
388 Finally, the proposal
stated that within two weeks, the American and Russian occupational commanders in
Korea would convene a joint conference to make recommendations, upon consultation
386 The full text of the communiqué, see in FRUS, 1945, 2: 815-824; FRUS, 1945, 6: 1151; see also,
United State, Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, 1027-1032.
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with democratic parties and social organizations, for the purpose of establishing a
provisional Korean democratic government.
389 The Moscow agreement was significant
because the Allied powers, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, for the first
time, agreed on the unification of Korea in an the official document.
American policy makers believed the Korean people could not satisfy the
Moscow agreement, nevertheless they felt the measure represented a forward step in
relations with the Russians toward the establishment of a provisional government.
Moreover, it also reflected the Americans’ belief that trusteeship was the best way to
check Soviet domination in Korea.
390 Both sides believed that cooperation between the
two countries might produce political stability and economic recovery for Korea.
391
However, Hodge and his advisors, since mid-October, had expressed strong opposition to
the idea of trusteeship.
392 In Hodge’s opinion,
If I see Koreans united and exert efforts worthy of independence, I will recognize
that independence right now…With respect to the problems of the thirty-eighth
parallel, if Koreans in the south follow my directions and unite as one body, we
will see one national government and the division of Korea will be quickly
resolved.
393
The news of the Moscow agreement reached Korea on the morning of December
28
th. It was a great shock and disappointment to the people who wanted immediate
independence. Thus, the agreement immediately produced a hostile response and
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resistance.
394 Even before the Moscow Conference, the Korean people had been openly
hostile to the trusteeship plan. When John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs of the United States Department of State asserted, on October 20, 1945,
that the “trusteeship” of Korea because of a perceived lack of capacity on the part of the
Korean people to be able to “self-rule,” most Korean people, on the right or left, were
offended and were firmly committed to opposing the trusteeship. The Central People’s
Committee emphasized: “if America tries to implement a trusteeship system, then the
Korean nation will surely fight against it even if the lives of the whole nation might be
denied.”
395 Moreover, many Korean people vehemently opposed the “trusteeship”
because it was reminiscence of the method used by the Japanese colonial rulers earlier.
396
These dissenters believed that the only difference between the two schemes was the
number of rulers empowered over Korea.
397 The South Korean press variously described
Moscow agreement as a second Munich, another mandatory rule, another agreement for
international slavery, an insult to Korea, or a violation of international treaties.
398
Undeniably, discontent was rampant.
Faced with strong opposition of the Korean people to the Moscow decision,
General Hodge stated that the question of trusteeship had not yet been decided in order to
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minimize its immediacy and importance. Alternatively, he stressed that the removal of
the 38
th parallel barrier and the creation of a provisional government were important first
steps toward Korean independence.
399 Upon receiving Hodge’s report about the Korean
reaction to the Moscow agreement on December 30, Secretary of State Byrnes stated that
“the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, working the Korean provisional government, may
find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship,” since the ultimate goal was to hasten
independence.
400 In his State of the Union message on January 14, 1946, President
Truman stated that the United States would proceed “as rapidly as practicable toward the
establishment of a democratic government in Korea by the free choice of the people of
Korea.”
401
Moscow Conference altered the relationship between President Truman and
Secretary of States Byrnes. Max Hasting argues that:
The American themselves now stood their own proposal on its head, and indeed
revoked their assent to it. In the wake of the Moscow meeting, President
Truman determined that Secretary of State Byrnes had given away far too much;
that the time had come for a determined stand against Soviet expansionism; that
Stalin should be confronted on a range of critical fronts.
402
As the result of a conference with Truman, Byrnes was forced to resign his position.
403
Truman then adopted a “get tough” policy toward the Soviet Union:
[W]e should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific. We should
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rehabilitate China and create a strong central government there. We should do the
same for Korea…. I’m tired babying the Soviets.
404
On December 29
th, immediately after the announcement of the Moscow
agreement, the Provisional Government of Korea and Kim Ku summoned the emergency
council of state affairs (the Emergency National Assembly). Kim Ku and his followers
urged all Korean officials of the American military government to conduct “an immediate
walkout” to show their anti-trusteeship position and in addition called for the Korean
people to resist any kind of international trusteeship of Korea.
405 Kim Ku and the KPG
declared that “it is against the desire of the entire people of Korea, who uphold the
principle of national self-determination.” They also predicted that “any trusteeship
applied to Korea will eventually destroy peace in the Far East.”
406 In addition, immediate
recognition of the KPG as the government of Korea was demanded. On December 31
st,
an anti-trusteeship resolution was adopted and addressed to the four powers:
1. It is against the desire of the entire people of Korea who uphold the
principle of national self-determination.
2. It is against the assurance given repeatedly by your nation during the Second
World War.
3. None of the three articles relating to the trusteeship contained in the United
Nations Charter is applicable to Korea.
4. Any trusteeship applied to Korea will eventually destroy peace in the Far
East.
407
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Koreans opponents of trusteeship now participated in daily demonstrations. All
stores and schools were closed. Then, on January 3, 1946, the Communist Party and
leftists suddenly reversed their position and started to support the Moscow agreement,
arguing for “the trusteeship plan as a guarantee that Korea will not fall into the hands of
the Western imperialists.”
408 The Korean people, many of whom considered communists
as champions of the anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period, felt a deep sense
of betrayal when the communists shifted to support of the trusteeship plan. The people in
the south believed that the communists changed their posturing because of orders from
Moscow and North Korea.
409 During this time of chaos on December 30, 1945, Song
Chin-u, the leader of the Korean Democratic Party, who was also known to favor the
trusteeship, was assassinated by a young man who defended his conduct as a righteous
display of patriotism.
The Moscow agreement on Korea became the crucial issue that divided political
parties into two hostile groups and intensified a domestic power struggle between the
right and left centered on the question of the unification of Korea.
410 Bruce Cumings
described this situation with an analogy: “two scorpions fought against each other in the
bottle.” From the moment, that communists’ suddenly changed to support of the
Moscow agreement, a marked polarization of the political climate occurred. Afterwards,
the rift between left and right became irreconcilable.
411 Before then, the Korean people
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regarded the anti-trusteeship campaign as an outburst of “anti-trusteeship nationalism.”
412
After the Korean Communist Party decided to support the Moscow agreement, much of
their popularity, at least that portion predicted an anti-colonialism and anti-feudalism,
disappeared. In addition, the anti-trusteeship campaign provided the rightists, whose
ranks included many former Japanese collaborators, with an opportunity to transform
themselves into an “anti-communist” and “anti-Soviet movement.” Thereafter,
throughout duration of the anti-trusteeship movement, the right perennially challenged
“the nationalist credentials of the Left” and smeared them as communists in order to
pander for popular.
413
Fully recognizing of the situation of anti-trusteeship movement, the American
military government and General Hodge criticized Korean leaders for exploiting the
situation for their own benefit. American officials emphasized that the Moscow
agreement supported establishment of a provisional government and might lead to an
early dissolution of the division of Korea and ultimately Korean unification.
414 Military
authorities also asserted that “trusteeship was not a certainty and that it might not be
necessary if better cooperation were obtained from the Koreans.”
415 William Langdon,
General Hodge’s political advisor, thought that most of the resentment was directed at the
Russians. However, Hodge reported to MacArthur that the leftist actions were creating
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anti-American sentiments, too.
416 General Hodge came to view any support for a
trusteeship as Communist-inspired. In his mind only the right represented truly popular
desires in South Korea.
417
In response to an urgent request from MacAthur for political guide lines, the JCS
sent the SWNCC’s recommendation to the general in Tokyo. The SWNCC 176/18
“Political Policy for Korea” of January 28 urged General Hodge to facilitate an
agreement between the various Korean political factions and establish a provisional
government. On February 8, 1946, rightists under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, Kim
Ku, and Kim Kyu-sik established a National Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean
Independence and also recommended that Hodge make a plan to establish a Korean
advisory body. Therefore, before the opening of the Joint Commission in March 1946,
Hodge set up the Representative Democratic Council (RDC) that was transformed from
Kim Ku’s Emergency National Council on February 14, 1946. The RDC consisted of
twenty-eight members. Among them, twenty-five were from the rightist National
Council, including former members of the provisional government and the KDP.
However, moderate leftist Yo Un-hyong refused to participate in RDC because of its
rightist membership orientation.
According to Peter Lowe, Hodge tried to block the Moscow agreement by
cooperating with Rhee and Preston Goodfellow in the creation of the Representative
Democratic Council (RDC). To fight against strong Leftists, the American Military
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Government planned to create the RDC.
418 Grant Meade argues that, “the State
Department expected the military government to continue operating behind a façade of
political neutrality, and the Americans were expected to make every effort to secure a
rightist victory.”
419 On February 16, 1946, prompted in response to action of the
rightists, leftists that supported the Moscow resolution organized the Korean Democratic
National Front (DNF) as a united front against the right.
420
Faced with growing disgruntlement about the anti-trusteeship movement, General
Hodge reassured the Korean people that a final decision on trusteeship had not been
reached, and that the United States did not intend to implement the Korean trusteeship
that the Korean people opposed.
421 General Hodge urged Korean leaders, including
Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, to call off the demonstrations and strikes that were
sweeping across South Korea. Rightist leaders reluctantly ordered the protests to stop,
but they continued to demonstrate against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party,
accusing the Russians of delaying Korean independence. Hodge reassured the Korean
people that the United States would pursue the goal of early independence for their
country, but warned that continued demonstrations could only create an unfavorable
impression of Korean political capabilities.
422
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The Joint Conference met between January 16 and February 5, 1946. During the
fifteen sessions held in Seoul, the two delegations tried to solve the “urgent problems”
that stemmed from the division of Korea. In practice, though, they heed very different
views and offered distinct solutions about the unification of Korea. While the United
States wanted to eliminate the barrier of the 38
th parallel and integrate the two separate
zones for administrative and economic purposes, the Soviet delegation thought the
problems could be solved better by exchange and coordination between the two
commanders in the separate zones.
Cognizant of with the deteriorating economic situation, the Soviet delegation
asked the United States for rice in exchange for raw materials and electric power. The
Americans, however, rejected the Soviets’ proposal because of a serious lack of rice in
the south stemming from the failure of its economic policy.
423 After three weeks of
discussion, the Joint Conference achieved limited agreements between the two
delegations: exchange of first-class mail; movement of Korean citizens from one zone to
the other; liaison between the two commands; allocation of radio frequencies; rail, motor
and water-borne transportations; and establishment of joint control posts.
424
On January 23, 1946, Stalin met Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, he was
suspicious of American aims. He bemoaned to Harriman that American military
authorities supported the anti-trusteeship activities of the rightists. He also pointed to
newspapers in South Korea that reported “only the U.S.S.R. and not the U.S. had insisted
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on trusteeship.” Harriman could do nothing but claim that the “alleged statements”
attributed to American officials in Korea were not representative of his government’s
policy.
425 Furthermore, Stalin blamed the American military governor, General Archer
Lerch, for encouraging criticism of the Moscow agreement.
426
On January 25, 1946, Tass, the Soviet news agency, claimed that American
military authorities permitted verbal attacks, not only on trusteeship, but also on the
Soviet Union. Tass published a statement in the South Korean press denying that the
Soviet Union alone supported the trusteeship of Korea. The Russians insisted that the
United States had initiated the discussions proposing trusteeship at the Moscow
Conference. The Russians argued that their proposal had been much more generous than
the American plan, for it limited the trusteeship period to five years and provided for the
creation of a Korean provisional government.
427 The Soviet Union presented itself as the
true protector of Korean interests.
428
The Tass statement shocked the Korean people and caused serious damage to the
prestige and credibility of the American military authorities. In 1905, the United States
abandoned Korea to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. Koreans now believed that the
United States had again discarded them to the Russians instead of the Japanese. General
Hodge and his staff were embarrassed and disturbed by dissemination of the news that
the United States not only originally proposed trusteeship but also that in their version it
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might last as long as ten years. Staggering from the severe blow to their credibility and
prestige, AMG asked SCAP and Washington for information on the Russian statement
and inquired as to what direction they should take now. Hodge had also ordered that the
Tass press release be censored in South Korean newspapers.
429
The State Department verified to the AMG on January 26 that the Soviet Union’s
claims were correct: the United States offered the trusteeship plan first.
430 Washington
informed Hodge that it would have been impossible for the United States to prevent the
domination of the Soviet Union in Korea without the trusteeship.
431 John Carter Vincent,
chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department, on January 27, 1946,
stated that “trusteeship is only a procedure, which may or may not be necessary since
independence of Korea is the goal.” He further stated that whether or not there was a
trusteeship depended upon the ability of the Korean people to work with the joint U.S.-
Soviet commission in establishing a democratic provisional government capable of
unifying and governing Korea.
432
Complaining of a lack of instructions from Washington, Hodge offered to leave
his post if such an action would save American credibility and prestige in Korea. If he
were not removed, Hodge demanded to be kept fully informed about future American
429 HUSAFIK, vol. 2, ch. 2, 53; Richard Robinson, Betrayal of a Nation, 30.
430 New York Times, January 26, 1946; Seoul Shinmun, January 26, 1946; Acting Secretary of State
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policy decisions in Korea.
433 General MacArthur, Hodge’s superior, refused to accept his
resignation because he had faith in Hodge’s ability. Hodge blamed the State Department
experts for the fiasco, claiming they did not know anything about Korea. He stated that
the State Department should more seriously consider some of his recommendations and
information forwarded from Seoul which, he insisted, was “based on fact and not
theory.”
434
E. Grant Meade argued that the problem basically stemmed from a faulty
command structure. MacArthur should not have been given responsibility for both the
Japanese and Korean occupation. The two situations were, in fact, quite different. Japan
was a defeated enemy; Korea was a liberated nation. There should have been a separate
channel of communication between Seoul and Washington.
435 As a result the judgment
of the local commander’s decisions in Korea was not given enough consideration. If
American policymakers had been in closer coordination with General Hodge, that fatal
mistake might have been avoided on the Korean peninsular.
Immediately after he landed in Korea, Hodge found that trusteeship in Korea,
with its emphasis on collaboration with the Russians, would not work. He believed that
North and South Korea could not be united until Russia was certain that the Korea would
remain a friendly country to the Soviet Union.
436 George F. Kennan, the United States
Ambassador in Moscow, supported General Hodge’s views. Kennan said that “there can
433 Berger, 65.
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now be little doubt that the U.S.S.R. wishes to assure [the] earliest and most complete
exclusion of other great powers from all connections with Korean affairs.”
437
Historical arguments on the meaning of the Moscow Conference for Korea vary.
Traditional historians argue that the Moscow communiqué could not be fulfilled because
the Soviets attempted to win a propaganda victory at the expense of the United States in
the wake of the agreement. On the other hand, revisionist historians blame the United
States for the ultimate failure of the Moscow agreement. They claim the Soviets were
prepared to grant immediate independence to Korea and believe American policy makers
used trusteeship as a tool to check possible Soviet domination in the region. According
to revisionist historians, General Hodge was adamantly opposed to the agreement. In
1980s and 1990s, revisionist Korean historians now argued that the leaders and people of
Korea during that time should have accepted a trusteeship because that was the last
chance to unify the Korean peninsula within an agreement fostered between the two
super powers.
438
In accordance with the Moscow agreement, the Joint Commission between the
Soviet Union and the United States convened at Seoul on March 20, 1946. At the
opening commencement of the Joint Commission, Colonel General Terenti Shtikov, the
chief of the Soviet delegation, claimed that:
The future provisional Korean democratic government must be created on a basis
of wide unification of all the democratic parties and organizations, supporting the
decision of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs... the
Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and
independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not
437 Kennan to Secretary of State, January 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 8: 619-21.
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become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.”
439
The Soviet delegation contended that those political parties and social
organizations that opposed the trusteeship and participated in anti-trusteeship activities
were not eligible for consultation about establishing the provisional Korean government.
The Russians demanded the exclusion almost all from the American delegation of the
rightists who supported the anti-communist parties. As General Hodge recommended to
Washington in February, while the Joint Conference was adjourned, the U.S. delegate
should issue the statement entitled “Statement of Aims, U.S. Delegation on Joint
American-Soviet Commission in Korea.” In the statement, its drafters argued that:
Freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and press are absolute and not relative or
subject to exceptions. They apply to all democratic persons, all democratic
schools of thought, all democratic parties, no matter how small their following or
whether or not their programs may correspond to the ideas of the existing
authorities.
440
In other words, the American delegation argued that the Koreans ought to be
permitted to express their views on any issue, including trusteeship, in terms of the right
of “freedom of expression.”
441 This statement not only represented the idea of American
democracy but also showed the intention of American delegation also was to prevent the
domination of Korea by the Soviet Union.
442 When both sides expressed their ideas
about the Joint Commission at the Joint Conference, neither side was able to agree on the
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definition of “democratic.”  As a result the conference failed because neither side could
agree as to the qualifications of the political parties and social organizations that were to
participate in the Joint Commission.
When it came to the Joint Commission, the United States faced a dilemma. If it
abided by and implemented the Moscow agreement, the delegation from the United
States would be forced to eliminate almost all rightists and allow only Communists and
their sympathizers in South Korea to participate in the establishment of the provisional
government. If the United States of America did not participate, it would violate the
compromise between the two countries in Moscow and the Joint Commission would
collapse.
443
President Truman also wrote an account of the meeting in his memoirs:
This Commission, which was, of course, the key element in the plan
agreed upon at Moscow, was dead-locked almost from the start. We took
the position that all Koreans were free to express their opinion and that
the Commission should listen to representatives of any Korean political or
social group that wished to be heard. The Russians, however, insisted that
only those Koreans should be allowed to address the Commission who had
given full support to the terms of the Moscow agreement. Virtually all the
political parties active in our zone, however, had expressed their
disappointment that independence would be postponed and a trusteeship phase
instituted first, and by Russian standards that disqualified them from being heard
by the Joint Commission. Korean Communists, of course, had refrained from
open opposition to the Moscow agreement, and because of this, if the Russians
had had their way, no one but the Communists would have been allowed to speak
on behalf of the Korean people.
444
To solve the dilemma stemming from the earlier opposition of the rightists to
trusteeship, and at the same time not break the agreement, the United States adopted the
policy of “freedom of expression” that guaranteed the right of the political parties and
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444 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 320.163
social organizations to express opposition against the trusteeship even if they agreed to
sign it as a prerequisite for participating in the establishment of an interim government.
445
As Richard Robinson argues, the policy of freedom of expression was “a false
issue manufactured for the occasion to cloud the real issues and discredit the Russians…
and was a necessary maneuver to prevent Russian domination of all Korea.” The Soviets
rejected the AMG’s interpretation of the Moscow agreement. The Joint Commission
deadlocked on this question until the middle of April. The Soviets then offered a new
proposal that guaranteed to “consult with political parties and social organizations that
acknowledge their mistake despite their former opposition to the Moscow Agreement,
and support the Agreement.”
446 However, the Soviet delegation insisted that no party,
regardless of its adherence to agree upon formula, could be represented by an individual
who had expressed opposition to the trusteeship provision of the Moscow agreement.
Ultimately, the Joint Commission failed and adjourned without any success on May 6,
1946.
In a final statement on the Soviet position, Shtykov told Hodge:
The main reason why the Soviet delegation insisted on barring certain persons
from consultation is that Russia is a close neighbor to Korea and, because of this,
is interested in establishing in Korea a provisional democratic government which
would be loyal to the Soviet Union….If they [the Koreans who raised their voices
against the Soviet Union] seized power in the government, the government would
not be loyal to Russia, and its officials would be instrumental in organizing hostile
action on the part of the Korean people against the Soviet Union.
447
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After the Joint Commission had failed to establish a provisional government, the
United States government and occupational authorities began to analyze the failure of the
Joint Commission. In addition, aware of the declining popularity of the AMG and in
order to gain popular support of Koreans, the United States began to adopt a new policy
designed to give Koreans of the American zone practice in self-government and to set up
a coalition between the moderate rightists and moderate leftists. October 7, 1946, five
months after the Joint Commission had adjourned, the Left-Right Coalition Committee
under the leadership of Kim Kyu-sik, a moderate rightist, and Yo Un-hyoung, a moderate
leftist, established “a democratic transitional government” in accordance with the
Moscow agreement.
On October 13, the AMG announced the creation of the South Korean Interim
Legislative Assembly (SKILA; Nam Choson Kwado Ippop Uiwon), which was to be a
branch of the proposed South Korean Interim Government (SKIG; Nam Choson Kwado
Chongbu). The SKILA replaced the Representative Democratic Council of South
Korea.
448 Half of the ninety members of the assembly were to be elected on the basis of
population and the other half Hodge would appoint.
449 The military government
excluded the extremists of the right-wing that caused the breakdown of the Joint
Commission. To strength the position of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviets in future
negotiations in the Joint Commission,
450 the military government adopted the policy of
448 Ordinance No. 118 of the Military Government, promulgated on August 24. See USAFIK, Official
Gazette, August 24, 1946, 1.
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coalition between the right and the left rather than trying to enhance the right-wing group
alone.
From the adjourning of the first Joint Commission in early May to the opening of
SKILA on October 13, 1946, the Left-Right coalition movement emerged as the crucial
political force in the south under American occupation.
451 The military government
announced its intention to hold the elections in late October. It was the first election in
South Korea since liberation from the Japanese. The handling of the process and result of
the election disappointed the coalition group. It became apparent that the rightist forces,
led by Rhee and Kim Ku, would overwhelmingly dominate the new Assembly. The
leaders of the coalition movement now charged that the election was undemocratic and
unlawful
452; Kim Kyu-sik, the president of SKILA, asked the military government for a
complete re-do over of the election, and Yo Un-hyong announced his retirement from
politics on December 4, 1946. The Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku faction, along with the
left, established the Legislative Assembly in the south on September of 1947, despite
America military attempts to eliminate political extremism.
453
Elected Appointed Total
Right 38 17 55
Moderate 1 15 16
Left 2 12 14
451 HUSAFIK, vol. 2, ch. 2, 91-92.
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Vacancies 4 1 5
45 45 90
Cited in Cho, Korea in World Politics, 132.
The Left-Right Coalition policy of the military government to consolidate the
moderate forces failed. The main reason for supporting the moderate forces was the
AMG fear that if the military government supported the rightist group, the majority of
moderates would join the communist camp. Lacking genuine support from the military
government, Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik’s Coalition policy between the moderate
right and left political forces designed to establish a unified and independent Korea. That
eventuality would have conflicted with American policy which considered the Coalition
movement as a mere consolidation of the rightist forces and eventually doomed to fail. In
the end, Yo Un-hyong’s assassination on July 19, 1947 by the rightist group seemed to
doom the last chance of national unification for Korean people.
Korean rightist leaders considered the policy of the AMG an invitation to
establish a “separate government” under the mandate of the election in South Korea.
454
The leftist forces, including the communists, opposed the election because they believed
it would further divide the country. Facing outright opposition from the left, the military
government in September 1946, closed three left-wing newspapers and arrested many
prominent Communist leaders. This suppression of the Communist Party marked an
important departure from the previous policy under American occupation.
455 In June of
1946, Syngman Rhee while traveling provincial regions also began to make public
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455 Cho, 133.167
speeches calling for the establishment of a separate government in the south.
456 When
Rhee went to Washington in December 1946 to persuade leaders of the American
government that “Russia would not agree to the establishment of a free government for
all Korea,”
457 he recommended that the United States support the establishment of a
separate government in the south, too.
After the first Joint Commission adjourned in May 1946, General Hodge wrote a
series of letters to General Chistiakov, the Soviet commander, to seek a resumption of the
Joint Commission for the unification of Korea. His effort failed. He reported to
Washington in July that there would be no possibility to reconvene the Joint Commission
at the local level and recommended that an effort be made to break the deadlock on the
U.S.-Russian governmental level. Approved by SWNCC, the State Department replied
to Hodge’s letter on August 3
rd, and explained that:
State, War and Navy Departments agree that it may eventually become necessary
to approach Soviets on a governmental level….For tactical reasons it is not
desirable to do so at this time. It is felt that such an approach now would indicate
U.S. impatience which would be interpreted by the Soviets as an indication of
weakness of our position in Korea. It is felt that desirable to indicate to Soviets in
every way possible that U.S. is determined to remain in Korea until U.S.
objectives have been achieved.
458
In October 1946, Major General A.V. Arnold, the chief American delegate on the
Joint Commission, expressed that “there was no hope” of negotiation between the two
superpowers and recommended that “if nothing is done, it must be on a higher level.”
459
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People in south were becoming very disillusioned by the results achieved by the Joint
Commission. October 18, the Coalition Committee issued a request for the reopening the
American-Soviet Joint Commission:
In accordance with the decision of the Moscow three-power conference, Soviet
Russia and the US, in order to accomplish the assigned task toward the people of
Korea, had formed the American-Soviet Joint Commission and had for some time
carried on its sessions. But the sudden indefinite adjournment of the said
Commission (since May 6, 1946) is not only a matter of deep regret but also
retards the realization of the burning aspiration of the Korean people to reestablish
their country as an independent state.
460
On January 20, 1947 General Hodge reported that there was danger of “full-
fledged civil war” in Korea “unless positive and cooperative international action is taken
immediately.”
461 General MacArthur also urged that “measures [should] be taken
immediately to break the U.S.-Russian deadlock in Korea by diplomatic means.”
462 In
order to solve the crisis situation in Korea, a Special Inter-Departmental Committee on
Korea, consisting of members of the War Department and the State Department,
submitted a draft report on February 25, 1947 suggested holding a separate highest level
meeting between the United States and the Soviet representatives to resolve all current
problems in Korea during the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was supposed to
convene in Moscow on March 10, 1947.
On basis of reports from local commanders and a special committee, President
Truman gave approval to Secretary of State Marshall to reconvene the Joint
460 United State Department of State, October 18, FRUS 1946, 8: 749.
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Commission.
463 While in Moscow, on April 8, 1947, George C. Marshall raised a
question which he sent a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov:
I wish to call to your attention to the situation in Korea. The representatives
of the Soviet Union and the United States on the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
  Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress towards the
establishment of a Korean provisional government. It has been 19 months since
the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into
two zones. The Soviet Commander in northern Korea has refused to permit
freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This
has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has
resulted in grave economic distress.
Marshall explained that the policy of the United States toward Korea had the
following basic objectives:
1. to assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing
sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for
membership in the United Nations;
2. to insure that the National Government so established shall be
representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people;
3. to aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis
for their independent and democratic state.
If, in the view of your Government, there seems little hope that the Joint
Commission in its new meetings can achieve the results expected of it in
the Moscow Agreement, I will be pleased to discuss reconsideration of the
Moscow Agreement in the effort to find a better way to bring about the
establishment of Korea as a genuinely free, independent and stable nation.
464
In May of 1947, after a subsequent exchange of letters, Molotov responded
favorably and agreed to reopen the Joint Commission without clarifying the issues to be
discussed or confirming that it would operate on the basis suggested by Secretary
Marshall. Marshall stated that the position of the United States was that “Korean
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representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from
consultation with the Commission…because of opinions they might hold or may have
expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they
are prepared to cooperate with the Commission.”
465
The Molotov-Marshall correspondence led directly to the second and final
meeting of the Joint Commission on May 20, 1947. Why did the Soviet Union resume the
Joint Conference? It seems that further delay in negotiations might leave the United
States no other choice than to increase economic aid to South Korea and to establish a
separate South Korean government.
466 Another reason, according to Soon Sung Cho, is
that it seems the Russians may also have believed that the left in Korea would be strong
enough to win against the right by the time a general election could be held.
467 While
rightists led by Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku were opposed to joining the Joint
Commission, the moderate groups and leftists declared their support of the ideas.
By the end of June, there was some progress in consulting with political parties
and social organizations in North and South Korea by the Soviets and the Americans.
Four hundred sixty-three political parties and social organization submitted applications
for consultation. Among them, four hundred and twenty-five were from South Korea:
fifty-five percent rightist and forty-five percent leftist. According to the poll, the
majority of Koreans favored that some parties and social organizations be eliminated
from consultation with the Joint Commission. The poll results were as follows: the KDP
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(1227), the Korean Independence Party (Kim Ku’s party) (922), the NSRRKI (Rhee’s
group) (309), the South Korean Labor Party (174), the DPF (9), Nochong (rightist labor
union) (91), and Chongpyong (leftist labor union) (14). The poll shows that many
Koreans felt the rightist anti-trusteeship parties and social organizations should be
excluded from the consultation. The poll also indicates that many Korean people favored
the KPR as the country’s name (70%) and the people’s committees as its governing
political body (71%).
468
The Soviet agreement implied that Moscow would drop its opposition to the
participation of Korean political parties which had opposed trusteeship. However, once
again, by July, Moscow was insisting on the exclusion of all Koreans who had joined in
political parties and social organizations which had participated in the anti-trusteeship
activities. The second and final Joint Commission met for five months but it failed, too,
because of the same reason; disagreement as to which political parties and social
organizations should be consulted in establishing a Korean provisional government.
469
Faced with the complete stalemate in the Joint Commission and in hopes of
finding a way to break the deadlock the Acting Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett on
August 26, 1947, wrote a letter Molotov that “the four powers adhering to the Moscow
Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out.” Lovett
proposed that representatives of the four powers begin their conversations in Washington
468 G-2 “Periodic Report,” no. 478, July 11, 1947; cited in Kim Jinwung, “American Policy and Korean
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on September 8, 1947.
470 However, the Soviet Union rejected the offer and replied that
the proposed conference was outside the scope of the Moscow agreement. Molotov
maintained that the Joint Commission was the only proper agency for implementing the
Moscow agreement. He also argued that the impasse “is primarily the result of the
position adopted by the American delegation.”
471
After the Joint Commission adjourned, on September 16
th Robert Lovett advised
Molotov that the American government had resolved to submit the Korean problem to the
United Nations.
472 On September 26, the Soviet Union responded by offering the joint
withdrawal of occupation forces in order to give the Koreans a chance to solve their
problems by themselves and to organize their own government without outside
intervention.
473 However, neither side was willing to give up their interests in Korea and
it proved impossible to reach an agreement between two countries.
Historian Carl Berger blames the permanent division of Korea on Truman’s
belligerent foreign policy against the Soviet Union. According to Cho, Russians viewed
American new policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan “not only as
barriers to the spread of communism, but also as serious threats to herself.”
474 Truman’s
policies intensified the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. The
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chances for fulfillment of the Moscow agreement on Korea, he contends, were slim and
the possibility of unification of Korea was unlikely.
475 Furthermore, as Cho points out,
after World War II “the reduction in the number of states able to play a major role in
international politics seriously affected diplomatic flexibility, partly because of the
disappearance of an effective balancer.”
476 Thus, there were no nations to break the
Korean impasse between the United States and the Soviet Union by their “good offices.”
In conclusion, I believe that an important cause of the failure of the Joint
Commission in 1946-1947 was the mindset of the American military government. From
the perspective of the Soviet Union, as Shytikov illustrated in a statement at the opening
day of the first Joint Commission in May 20, 1946, the Soviet Union had a keen interest
in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet Union wanted to build a Korea “friendly” to the Soviet
Union and one that would “not become a base for an attack on it” in the future.
477
Accordingly, the determination of the Soviet Union to fulfill the Moscow agreement was
more serious than the United States. Thus, Stalin decided to send higher ranking generals
than the United States did. In the Joint Commission, the Soviets emphasized not only
Korean independence but also Soviet interests in Korea. As Cumings argues, it was the
Soviet Union that suggested the arrangement for a provisional government in the
Moscow agreement. Second, the Soviet position was more logical and consistent
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throughout the whole conference because they planned to stick to the Moscow
agreement.
After adjournment of the Joint Committee, the Left-Right Coalition Policy of the
military government was designed to set up a new political structure in the south. Having
become weary of the rightists, who proved an obstacle at the conference, the American
military government feared that if it only supported the rightist groups, moderates would
join the communists. At the beginning of the occupation, had the American military
authorities offered administrative power to the coalition groups or the moderate rightists
and leftists groups, which comprised a majority of Korean nationalists, rather than
belatedly, the coalition groups, which were more acceptable to the Soviets, could have
gained political hegemony in the south and possibly built a united, independent, and
democratic country.
In the end, as Cumings claims, the military government was fixated on building
an anti-communist bulwark in Korea and therefore did not consider Yo Un-hyong and
Kim Kyu-sik’s coalition groups as the legitimate and proper political forces to carry out
reform in the south. They viewed it as a mere instrument to expand the influence of the
rightist group. When the coalition group’s ideas and policies came into conflict with the
American military government policy, it finally was doomed to failure. In any case, the
Moscow agreement became a turning point in the politics of Korea. Throughout the
duration of the anti-trusteeship movement, the rightists, including many former Japanese
collaborators, challenged “the nationalist credentials of the Left” and transformed
themselves into “anti-communist” patriots in the south. The rightists reminded the
people that the Moscow Agreement resembled the methods of Japanese colonial rulers175
earlier. Ultimately, they rallied Koreans together through their leadership of the anti-
trusteeship movement and began to oppose decisions of the superpowers. Historical,
collective experience and reminiscences of Korean leaders and the people about earlier
relations with foreign powers in the early 20
th century now prohibited Koreans from
considering the only viable chance for unification of Korea at the time.
More important, as the Cold War climate more deeply influenced politics in
Korea, it also intensified the polarization of rightists and leftists. Due to vehement
resistance of rightists in the south and a lukewarm attitude among officials of the
American military government, the decisions reached in the Moscow agreement could
not be fulfilled in Korea. This result, in turn, further illustrated that the relationship
between the two superpowers was deteriorating. The hope for a unified Korea anytime
soon was fading away. As the trusteeship plan in Korea shows, however, the power
relations between local leaders and the superpowers were not one-dimensional, flowing
merely from the top down. Sometimes powers relations seemingly flowed in a different
or even inverse fashion.176
CHAPTER VI
Two Koreas and Withdrawal of Foreign Occupation Forces
This chapter investigates why and how the United States took the Korean problem
to the United Nations after the repeated failures of the U.S.-Soviet Union Joint
Commission and why the Soviets boycotted the American plan. It also describes the
political landscape on the Korean peninsula, dramatic changes that occurred since the
failure of the Joint Commission, and how Korean nationalists, faced with a permanent
division of Korea, tried unsuccessfully to revive efforts to unify the south and north. It
shows how South Korea was established and how political and ideological divisions were
transformed into a climate of competition between North Korea and South Korea.
After the breakdown of the Joint Commission, the American government realized
that the Korean unification problem could not be solved by bilateral negotiation between
the Soviet Union and the United States, so it therefore sought a different solution. The
United States government encountered increasing pressure from the American public,
who wanted their soldiers back home as soon as possible and reduced military spending.
President Truman described the situation, writing: “I instructed the State and Defense
Departments to weigh our commitments and consider where we might safely
withdraw.”
478 The American military government in Korea also dealt with increasing
478 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 325.177
disdain among the Korean people who were disappointed with the results attained by the
Joint Commission. Thus, policy makers in Washington reviewed Korean policy during
the summer and fall of 1947, and as a result, the United States government decided to
submit the Korean issue to the United Nations despite strong opposition by the Soviet
Union.
479 United States decision makers believed that submission of the Korean problem
to the United Nations offered “the greatest chance of bringing about the most favorable
conditions for early U.S. withdrawal… without serious damage to the military security
position of the United States in the Far East.”
480
On September 17, 1947, having submitted the Korean question to the United
Nations, Secretary of State George C. Marshall told the United Nations General
Assembly, saying “We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach
agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to
independence.”
481 Yet, this American action ultimately led to the emergence of separate
479 Joungwon Alexander Kim, Divided Korea, 79; Soon Sung Cho, Korea in the World Politics, 182-83;
Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, 41. Faced with the opposition of the
Soviet Union, the United Nations had practically no means of unifying of Korea. Goodrich criticize that it
merely received a “hot potato” from the United States. For a strong argument against the United Nations
role in Korean affairs, see Jon Holliday, “The United Nations and Korea,” in Frank Baldwin (ed.), Without
Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973), 109-142.
Holliday writes: “The United Nations was not called in to concern itself with Korea by the people of
Korea. It was mobilized by the United States to add the weight of what was alleged to be ‘world opinion’
in support of America’s policy,” 109; cited in Hakjoon Kim, Unification Policies of South and North
Korea, 1945-1991: A Comparative Study (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1992), 61.
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Whitney Stueck, Jr. The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 86.
481 Address by Secretary Marshall before the UN General Assembly, September 17, 1947, unclassified;
Departmet of State Bulletin, September 28, 1947, 618-622; For an excellent study and detailed information
the United States government policy in the United Nations, see Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of
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Korean states in 1948. Actually, the United States policy makers sought United Nations
involvement for several reasons. First, previous bilateral negotiations between the Soviet
Union and the United States about Korean unification question did not succeed and led
only to stalemate. Secondly, the American leaders understood that the reach of United
States’ power could sway the opinion of the other members in the United Nations and
thereby pressure the Soviet Union to make concessions. Finally, the United States
government needed to support the South Koreans who were struggling against the
Communists and could not afford to withdraw from Korea until the Korean peoples
established their government.
482
In Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, Leland M. Goodrich
explains Washington’s decision for United Nations involvement:
Bringing the question before the General Assembly for a United Nations solution
seemed, under the circumstances, the most promising course. On the one hand,
this would meet a criticism of American policy which had been made at the time
of enunciation of the Truman Doctrine that the United States was bypassing the
United Nations. On the other hand, it would place on the United Nations and its
members some of the responsibility which the United States had hitherto assumed
alone. At the same time, since American military security was not considered to
be at stake, no vital interest would be jeopardized.
483
Some historians, however, criticize the Truman administration’s decision to involve the
United Nations in the Korean situation. In The Origins of the Korean War, Peter Lowe
argues that the United Nations had no power to bring about a compromise between two
countries especially when the United States had undue influence over its members. The
482 Cho, Korea in World Politics, 168.
483 Goodrich, Korea, 28-29.179
United Nations’ resolution, Lowe maintains, was merely a reflection of American policy
and was doomed to failure because of Soviet suspicions.
484
As for the withdrawal from Korea, the State Department officials thought that it
was impossible to make and adhere to a firm withdrawal timetable. They believed that
United States troops should stay in Korea long enough to build a South Korea strong
enough to resist any Communist threat.
485 Like Joseph E. Jacobs, political advisor to
General Hodge, they argued that the United States would lose prestige and credit among
the Asian peoples, especially in Japan, if they withdrew from Korea.
486 On the other
hand, military leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the officials in the Defense
Department, regarded the Korean peninsula as a low priority in terms of geo-political
strategy or for the security of the United States. They concluded that “the United States
has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.”
487 The
continued presence of American troops in Korea, they asserted, caused excessive military
expense and trouble. American troops, it seemed, should be withdrawn as soon as
possible before they suffered a serious loss of prestige. These United States officials also
recommended that Korea receive economic aid while the withdrawal took place.
488
President Truman sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China and Korea from
July 23 to September 3, 1947 to assess the situation before making a decision. General
484 Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, 43.
485 Butterworth Memorandum, March 4, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6: 1137.
486 Jacobs to Secretary of State, July 7, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6: 690-91.
487 Memorandum to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6: 815-816. See Truman,
Years of Trial and Hope, 325-26.
488 Forrestal to Secretary of State, September 29, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6: 817-18; Truman, Years of Trial
and Hope, 325-327.180
Wedemeyer recommended in his report to President Truman that to achieve a successful
withdrawal, the United States should build up South Korea’s strength to enable the newly
freed country to resist any potential military threat posed by the Communists.
489
Wedemeyer believed that a Soviet invasion was “currently improbable,” yet also felt
American troops should remain in South Korea until the Soviets also withdrew their
forces.
490
At the U.N., the General Assembly voted on September 23, 1947, to place the
Korea question on its agenda and referred it to the First Committee for consideration and
report.
491 The Soviet Union, however, was not willing to work with the United Nations.
Three days later, on September 26, the Soviet delegation on the Joint Commission in
Seoul proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea “during the
beginning of 1948” and that the Koreans organize their own government themselves
without outside interference.
492 The American delegation rejected the Russian proposal,
claiming the Joint Commission did not have the authority to consider the question. On
October 9, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov offered the same proposal to Secretary of
State Marshall. On October 18, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett replied to
Molotov’s proposal, stating “the question of withdrawal of foreign occupation forces
from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of the problem of setting
489 The Wedemeyer Report to President, September 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6: 796-803.
490 Ibid; New York Times, 29 August 1947, 7.
491 U.N. Official Document, Verbatim Record, Second Session, 1947, the Plenary Meeting, Vol. 1, 299.
492 Tel. 381 from Seoul, September 26, 1947, secret; in US Department of States, decimal file, 740.00119
Control (Korea)/9-2647.181
up an independent government for a unified Korea, and added that the Soviet suggestions
had been called to the attention of the General Assembly.”
493
The Soviet proposal created a dilemma for the United States government because
American policy was to maintain its troops in South Korea until the establishment of an
independent government there while, at the same time, rejecting suggestions for
withdrawal of occupation forces.
494 Disregarding evidence that 57 percent of the
participants in the survey favored the Soviet proposal,
495 the United States representatives
on October 17, 1947, submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee of the General
Assembly that the Soviet Union and the United States hold elections in their respective
zones of Korea under United Nations supervision no later than March 31, 1948, for the
purpose of electing a national assembly and forming a national government. As
representation in the Korean National Assembly was to be apportioned on the basis of
population,
496 South Korea would be assured two-thirds of the elected representation.
Elected members of the national assembly would then be responsible for establishing a
national government. In turn, this new government, in consultation with the
Commission, would negotiate with foreign occupation authorities for the withdrawal of
their troops from Korea.
497 The United States resolution also proposed the creation of a
493 Acting Secretary Lovett to Mr. Molotov, Oct. 18, 1947, unclassified; in US Department of States, RG
59, decimal file, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10-1747; U.S. Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), 6-7.
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United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe national
elections in the country.
498
When the First Committee of the United Nation General Assembly took up the
Korean question on October 28, 1947, the Soviet Union turned down the American offer
and suggested instead counterproposals in a draft resolution. Those documents called for
a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and establishment of a Korean government
by the indigenous people themselves. The First Committee rejected the Soviet resolution.
The Soviet delegate submitted another draft resolution to invite elected representatives of
the people from North and South Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean
question.
499 On November 5, the First Committee adopted a resolution based chiefly
upon the American draft that led to the creation of UNTCOK. The committee then made
their report to the General Assembly. On November 14, 1947, the United Nations
General Assembly finally adopted the American resolution recommended by the First
Committee without change.
500 The main provisions of the resolution adopted by the
General Assembly were as follows:
1. Elected representatives of the Korean people should be invited to take
part in the consideration of the Korean question, and in order to facilitate and
expedite such participation and to observe that Korean representatives were in
fact duly elected be the Korean people and not mere appointees of military
authorities in Korea, a nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on
498 United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1948, 247-298; United
Nations Document, A/C. 18/31.
499 U.N. Document, A/C. I/229; Goodrich, Korea, 31; U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Second
Session, Comms, 1-2 (1947), 606; Stueck, ibid., 90.
500 U.N. Official Record, Second Session, General Assembly Resolution 112(II), 16-18; New York Times,
November 14, 1947, 11; U.S. Department of States, Korea 1945 to 1948, 51-65.183
Korea
501 should be established, to be present in Korea, with the right to travel,
observe, and consult throughout Korea.
2. Elections should be held in Korea not later than March 31, 1948, “to
choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the
prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and
which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National
Government of Korea.”
3. As soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should
convene, form a National Government, and notify the Commission of its
formation.
4. Upon the establishment of a National Government, that government
should, in consultation with the Commission, constitute its own national security
forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein,
take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian
authorities of north and south Korea, and arrange with the occupying powers for
the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as soon as possible, if
practicable, within 90 days.
5. The Commission may consult with the Interim Committee of the
General Assembly in the light of developments.
6. The Member States concerned should afford every assistance and
facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
502
Thus, UNTCOK was created to supervise elections throughout the Korean
peninsula and had its first meeting in Seoul on January 12, 1948. The next day, it
adopted a resolution that “every opportunity be taken to make it clear that the sphere of
this Commission is the whole of Korea and not merely a section of Korea.” On January
15, the Commission decided to communicate with the military commanders of North and
501 The nine nations named to the Commission: Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the
Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine. The Ukrainian representative did not participate in the activities of the
Temporary Commission.
502 Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Nov. 14, 1947, unclassified; U.S.
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South Korea. However, Soviet occupation authorities refused to cooperate with
UNTOCK as far as any nationwide election in Korea was concerned.
503
In response to the Moscow’s boycott, UNTCOK decided to consult with the
Interim Committee of the General Assembly in February 19, 1948. After hearing from
Chairman K. P. S. Menon of India a detailed survey of the political situation in Korea,
and despite opposition to separate elections of members of UNTCOK,
504 the Interim
Committee adopted a resolution on February 26, 1948 that stated: “as a necessary step
therein, the UNTCOK should proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea or, if
that were impossible, in as such much of Korea as was accessible to it.”
505 This decision
meant that there would be election in the south alone and not in North Korea for the time
being. It seemed to establish a permanent division of Korea and, thus, America’s mission
to achieve independent and a unified Korea seemingly had failed.
506 On March 11,
despite the opposition from Australia and Canada, UNTCOK decided to observe
elections in South Korea on May 10, 1948.
507 The elections were to be conducted on the
basis of an adult suffrage and by secret ballot.
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504 On opposition to a separate election existed among some of America’s allies. From the start, Australia
and Canada in UNTCOK maintained that the United Nations should not hold elections in South Korea
alone unless the North participated because this unilateral action would actually result in permanent
division and two hostile governments in Korea; in United Nation Document, A/AC. 18/SR. 9.
505 Resolution of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, Feb 26, 1948, unclassified; UN doc.
A/AC. 18/31; Korea, 1945 to 1948, 70-71; New York Times, February 27, 1948, 10; Austin to Secretary of
State, February 24 and March 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6: 1128-29, 1134-36; Landon to Secretary of State,
March 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6: 1146-47.
506 Goodrich, Korea, 49-50.
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Meanwhile, the decision of the United Nations-supervised election in Korea had
brought about tremendous resistance among the Korean peoples and produced a sharp
division among the political groups in South Korea. Except for some groups of the right
wing such as Syngman Rhee and KDP, who supported the United Nations’ decision to
hold immediate general elections, leftists and moderates such as Kim Kyu-sik, Yo Un-
hyong, as well as the die-hard rightist Kim Ku, opposed the United Nation’s plan. Kim
Ku argued that the U.N. did not have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of
Korea.
508 The latter groups believed that separate elections held only in South Korea
created a dangerous situation and perpetuated the division of Korea. These groups in
February 1948 formed the National Independence Federation, a loose coalition of
rightists and leftists opposed to the United Nations plan. On February 16, 1948, Kim
Kyu-sik, Kim Ku, and five other prominent political figures in the south proposed
convening a joint conference of political leaders of the South and North to achieve
Korean independence.
509
In an attempt to forestall national elections, North Korea, on March 25
th, called a
North-South Korean Leaders Conference at Pyongyang to discuss plans for the
unification and independence of Korea.
510 Some notable leaders in South Korea such as
Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, one of the leaders of the American sponsored coalition, who
508 Kim Ku, Paekbom Iichiji: The autobiography of Kim Ku, annotated by Do Jin Soon, (Seoul; Dolbagae,
1997), 1-9.
509 The idea of holding a joint conference between North and South Korean leaders to establish national
independence was not new. In late January 1948, Kim Kyu-sik, realizing that the Korean question could
not be settled either by the Moscow Agreement or by the United Nation, gave serious thought to convening
Korean independence without external interference and proposed a conference of northern and southern
leaders under UNTCOK’s observation; United States Department of Army, Supreme Commander, Allied
Forces, Japan, South Korean Interim Government Activities 30 (March 1948), 153-154.
510 SKIG Activities (March, 1948), 153-54,186
opposed the separate election on the grounds that it would be a permanent division of the
country, accepted the North Korean invitation.
511 Prior to his departure for Pyongyang,
Kim Kyu-sik issued a statement that contained five principles for national reconstruction:
1. Any form of dictatorship shall be rejected and a truly democratic government
should be established.
2. Monopolistic capitalism shall be rejected and private property ownership
should be recognized.
3. A united central government shall be established through a general election of
the entire nation.
4. No military bases shall be allowed to any foreign power.
5. Regarding the early withdrawal of the two occupation forces, the powers
concerned should immediately open negotiations for reaching an agreement as
to the time and conditions of withdrawal and make a definite pronouncement
to the world.
512
This conference, in which renowned South Korean political leaders participated,
gave Kim Il Sung a golden opportunity to claim that he and his communist party tried to
unify Korea with the full support of the entire people.
513 The North-South Joint
Conference occurred in Pyongyang on April 19-26, 1948. At the conference, leaders
criticized the United Nation plan and passed a series of resolutions. A joint communiqué
was issued on April 30. The main points of the communiqué were as follows:
1. The only solution for Korea under the present situation is the immediate and
simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.
2. Leaders of both the North and South will never permit an outbreak of civil war
or any disturbance which might militate against Korean desire for unity after
the withdrawal of foreign troops.
3. Following such withdrawal, a political conference of all of Korea will be
convened for the purpose of establishing a democratic provisional government,
511 United Nations Document, A/575, add. 2, 90.
512 Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation—A History of the Korean People (Seoul:
Hollym International Corp., 1996), 359-360.
513 Chong Sik Lee, “Negotiations among Private Groups: The Case of the 1948 South-North Consultative
Conference,” The Journal of Asiatic Studies (December 1970), 384. Quoted in Hanjoon Kim, Unification
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which in turn will “elect” a United Korean Legislative Organ on the principles
of universal, direct and equal elections and on the basis of a secret ballot. This
legislative organ will then adopt a constitution.
4. The signatories of this declaration will never acknowledge the result of a
separate election in South Korea nor support the separate government so
established.
514
When the leaders returned from the north in early May, they reported to the
people that Kim Il Sung would not establish a separate government in the north.
Furthermore, they announced that the North Koreans would continue to supply electricity
to the south and that Cho Man-sik, who was under house arrest, would soon be
released.
515 However, the week following the issuance of their joint statement in
Pyongyang, the supply of electricity from the north was suddenly cut off.
516 On May 1,
the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly adopted a new constitution. Many
hopeful people who supported the North-South Joint Conference now realized that the
North Koreans also were preparing to establish a separate government in the north just as
the south did.
517 As a result, the movement of the leaders of the south to unify the
Korean peninsula failed. It was the last effort for unification by the Koreans themselves.
Because of the deterioration in Cold War relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union, South Koreans were unable to progress further in their efforts for
unification at the time.
518
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In South Korea, the struggle between various groups those in support and
opposition to the separate election intensified. Throughout the south many bloody events
took place. On April 3, 1948, an uprising on Cheju-do, an island located some fifty miles
from the southern coast of the peninsular, was partly motivated by the residents’
determination to prevent the elections. Erupting suddenly on April 3, the revolt spread.
The American military government dispatched reinforcements to the island, but many
defected to the rebels. The situation grew so desperate that newspapers in Seoul began to
speculate that American troops might be needed to suppress the guerrillas. Such an
intervention never occurred, and the rebels on Cheju-do were finally defeated in the
spring of 1949. There were a large number of casualties and more than 12,000 houses
were destroyed.
519
According to historian John Merrill, Pyongyang was not in support of the
rebellion on Cheju-do. Although the Communist leaders in the North opposed the
elections, they realized that the southern guerrillas were too weak to threaten the elections
seriously. They preferred to resort to a united front strategy. Accordingly, a conference
was held in Pyongyang in April 1948.
520
At this crisis moment, in order to overcome formidable obstacles, the National
Security Council issued the report of April 2, 1948 (NSC 8) which summed up American
policy toward Korea on the eve of the elections:
521
(1) To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible,
independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.
519 John Merill, “Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local setting of the Korean War” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Delaware, 1982), 63-70.
520 Ibid.
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(2) To ensure that the national government so established shall be fully
representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
(3) To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational
system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state.
To these may be added that South Korea forces should build up as soon as
practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives.
522
UNTCOK also discussed the subject of the election, and on April 28, it adopted a
resolution that the Commission would observe the elections to be held on May 10.
523
They insisted that the elections were to be held in “a reasonable degree of free
atmosphere and the democratic rights of speech, press and assembly were to be respected
and observed.”
524 In spite of the bitter opposition of leftists and attempts of Communist
terrorists to obstruct and sabotage the elections, general elections were held in South
Korea on May 10
th to elect members to the National Assembly. The election resulted in
an overwhelming victory for the rightists including Syngman Rhee and the Korean
Democratic Party. It was not surprising that the National Assembly was dominated by
rightists: first, many leaders such as Kim Ku and members of the coalition committee,
including Kim Kyu-sik, did not participate in the election. Second, the Communist party
was outlawed by the military government. Third, Yo Un-hyong was assassinated on July
19, 1947.
525
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In the first election in Korean history approximately 95 percent of the registered
voters turned out to vote.
526 General Hodge announced that the May 10
th election was “a
great victory for democracy and a repudiation of Communism.”
527 On June 25, 1948, the
Temporary Commission reported that the results of the election are “a valid expression of
the will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the
Commission and in which the inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the
people of all Korea.”
528
It should be noted, however, that the announcement that “the elections were in
fact a free expression of Korean will,” is questionable.
529 The Korean police intimated
the persons who opposed the election and the rightists were intolerant of their opponents’
political activities, especially the leftists. Max Hastings claims that 589 people were
killed by Korean policemen and soldiers in the six weeks before the elections.
530 Also,
UNTOCK could not possibly have observed the election because the observers were too
few to cover the geographical scope of the election in South Korea. One of obstacles
faced by the Temporary Commission was that the Koreans had almost no experience with
elections.
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Meanwhile, Richard C. Allen, a military historian on the AMG, describes the
elections as “a qualified success.” Allen argues that Rhee’s popularity, first and
foremost, in the south cannot be denied. There were some threatening and violent acts,
nevertheless many Koreans participated in the election.
532 Joseph E. Jacobs asserts that
Rhee, in fact, was:
the outstanding leader in a confused, ill-informed society lacking in leadership—
no doubt a bad, self-seeking and unwise leader, but nevertheless a dominating,
shrewd, positive, feared character. His large following has nothing to do with
love or veneration for the man… It is … the result of a wide belief that Rhee is
the source of all present and future political power in South Korea, the supreme
protector of vested interests and the existing order of things, and that he is the
man on whom to stake all one’s fortunes. Although treatment of him by the
United States and events at times should have created doubts on this score, his
unfailing success, through a variety of circumstances in stealing every important
and historical public show in South Korea confirms and reconfirms this belief.
533
Jacobs believed that Rhee probably could have won an election because he was the best-
known candidate. He was well known as a Korean patriot. His political connections and
strength of personality helped to create the government of South Korea.
National Assembly Election Results, May 10, 1948
Party or Organization Leader No. Candidates No. Elected Percent Elected
Independent --- 417 85 20.3
National Society Syngman Rhee 235 55 23.4
532 Richard Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E.
Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1960), 97.
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KDP Kim Song-su 91 29 31.9
Great Korea Youth
Alliance Kim Ku 87 12 13.8
Radical Yough
Corps Yi Bum-sok 20 6 30.0
893 198
By Jungwon Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945-1972, 82.
Although members of varied political affiliation were elected, there was
essentially a three-way alignment within the assembly: 80 members including some of
independent members were controlled by the KDP, 61 members committed to Rhee, and
57 affiliated with the KPG group.
534 The most significant factor in the election was that
most eligible adults, including women in South Korea, for the first time, enjoyed their
suffrage in modern Korean history: 7,837, 504 eligible voters, or 79.9 percent of the
Koreans above the age of 21 had registered. Of this number, 51 percent were men and 49
percent were women.
535 The result of the May 10
th election did not represent “the birth
of Western-style pluralistic democracy.” However, it was an expression of desires
among Korean people for independence while at same time it represented “a tactical
victory for the United States policy.”
536
The May 10
th elections produced 198 elected representatives in the Korean
National Assembly. Originally, the National Assembly consisted of 300 members. One
534 Jungwon Kim, ibid., 117.
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hundred seats, though, were tentatively “reserved” for representatives from the north.
The members of the National Assembly represented single district with approximately
100,000 constituents each. The members consisted of large landowners, industrialists, as
well as small businessmen, professional men, scholars, and former participants in the
provisional government.
537 Syngman Rhee’s the National Society for the Acceleration of
Korean Independence won 55 of the 200 seats in South Korea’s new assembly. Rhee
easily reached agreements with other rightist parties, giving him a governing majority.
On May 31, 1948, the National Assembly convened for its first meeting and elected
Syngman Rhee as chairman by an overwhelming majority vote of 180. The Assembly
established rules of procedure, organized special committees, and set up a liaison system
between UNTOCK and the U.S. military government. On July 12, the Assembly adopted
a constitution.
538 It provided for a strong executive branch of government.
In the early stages of the National Assembly, its members discussed a constitution
for the Republic of Korea. Like the constitutional founding in the United States, two
groups, generally speaking, offered competing visions on how to build the form of
government: one favored a strong executive form of government; the other favored a
parliamentary system in which the cabinet would be responsible to the legislative
body.
539 The National Assembly decided in favor of a strong executive power for the
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Republic of Korea on July 12, 1948. The delegates signed and promulgated it into law on
July 17.
The constitution provided for three branches of the government—executive,
legislative, and judiciary—within a system of a checks and balances. Under its terms the
people of Korea would elect their President and Vice-President as well as members of the
National Assembly. The President of Korea would appoint all officials of the
government including the Chief Justice of Supreme Court and the Prime Minster,
540
although the appointments had to be confirmed by the Assembly. The Constitution also
provided the Assembly power to impeach the President. A State Council of eight to
fifteen members was created as more or less a consultative body to assist the President.
All heads of the eleven executive ministers were made members of this Council, and the
President was empowered to appoint or discharge them without the approval of the
legislative body.
On July 20, the National Assembly elected Syngman Rhee President of the
Republic of Korea and Lee Si Young Vice-President.
541 President-elect Rhee appointed
Lee Bum-suk as Prime Minister. The formation of the new republic was completed by
early August. On August 9, President Rhee notified the occupation authorities of the
official existence of the new government and requested that governmental authority be
placed in its hands. On August 12, the American government stated: “it is the view of
the United States government that the Korean government so establishment is entitled to
540 The Office of Prime Minister was abolished in 1954 by constitutional amendment; Hakjoon Kim,
Unification Policy, 58.
541 By constitutional amendment in 1952, the President and Vice-President are elected by popular vote.195
be regarded as the Government of Korea envisaged by the General Assembly resolution
on November 14, 1947,”
542 and designated John J. Muccio as special representative of
President Truman with the rank of ambassador, to the Republic of Korea.
543
On August 15, 1948, the third anniversary of Korean liberation, the new
government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated. On December 12, 1948, the
United Nation General Assembly expressed its approval for the election and adopted a
resolution declaring that “there has been established a lawful government (the
Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that
part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult… and
that this is the only such Government in Korea.”
544 In other words, the United Nations
had recognized the Republic of Korea with the status of being the only legitimate
government on the Korean peninsula,
545 and it was so recognized by the nations of the
non-Communist world. However, the new South Korean government was not able to
control their new domain. For example, the ill-equipped and ill-trained South Korean
army was inadequate to cope with internal security problems.
546
542 New York Times, 13 August 1948, 1; U.S. Department of State Department of State Bulletin (August 22,
1948), 242.
543 New York Times, 2 January 1949, 1; John J. Muccio File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence
Missouri.
544 United Nations General Assembly, resolution 195 (III), December 12, 1948; U.S. Department of State
Department of State Bulletin (December 12, 1948), 729; The text of the U.N. Resolution of December 12,
1948, can be found in Goodrich, Korea, 217-19.
545 Marshall to Lovett, November 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6: 1327-29.
546 Cho, Korea in World Politics, 230-31.196
Soon after American troops started to withdraw, the situation of South Korea
became plagued by acts of sabotage and the outbreak of riots. Less than two months after
the inauguration of Republic of Korea, there was a serious army mutiny at Yosu and
Sunchon when on October 2, 1948 the constabulary forces sent to suppress the revolt on
Cheju Island rebelled against the central government. It quickly spread to the southern
Cholla province. Some one thousand lives were lost before the rebels were defeated after
a month’s fighting. According to a report of the U.N Commission in Korea, 9,536 rebels
were killed or captured between October 1948 and August 1949.
547 The historian Max
Hastings asserts that there were a total of 89,710 police arrests from September 1948 to
April 1949 and only 28,404 of the victims were released without charge.
548 On
November 2, at Taegu, another constabulary troops’ revolt broke out. However, it was
also quickly suppressed.
After the Yosu and Taegu revolts, Rhee declared martial law in one-fourth of
South Korea
549 and transformed the country into a virtual police state. Rhee asked the
United States government to maintain American troops in Korea until Korean forces were
able to maintain law and order.
550 In this emergency situation the newly-born Republic
of Korea was on the verge of collapse because of a lack of internal security, and the
reality that the Department of Army had adopted a schedule to remove all American
troops from Korea by the end of 1948. Army leaders believed that their mission to
547 Cho, ibid., 232.
548 Hasting, The Korean War, 42.
549 Seoul Shinmun, November 2-8, 1948.
550 U.S. Department of State, The Conflict of Korea: Events Prior to the Attacks on June 25, 1950
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establish a South Korean government was completed and that the time had come for
American troops to withdraw. Accordingly, the army under the National Security
Council directive (NSC-8) began its withdrawal. Then, the State Department requested
the military leaders to temporarily halt withdrawal and remain in Korea until South
Korean forces were able to protect their government from internal conflicts.
Consequently, the withdrawal was delayed until June 30, 1949.
In sum, as a result of the breakdown of the 1
st and 2
nd Joint Commissions, the
United States and the Soviets could not fulfill the Moscow agreement. Also, after World
War II ended, Truman faced strong pressure from the people and Congress to bring the
soldiers home and reduce the military budget. In addition, due to fears that leftists might
soon dominate the Korean peninsula, the U. S. government decided to submit the Korean
issue to the United Nations in order to establish a separate government as the best way to
guarantee the interest of Americans. Again, U. S. interests took priority. After the
announcement of the results of the South Korean election, the rightists supported the
decision of the United Nations. Korean nationalists, however, such as Kim Kyu-sik and
the die-hard rightist Kim Ku (who, ironically, had helped consolidate rightist political
power until then), met together to prevent the permanent division of Korea and to hold
the North-South Korean Joint Conference on March 25, 1948. Their efforts came too
late. The different regimes already were established in North and South. Furthermore,
the onset of the Cold War brought deteriorating relations and less frequent cooperation
between the United States and the Soviet Union and that development, in turn, impacted
local community and politics as well.198
As a result of the May 10
th elections in the south, Syngman Rhee proclaimed the
establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948. In response to the formation
of the new government in the south, the Russians and Kim Il Sung in the north
established the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948 and the
Supreme People’s Assembly appointed Kim Il Sung as the premier of the DPRK. The
existence of two different governments at the time further cemented the division of the
peninsula. Yet, at the same time, these two new governments both claimed jurisdiction
over all of Korea. The two men who led these rival regimes, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il
Sung, were equally determined to reign over a united nation. Since each viewed the other
as nothing but a usurper or a puppet of a foreign country, peaceful unification now
seemed unlikely.199
CHAPTER VII
Syngman Rhee and the First Republic of Korea
This chapter examines who or what department was responsible for the American
decision to withdraw from Korea.It also explores Rhee’s foreign policy toward the
United States. I deal, moreover, with the activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group
in Korea after the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed forces. Lastly, this chapter investigates
why the Truman administration decided to intervene in the Korean War. In each case, it
appears self-interested agendas were at the core of U. S. policy.
On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (hereafter cited as ROK) was
established in the south. Syngman Rhee and the KDP advocated the establishment a
separate government to prevent overrun by the Communists.
551 President Rhee was
confident in the procedure for establishing of Korea, not only because of his political
victory, but also because the United Nations agreed to accept responsibility for the
independence of a unified Korea and had shown support for his new government. Rhee
believed that the United Nations decision on Korean unification was proof that “even a
powerful nation like Russia cannot afford always to ignore world opinion.”
552
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On September 12, 1948, the optimism of Rhee and his followers was reflected in
the National Assembly which adopted the following resolution for Korean unification:
We hope you, our fellow countrymen in North Korea, will hold a general election
soon in a free atmosphere, in accordance with the United Nations resolution, as
we did, and elect the true representatives of the people, sending them to the
National Assembly.
553
The National Assembly, it should be remembered, had reserved 100 seats in the
Assembly for the representatives of North Korea, once that region held elections under
the observation of the United Nations Commission, similar to the action taken in South
Korea.
However, contrary to Rhee’s expectations, the first Republic of Korea began with
a turbulent domestic and international environment. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean
War, many tragic incidents took place in the south. Internationally, the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union had deteriorated during the early stage of
the Cold War, thus making it difficult to build a democratic country. These internal and
external situations shaped the character of South Korean society as it is today.
554
With the inauguration of the Government of the Republic of Korea on August 15,
1948, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was
terminated and began to negotiate for the transfer of its authorities. After August 15, the
United States Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) needed a new agency for assisting the
Korean forces. General Hodge was replaced by General John B. Coulter on August 27.
General Coulter organized a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) under the
553 U.S. Department of State, The Record on Korean Unification 1943-1960 (Washington, D.C.:
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command of General William L. Roberts.
555 During the remainder of 1948 PMAG had
problems: first, small numbers of advisors in PMAG (100 in August to 241 by the end of
the year because of the riots) could not fully train Korean units. Second, the members of
PMAG were mainly relegated to administrative purposes.
556 Thus, PMAG officially
ended on July 1, 1949 when the withdrawal of the United States troops had been
completed. It was then reborn as the United States Military Advisor Group to the
Republic of Korea (KMAG) under the jurisdiction of Ambassador Muccio.
557
In the meantime, before the ROK was established, the Joint Chiefs Staff had made
plans for the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Korea in the latter part of
1947. They were concerned primarily with three major problems: (1) withdrawal of
United States troops; (2) giving military aid and assistance, including training of Korean
security forces and furnishing of equipment and supplies; and (3) rendering assistance so
as to enable the Republic to develop a viable economy.
558 On August 4, 1947, the
SWNCC established an ad hoc committee to formulate a withdrawal policy for Korea.
Although the United States military authorities favored an early withdrawal, they worried
about negative ramifications of pursuing such a course. The planners of the Department
of State argued that “the United States cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under
circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire
country. The resulting political repercussions might seriously damage U.S. prestige in
555 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 35.
556 Ibid.
557 Cho, 251.
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the Far East and throughout the world, and would probably discourage those small
nations that currently relying upon U.S. support to resist internal or external Communist
pressure. Every effort, it seemed, though, should be made to liquidate or reduce the U.S.
commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as possible without abandoning Korea
to Soviet domination.”
559
President Truman dispatched General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China and Korea
on a fact-finding mission in July 23, 1947 to evaluate U.S. commitments in Korea, and
General Wedemeyer submitted an extensive report to the President on September 19,
1947. The report stated that it would be unacceptable to the American public if American
troops indefinitely occupied South Korea. Although he agreed the United States had little
strategic interest in Korea, he argued that a withdrawal from Korea would cost
immensely in moral prestige and credibility among Asians and allies throughout the
world. Therefore, in order to withdraw United States troops from Korea, Wedemeyer
recommended that the United States should actively train and equip Korean security
forces to fight against the Communists’ threats.
560
A political advisor in Korea, Joseph E. Jacobs, recommended that policy makers
should thoroughly examine this policy before the United States decided to withdraw its
troops from Korea: Was Korea vital to the security of the United States and its fight
against the Soviet Union? If ROK was crucial to the American policy of containment of
the Soviet Union, Jacobs argued, then the United States should liquidate the Moscow
559 The Department of State, August 7, 1947, FRUS 1947, 6, 738-39.
560 Report to the President on China-Korea, September 19, 1947, Submitted by Lieutenant General Albert
C. Wedemeyer, (known as Wedemeyer Report), September 19, 1947, FRUS 1947, 6, 796-803; William
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agreement “as quickly and gracefully as possible” and begin to make South Korea a
strong bastion against Soviet dominion. If not, the United States should “get out of
Korea as quickly and gracefully as possible,” and make peace with the Soviets in Korea
for important leverage in “bargaining in other fields.”
561
In September 1947, the Soviet Union suggested a proposal in the Joint
Commission that in order to allow Koreans to establish their own government, U.S. and
Soviet troops should withdraw immediately.
562 Military leaders in Washington thought
the Soviet proposal seemed a good opportunity to withdraw American soldiers from
Korea as the region was deemed to have little strategic importance and required large
expenditures for maintaining American troops. President Truman ordered the State and
Defense Departments “to weigh our commitments and consider where we might safely
withdraw.”
563 The Joint Chiefs of Staff
564 on September 26, 1947 presented its views on
the troop withdrawal from Korea. This study concluded:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security,
the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and
bases in Korea for the reasons hereafter stated.
In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a
military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial
reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive
operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most
probably would bypass the Korean peninsular.
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In light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two
divisions, totaling some 45,000 men, now maintained in south Korea, could well
be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair
the military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence, the Soviets
establish military strength in South Korea capable of mounting an assault on
Japan.
565
The decision to withdraw American troops from Korea was a sign of American
military leaders’ reluctant commitment in the area. American military leaders, despite
North Korea’s threat to South Korea, maintained a limited military commitment to Korea
because of little military strategic importance for the security and interests of the United
States. They believed that the containment policy should not extend to Korea because of
a scarcity of military spending such as money and manpower. General MacArthur
supported the JCS decision because he believed that Korea was doomed in any event to
become a Soviet satellite. George Kennan, head of the PPS, and Harriman, the former
Ambassador to Russia, did not regard Korea as militarily essential to the United States.
Kennan felt that U.S. policy should cut its losses and get out of there [Korea] “as
gracefully but promptly as possible.”
566
In October 1947 the JCS requested General MacArthur and Hodge’s opinions on
establishing South Korean armed forces.
567 To create conditions for American
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withdrawal, Hodge claimed that it was necessary to have 100,000 troops for South Korea
within a year under substantial U.S. support. He recommended a school to train the
Koreans in the use of American equipment. However, unlike Hodge, MacArthur
commented that it would be inadvisable to create a South Korean armed force as long as
the United Nations handled the Korean problem.
568 MacArthur recommended instead
increasing the Korean Constabulary up to 50,000 men.
569
The resolution of the General Assembly of November 14, 1947 now
recommended that the occupation troops be withdrawn “if possible within ninety days”
after the establishment of the Korean government.
570 As early as March 1948, as the
Temporary Commission on Korea engaged in the implementation of the UN resolution,
the State Department took the position that the Department of Army should be requested
to “maintain flexibility” in its plan for withdrawal of occupation forces “pending the
outcome of anticipated further developments.”
571 In the meantime, Secretary Marshall
affirmed the mission of the Korean Constabulary as follows: (1) to show loyalty to the
ROK government and insusceptibility to defection in event of abstention from attempted
coup d’etat by political factions or individuals, (2) to demonstrate capability of
maintaining internal order amidst conditions of political strife and inspired disorder, (3)
to offer the capability of maintaining border patrols and of offering at least token
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resistance to invasion from the north, and (4) to organize in manner to indicate clearly its
peaceful purpose and to provide no plausible basis for allegations of its constituting a
“threat” to North Korea. In order to carry out such a mission effectively, the Korean
Constabulary needed adequate equipment for at least two years normal operation.
572
On April 2, 1948, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted a policy paper
(NSC 8) from the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC
176/39) on United States policy in Korea. NSC 8 compromised the State Department and
the Department of Army’s withdrawal plans from Korea. To achieve that result, NSC 8
decided the United States government would assist Koreans by extending economic aid
to establish a sound economy and creating a 50,000 South Korean Constabulary for self-
defense against any overt act of aggression by North Korea. NSC 8 concluded that the
United States military commitment should be carried out “within practicable and feasible
limits of support” of the government established in South Korea as a means of facilitating
the liquidation of United States expenditures in Korea with a minimum of bad effects.
NSC 8 also suggested that every effort should be made to create conditions for the
withdrawal of occupation forces by December 31, 1948. On April 8 President Truman
approved NSC 8.
573
On same day the Department of Army directed Hodge to create conditions in
Korea so that the United States could withdraw forces by the end of the year. Hodge was
to train and equip Korean forces primarily for defense and internal security. Therefore, it
was anticipated, the South Koreans would not use their forces in an aggressive manner
572 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army (Royall) September 17, 1948, FRUS 1948, 6, 1302-
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which might cause U.S. involvement in a war. The United States envisaged, after the
withdrawal of its occupation forces, the establishment of a diplomatic mission with a
military advisory group attached if necessary to administer economic and military aid to
South Korea.
574
While the Department of Army prepared for withdrawal shortly after the South
Korean election of May 10, the State Department officials and the occupation authorities
in Korea tried to postpone the withdrawal because they believed that a hasty departure of
American troops would inevitably had a bad effect upon the Korean situation. On June
23, 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall informed the Secretary of Army Kenneth
C. Royall that the State Department was making every effort to achieve withdrawal by
the end of 1948, but that it still was necessary to maintain sufficient flexibility in the
withdrawal plan.
575 Royall replied that the mission in Korea would minimize any
anticipated bad effects from the withdrawal. He informed Marshall that the withdrawal
would be completed by December 31, 1948 as planned in NSC 8.
576
Those who opposed the withdrawal of American troops tried to postpone the
evacuation until the decision of the United Nations General Assembly on the South
Korean government. General Hodge also recommended that delay was essential for
stabilizing South Korea and claimed that “the saving of a few days on withdrawal may
result in the three years of work and millions of investment in developing of a substitute
574 Sawyer, 30.
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for Communism in Korea being literally thrown away.”
577 Political advisor Jacobs
advised against any “unilateral” withdrawal until the United Nations took definite action
as “our relationship with Korea is based on the General Assembly resolution.”
578 Based
on these recommendations and the pending actions of the General Assembly scheduled to
convene on September 21, 1948, the State Department agreed with the recommendation
from the field that stressed flexibility.
579
In order to transfer authority smoothly to the new government, on August 24
General Hodge and President Rhee signed an interim military agreement for the
relationship between the USAFIK and the ROK government. It was agreed that the
USAFIK would continue to assist the ROK government in training and equipping of the
security forces including the Korean Constabulary, coast guard, and police and that the
Americans could retain jurisdiction over facilities and base areas necessary for the
maintenance of their troops until the completion of their withdrawal from Korea.
580
The internal situation was also extremely unfavorable for the effectuating decision
to withdraw throughout 1948. The Cheju-do rebellion on April 3, 1948, the Yosu and
Sunchon rebellion by the ROK Constabulary Regiments in October, and the Taegu riot
on November 2, in the end, were suppressed by Korean Constabulary with the help of
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American military advisory officers.
581 But these tragic incidents also served to
destabilize the Rhee government. The American military government handed over South
Korea in economic shambles to the Rhee government in August 1948. The continued
division of Korea combined with the legacy of a colonial economy that lacked self-
sufficiency, trained management, and technical personnel further dislocated the Korean
economy.
In addition, rapid population growth due to a high birthrate and heavy influx of
refugees from the North and elsewhere brought about added economic problems. South
Korea, whose population grew from 15 million in 1945 to 21 million in 1948 with the
influx of some 1.1 million Koreans who returned from Japan and China, and over 2.5
million Koreans who fled from the north to the south between August 1945 and June
1950, continued to witness steady population growth with an annual birth rate of 3.0
percent.
582 These growing population pressures, particularly in large cities, created
serious shortages of food, clothing, and housing.
In an effort to meet the basic needs of the people, Rhee’s government sought
economic assistance from the United States. The shortage of food, housing, fuel, and
medical supplies threatened the health of the people and created serious social problems.
During the period of American military government in Korea economic assistance under
the name of “Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Appropriations” (GARIOA)
focused on food, clothing, fertilizer, and petroleum. From the liberation of Korea in
September 1945 through the end of the fiscal year 1948 the United States made available
581 Sawyer, 39-40.
582 Nahm, 383.210
$212 million in assistance under the GARIOA program.
583 Then Congress allotted $144
million for the fiscal year 1949 to the GARIOA activities related to the Korean
program.
584 Toward the end of the occupation, the United States had two goals for the
new Republic: (1) a gradual shift from relief to economic assistance in terms of capital
investment, and (2) the strengthening of Korean security forces.
585
On September 23, 1948, President Rhee sent Chough Pyong-ok, Special
Representative of the President of Korea, to the United States to ask for military and
economic assistance. Chough expressed the view that the ROK, as a “bulwark of
democracy” in the Far East needed United States support until the new Korean
government was strong enough to stand alone. Then he presented the essential elements
of US support needed: (1) the retention of U.S. occupation forces in Korea for the time
being, (2) development in the meantime of effectively trained and equipped ROK
security forces, and (3) continued U.S. economic assistance to the new government with
emphasis on the rehabilitation of electric power facilities and light industries. Chough
emphasized that the disparities between the North Korean armed forces and the South
Korean Constabulary and warned that an early completion of the American withdrawal
left an unpredictable situation in South Korea.
586
The Rhee government also had to deal with many other economic problems.
Inadequate tax collection, uncontrolled deficit spending, and the steadily increasing
583 Cho, 238, cited in footnote 33; Department of the Army’s total allocations under the GARIOA program




586 The Department of States, September 23, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6, 1309-1311.211
amount of currency in circulation
587 created rampant inflation that worsened the existing
economic problems. As for a strategy improve the economic situation, the United States
and South Korean governments were in conflict. American policy makers in Washington
were highly critical of Rhee’s unwillingness to increase taxes as a means of controlling
the inflation as strongly recommended by the State Department.
American policy focused primarily on promoting economic stability because
survival of the Republic of Korea as a part of the fight against the Communism
concerned the United States most. In the wake of those riots and unstable political and
economic conditions, John J. Muccio, Special Representative of the President in Korea,
recommended on November 12 that the United States government delay the completion
of the withdrawal of occupation troops for “several months.” Muccio believed that only
the presence of the United States Army would guarantee minimum Korean internal and
external security.
588
President Rhee also appealed to President Truman to retain U.S. troops on
November 19, 1948 saying that “it is imperative that until the complete loyalty of all the
defense forces is assured and until the defense forces are capable in dealing [sic] with any
threat from without or within the country, the United States should maintain an
occupation force for the time being and establish a military and naval mission as a
deterrent to aggression and consequent civil war.”
589 Rhee requested additional security
587 Between December 31, 1948 and January 1950, the government printed some 150 billion won of
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forces of 50,000 to control subversive elements. In the same month, the National
Assembly of Korea passed a resolution calling for postponement of the withdrawal of the
United States troops until the ROK established adequate security forces.
590
Several civilian representatives, including Mr. Muccio, and military leaders of the
United States in Korea, now had recommended against a hasty withdrawal from Korea
and warned that such a move could trigger the downfall of Republic of Korea. The State
Department agreed with their opinions and delayed withdrawal of U.S. troops until the
Korean government established a solid internal security force. On November the JCS
ordered MacArthur to retain a maximum strength of 7,500 men.
591
However, military leaders in Washington thought responsibility for the defense of
Korea would continue to fall primarily on the United States government as long as United
States troops stayed in Korea. Shortly after the United Nations General Assembly
adopted its second resolution on Korea on December 12, 1948, William H. Draper, Under
Secretary of the Army, suggested to Assistant Secretary of State, Charles E. Saltzman on
December 22, 1948 to initiate the withdrawal on February 1, 1949 for the remaining
troops in Korea and that it be completed no later than March 31, 1949.
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Korea, Far Eastern series 45, 17.
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Meanwhile, the Soviet Union announced that the evacuation of its troops had
been completed on December 25, 1948.
593 After the Soviets left North Korea, the United
States, with the only foreign troops on the peninsula, was placed a difficult position and
Soviet Union propaganda sources relished in their dilemma. After the Second World
War ended, the Russians argued, the people of Asia wanted “above everything else to
have freedom from Western colonialism,”
594 however, the officials in the United States
and the Rhee government strongly opposed a hurried withdrawal. It proved problematic
for the Truman administration that the United States troops’ withdrawal from Korea
could result in communist domination of Korea and thereby Japan would be surrounded
by communist threats on three sides.
595
To improve the Korean economy Truman announced on August, 1948 that the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) should take over the responsibility for the
economic aid program in Korea from the Department of Army effective January 1,
1949.
596 Operating the aid program as the sole agency during the period between the
establishment of Republic and the outbreak of the Korean War, the ECA devised the
long-term aid program to promote economic stability in an effort to contribute to the
political stability of the new Republic.
597 In turn, the ECA recommended that the Korean
government (1) balance its budget throughout the governmental economy and increase
593 New York Times, December 31, 1948; Department of State, The Conflict in Korea, 6.
594 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf,
1948, 1967), 327.
595 The Assistance Secretary of State for the Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the
Army (Draper), January 25, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7,2: 944-45.
596 Memo by President Truman to the Secretary of State, August 25, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 6, 1288-9.
597 The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Frank Pace, Jr.), May 16,
1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 1024-1029.214
revenues; (2) maintain controls over the issuance of currency and over credit in the
interest of economic stability; (3) regulate foreign exchange transactions and foreign
trade to insure that all foreign exchange resources made a maximum contribution to the
welfare of the Korean people and recovery of the Korean economy, etc.
598 The State
Department supported the ECA plan by arguing that South Korea “is the only effective
foothold of western democracy on Continental Northeast Asia,” a place from which the
United States could not withdraw without serious damage to American prestige.
599
The Economic Cooperation Administration’s program of assistance to Korea
went beyond the relief plan and eventually looked toward a rehabilitation program to
achieve self-sufficiency for the Korean economy. The ECA requested a $150 million aid
bill for the fiscal year 1949. President Truman submitted the request to the Congress on
June 7, 1949 and argued that the aid bill was “the minimum aid essential… for progress
toward economy recovery.” Truman explained that “the aid already being provided was
essentially for basic relief and that without the continuation of that relief the Korean
economy would collapse inevitably and rapidly.” Truman also stated that “relief alone
would not make it possible for the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting” and that
“the Republic would remain dependent upon the level into the indefinite future—and
subject to the same inevitable collapse at any time the relief should be withdrawn.” In
short, he recommended that the aid program should be not only for relief but also for
598 Eighth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Supplement (H.Doc. 645, Part
2), 1950, 46-53.
599 The Acting Secretary of State to the Budget Director, May 16, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 1024-1029.215
recovery. Truman explained that the ROK would “stand as a beacon to the people of
northern Asia to resist the control of the Communist forces” with U.S. assistance.
600
Attacking the State Department’s policy in the Far East, and especially in China,
Republicans insisted that $150 million of aid for Korea would be useless. After the fall
of China, Republicans thought there would be no chance for the survival of South Korea
in case of a full-scale invasion from the North. After nearly three weeks of heated
discussion and testimony, the Korean aid bill was approved by the committee and
reported to the House on July 1, 1949. However, despite strong lobby by the Truman
administration, it was not brought to the floor of the House until January 1950, because
the Rules Committee decided to postpone a vote until China policy was settled.
601 On
January 19, 1950 when the Korean economic aid bill was brought to a vote, the House
narrowly rejected it, 193 to 191.
602
Shocked by the defeat of the bill, the Truman administration compromised with
Republican leaders in the Senate. Acheson warned Truman that “this action, if not
quickly repaired, will have the most far-reaching adverse effects upon our foreign policy
not only in Korea but in many other areas of the world.”
603 As a result, the Truman
administration replaced the Korean aid bill with the ‘Far Eastern Economic Assistance
Act’ which included $103 million to the Chinese Nationalists. It authorized a total of
$110 million to South Korea for the fiscal year of 1949-1950, the first year of a
600 U.S. Department of State, Department State Bulletin, June 19, 1949, 782-83.
601 Dobbs,The Unwanted Symbal, 161-168.
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contemplated three year program with an estimated total expenditure of about $285
million.
604 (Actually, Congress took no action on the Korean aid bill during 1949 and
only gave the ECA $60 million for economic aid—$30 million by the Third Deficiency
Appropriation Act and another $30 million by the Second Supplemental Appropriation
Act)
605
After the House rejected the Korean economic aid bill, an amended bill (which
provided $60 million instead of $90 million) passed both the House and the Senate on
February 14, 1950.
606 Congress later cut Korean aid to $50 million, and the appropriation
under this authorization was not actually made until June 29, 1950, after the Korean War
broke out.
607 Economic assistance from the United States was essential to the
consolidation of the new Korean government. As Arthur C. Bunce, the head of the ECA
in Korea, claims, the Korean aid bill symbolized the U.S. containment to defend the free
world against Communist threat.
Nevertheless the long delay of American aid by Congress during this critical time,
the economic situation, especially inflation, in Korea improved to achieve a stable
economy before the outbreak of Korean War.
608 The State Department in Washington
emphasized to President Rhee that the military and political situation could not be
considered “more important than the economic situation or as not being directly affected
604 Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1950, 212; State Department, The Conflict of Korea, 8. For
detailed information see U.S. Congress, House Report 2495, Background Information on Korea, 27-33.
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606 Department of States, February 14, FRUS 1950, 7, 12.
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608 Cho, 243.217
by the latter.” They feared that the irresponsible financial policies of the Korean
government, such as uncontrolled deficit spending, and the increasing amount of
currency in circulation, if continued, would nullify the economic aid program. Unless the
Korean government showed the “willingness and the ability to inaugurate measures
designed to stabilize the internal economy of Korea,”
609 in the early 1950s, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson warned President Rhee that the United States would have to “re-
examine, and perhaps make adjustments” in the aid program to Korea.
610
As the situation in China deteriorated with the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalist regime in January 1949, the United States no longer intended to resist
Communist aggression on the Asian continent.
611 The Chinese situation now made the
defense of South Korea appear to military planners as strategically impracticable.
However, in opposition to this view, some officials in the State Department also
reiterated that Korea’s importance to American policy.
612 They argued that the Republic
of Korea was “the only remaining foothold of democracy in Northeast Asia.” If the
communists overran the Korean peninsula, it would encourage the Communists in Japan
and discourage Japanese people who were striving to build a democratic notion. Edgal T.
Johnson, the director of the ECA, claimed that a strong Korea would also protect Japan
and further American interests despite Mao’s victory in China.
613 The Japanese economy
609 US Department of States, RG 59, decimal file, 895b. 13/4-350; Department of State Bulletin, April 17,
1950, 602.




needed support from outside sources, and Korea was a natural and complementary
trading area.
614
Thoroughly reviewing the Chinese and Korean situations, the NSC decided to
develop a Marshall type plan for Korea, the new “symbol in the Cold War.” The NSC
concluded that sufficient economic and military aid should be continued to enable the
Korean army to fight against the Communists. W. Walton Butterworth, the Director of
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, advised Rhee to avoid repeating Chiang’s mistakes:
I said that I also felt that it was essential that the new Korean Government avoid
the mistake of becoming static and anti-progressive, and thereby losing the
support of the people…I added that the static character of the Nationalist
Government and its failure to accommodate itself to the developing needs of the
Chinese people had alienated the support of many Chinese who were in no sense
of the word Communists.
615
In January 1949, Muccio reported that the ROK government was still weak but
stronger than in earlier months. Also, ROK security forces were improving and now
capable of dealing with sizable internal disturbance, revolt, and border attacks but not
ready to defend against an outright invasion from the North. Muccio recommended an
increase on the Korean army to 65,000 men, 45,000 police, and 4,000 coast guards.
Muccio stated that U.S. support would contribute not only to the survival of the ROK, but
also provide greater security for the U.S. position in the Far East. Muccio suggested that
additional weapons, equipment, and other items should be provided to the security forces
614 In his article Ronald L. McGlothen argues that the primary area of concern for American policymakers,
and of Dean Achenson in particular, was not the economy of Korea itself but for its psychological impact to
Japan and for regional recovery and Japan-centered plans in Asia. Ronald McGlothelen, “Acheson,
Economics, and the American Commitment in Korea, 1947-1950,” Pacific Historical Reviews, (1988): 23-
54; For more details on the relation between Acheson and the American reconstruction of Japan and the
American commitment in Korea, see, Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling The Waves: Dean Acheson and
U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), ch. 2 and 3.
615 US Department of States, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 941.219
and that the final withdrawal of the American troops should be postponed until July 1,
1949, which was less than two months beyond the date the Army favored.
616
General MacArthur, however, favored an early withdrawal of American troops
from Korea. He maintained that the United States did not have the capability to train and
equip South Korean troops to enable them to resist a full-scale invasion if accompanied
by internal disturbances fomented by the Communists. The South Korean defense forces,
MacArthur asserted, should be able to resist internal conflicts, not overt aggression from
the outside. If a serious threat developed, the United States would have to give up active
military support of the ROK forces.
617 But MacArthur suggested May 10, 1949 should
be the last date for withdrawal to thereby gain the psychological benefit of the date—the
anniversary of the first general elections in Korea.
618 Secretary of the Army Kenneth C.
Royall agreed.
619
On February 8, 1949, President Rhee met with Secretary of the Army Royall,
General Wedemeyer, and Ambassador Muccio to review the question of American troop
withdrawal and the training of the Korean army in Seoul. In this meeting, Royall
expressed the opinion that American troop should withdraw as soon as possible to relieve
burdens of the United States army. On the other hand, Muccio was concerned with
credibility and the moral responsibility of the United States. To him, the survival of the
616 US Department of State, FRUS 1949, 7: 947-952; Tel. 69 from Seoul, January 27, 1949, top secret; in
US Department of States, RG 59, decimal file, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-2749.
617 Sawyer, 37; Schnabel, 34-5; Butterworth Memorandum, January 10, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2, 942;
William Stueck, et al., “An Exchange of Opinion—Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean
Conflict: The Kolko Thesis,” Pacific Historical Review 42 (1973): 541-42.
618 Sawyer, ibid.
619 US Department of States, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 946.220
ROK was important to United States prestige among its other allies. He argued that until
the preparation of at least a minimal South Korean defensive capability, America should
not withdraw its troops.
620 On March 12, 1949, the Department of the Army
recommended that the ROK receive minimum equipment and supplies essential for an
Army of 50,000 men and a Coast Guard contingent of 3,000 sailors. In practice, the
Army rejected any expansion of military assistance to the ROK.
621
On March 22, 1949, the State Department and Defense and the National Security
Council thoroughly reappraised the position of the United States Korean policy. The
report, called NSC 8/1, analyzed developments in Korea based on the broad objectives of
U.S. policy. Consequently, NSC 8/1 was revised, and then presented to the NSC meeting
as NSC 8/2. On March 23, 1949 President Truman signed it as policy.
622 NSC 8/1 not
only pointed out a serious military imbalance between the North and the South and the
existence of an increasing North Korean threat to the South, but also indicated the United
States had three possible alternative courses of action: (1) to abandon the ROK to
Communist domination, a course of action which…would do violence to the spirit of
every international commitment undertaken by the U.S. during and since the war with
respect to Korea and which might damage irreparably American prestige and influence
throughout the Far East (2) to guarantee unconditionally the political independence and
territory integrity of South Korea, by force arms if necessary, a course of action which
would commit the United States to continued direct political, economic and military
620 Ibid., 956-959.
621 JCS 1483/62; in RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), Sec. 13.
622 NSC Report to the President, March 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 969-78.221
responsibility in Korea, even to the extent of risking involvement in a major war in an
area in which virtually all of the natural advantages would accrue to the USSR; or (3) as a
middle course, to establish within practicable and feasible limits conditions of support for
the government of the Republic of Korea as a means of facilitating the reduction of the
U.S. commitment of men and money there while at the same time minimizing to the
greatest practicable extent the chances of South Korea’s coming brought under
Communist domination as a consequence of the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces.
623
Favorably disposed to implementing the last option, the State Department limited U.S. 
assistance in training and equipment to a level needed to maintain current strength.
624
The NSC 8/2 planned to maintain a well-trained and equipped Army of at least
65,000 men (formerly the constabulary) for internal order and border security, 4,000
coast guard for suppression of smuggling, piracy, illegal entry and hostile infiltration by
sea into South Korea and 45,000 police for law enforcement and cooperating with the
Korean army in the preservation of public order.
625 While the JCS, the Army, and
MacArthur stressed that a withdrawal of remaining United States troops should be
completed no later than June 30, 1949, Ambassador Muccio emphasized the importance
of Korea for U.S. prestige or credibility in Asia. The weak ROK government wanted to
keep the American troops until its forces were capable of mounting a viable defense
against North Korea. President Rhee, too, had continuously requested military and
623 Ibid; US Department of State, FRUS 1949, 7, 2: 975; Department of State, The Conflict in Korea, 6-10.
624 NSC 8/1, JCS 1483/63; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, II, 328.
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economic aid. Although it directed the completion of the withdrawal, NSC 8/2 made
clear that it would not lesson US support to the ROK government.
626 When Ambassador
Muccio requested more offensive equipment from the United States government, military
planners in Washington dismissed such requests as completely beyond the scope of NSC
8/2.
During late 1948 and 1949, Rhee’s government tried to stall the American troop
withdrawal. The South Korean government argued that it would induce a North Korean
invasion, thus American troops stayed in South Korea until the ROK security forces were
strengthened. However, the United States was determined to complete the withdrawal of
its troops from South Korea on the assumption that there would not be a North Korean
military attack. Rhee realized that his government could not stop the withdrawal and,
therefore, sought military and economic assistance from the United States government as
an alternative.
Concerned about the security of the ROK, President Rhee expressed great anxiety
for the future of South Korea in his statement announcing the withdrawal time table:
The United States has left us with a problem too great to be solved by ourselves
alone, especially with half of our strength shorn away. We do not believe that the
United States can or will withdraw its remaining troops until it has answered our




626 US Department of States, FRUS 1949, 7, 2: 969-978.
627 Memo by Butterworth to Secretary of State, April 18, 1949; President Rhee’s statement, in Muccio to
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President Rhee and the United States Army seriously disagreed over the question
of American military assistance and defense commitments to South Korea. For his part,
Rhee demanded one of three conditions from the U.S. government:
What I am advocating as a solution to the grave threat against Korean and all Asia
by the aggressive forces of Communism is adoption of one of the following three
things: (1) the formation of a Pacific Pact similar to NATO; or (2) and agreement
between the United States and Korea alone, or with some other nations, for
mutual defense against any aggressor nations; or (3) a public declaration by the
United States of a pledge to defend a reunited, democratic, independent Korea, in
accordance with the policy of President Truman respecting Communist
aggression.
628
Rhee was most interested in a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Thus,
in July 1949, Rhee sent Chough Pyong-ok, a special envoy, to Washington to ask for
increased armaments to defend against a North Korean invasion. At the meeting on July
11, 1949, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson rejected proposals submitted by Chough;
including, first, the expansion of the Korean army from 65,000 to 100,000; second, a
public American assurance to assist South Korea in the event of an armed attack; and
third, the formation of a “Pacific Pact” similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
629 Rhee’s government alleged that a North Korean invasion was imminent.
However, Washington regarded such claims with some skepticism. In order to guarantee
the security of the ROK, Rhee sought to establish a regional defense body among anti-
communist nations in the Pacific like the NATO. In August 1949, Rhee received Chiang
Kai-shek to discuss the matter further. The Chinese leader had been an advocate of a
Pacific defensive alliance since May 1947.
628 US Department of States, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 992.
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President Truman recognized the importance of Korea, yet believed that South
Korea could survive a communist threats with American assistance. On June 7, 1949,
Truman appealed to Congress for a continuation of military and economic assistance to
South Korea because “the Korean republic, by demonstrating the success and tenacity of
democracy in resisting Communism, will stand as a beacon to the people of northern Asia
in resisting the control of the Communist forces which have overrun them.”
630 As noted
earlier, President Truman asked for economic aid to Korea in the amount of $150 million
for the fiscal year of 1949. Truman’s message to Congress on June 7 was a new direction
for American policy toward South Korea and its effort to create a stable nation.
On June 29 1949, the withdrawal of the last United States troops from South
Korea was completed. However, in accordance with the request of the Korean
Government, the American Military Advisor Group in Korea (KMAG) was established
with only some 500 military advisors under Brigadier General William L. Roberts to train
the Korean security forces.
631 KMAG was put under direction of Ambassador Muccio.
During the period of July 1949 to June 1950, United States military assistance to South
Korea can be categorized into two parts: (1) the military advisory group’s training of the
ROK forces, and (2) the aid of military equipment for Korean security forces.
632 Despite
completing its withdrawal, the United States left behind nearly $56 million worth of
630 US Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1949, 781; Quoted in Glenn D. Paige,
ed., 1950: Truman’s Decision (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1970), 28-29; Cho, 241.
631 Department States Bulletin, June 19, 1949, 786-7.
632 US Department of State, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 969-978.225
small arms, ammunition, light artillery, and small vehicles “sufficient for a force of
50,000 men under the Surplus Property Act.”
633
The mission of KMAG was to develop internal security forces for the Republic
of Korea, especially apt in defensive training and weapons within the limitations of the
Korean economy rather than assume an aggressive posture.
634 As a result, the South
Korean army had few offensive weapons such as tanks, artillery or bombers. One
American military advisor claimed the ROK army “could have been the American army
in 1775.”
635 In July 1950, three weeks after the Korean War began, Brigadier General
Roberts, former head of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Korea, explained that
“South Koreans had not been given tanks, heavy artillery, or combat airplanes because
the U.S. was afraid that the South Koreans would attack Communist North Korea.”
636
Muccio stressed the importance of granting additional military assistance for
strengthening the Korean Coast Guard and creating a Korean Air Force. On September
1949, Muccio sent a report to Washington warning of North Korea’s growing airpower:
In this connection, recent and persistent reports from North Korea suggest that the
Soviets are supplying the North Koreans with a relatively sizable number of
comparatively high-performance military aircraft. Should it be confirmed, as now
seems indicated, that the North Koreans are in possession of military aircraft
giving them a greater superiority, it will then be necessary to consider steps
looking to the strengthening of the air arm of the Republic of Korea.
637
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President Truman believed that U.S. economic support could not ensure the safety
of South Korea and that military assistance was necessary. On October 6, 1949,
Congress approved Truman’s Mutual Defense Assistance Act and authorized the
allocation of $10.2 million to Korea.
638 The MDA program would provide equipment for
the existing ROK internal security forces to do their missions under three priorities: (1)
to preserve internal security, (2) to prevent border raids, (3) and to deter armed attack
from North Korea. Thus, a bilateral agreement between the two nations was signed on
January 26, 1950.
639 On March 29, 1950, a final determination on the specific items most
urgently required by the Korean government received priority. By June 25, 1950 when
North Korea invaded, the South Korean military had received only $52,000 worth of
signal equipment, and spare parts valued at $298,000 were en route, however, only
$1,000 worth of spare parts actually had been received before the Korean War.
640
Although realistically facing increasing threats from the North, South Korean
officials also exaggerated the strength of North Korean military forces when pleading for
additional aid to strengthen ROK forces. President Rhee appealed directly to Truman for
more military assistance, citing the danger of a Communist assault from North Korea “in
the immediate future.”
641 Rhee informed Truman that “we have ammunition available
638 This fund was essentially for the maintenance of material and spare parts for the substantial quantity of
military equipment already given to Korea.
639 For the text of the treaty, see U.S. Department of Army, U.S. Agreement with Republic of Korea
(Washington, 1954), 9 & 11; cited in Cho, 253.
640 Sawyer, 103; US Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, Report 2495, Background Information
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641 President Rhee to President Truman, August 20, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 1075-1076; file 895.20/10-
749, encl. 1.227
only for two days… We will not attack the territory north of the 38
th parallel.”
642 Truman
replied to Rhee’s plea and emphasized that the development of a sound economy was far
more important than the insupportable burden resulting from amassing large military
forces.
643 Truman stressed the importance of an economically stable environment
because political insecurity and social disorder in the world was an open invitation for
communist infiltration.
644
Ambassador Muccio reported that the $10.2 million program was “patently
inadequate” for Korea’s needs and recommended that the State Department provide
additional assistance of $9.8 million which would bring the total sum available for
military aid to Korea for fiscal year 1950 to a minimum of $20 million to fund counter
mobilization against steadily expanding North Korean forces.
645 Muccio urgently asked
for funds that could be made available from the $75 million authorized to President
Truman for China and the “general area” by the MDA Act of 1949.
646 However,
Washington rebuffed Muccio’s proposal. The JCS and Defense Department believed that
“there is no military justification for additional military assistance to Korea,” and that
Korea had already received all the necessary aid it needed.
647 Later, Truman argued that
642 Ibid.
643 President Truman to President Rhee, September 26, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, 2: 1084-85.
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there were many “points of contact between East and West, from Norway through Berlin
and Trieste to Greece, Turkey, and Iran; from the Kurile in the North Pacific to Indo-
China and Malaya.”
648
On January 12, 1950, Secretary Acheson made a controversial speech before the
National Press Club in Washington, D. C. where he described an American
”defense perimeter” that excluded Korea and Formosa in the Pacific. The Pacific defense
perimeter of the United States ran along the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and down
to the Philippine Islands. He stated that
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific was concerned, it must
be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack… Should
such an attack occur… the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist
it and then upon the commitment of the entire civilized world under the Charter of
the United Nations… to protect their independence against outside aggression.
649
Acheson implied that Korea, though not within in the defense perimeter in the Pacific,
would not be utterly abandoned and that the United States would continue to support
South Korea in association with the United Nations until ROK could establish itself
firmly.
650
Revisionist historians like I.F. Stone and Bruce Cumings argue that Acheson’s
speech gave Stalin and Kim Il Sung the wrong signal, it seemed that the United States
would not intervene if the North attacked. They maintained that MacArthur, Syngman
648 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 331.
649 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, 357-8; Cho, 259-260; For the full text of Acheson’s statement,
see Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, 111-116.
650 Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, 116-117; Cho, 261.229
Rhee, and Chang Kai shek invited the Communist attack on South Korea.
651 Traditional
historians claim that Acheson’s speech was not intended for that purpose. His speech
was the confirmation of long-standing U.S. military strategy toward Korea. Since
September 1947 the NSC had decided that Korea had no strategic importance for
American defenses, the same conclusion that would be reached by the same agency again
NSC in 1949.
652 The defense perimeter, it should be noted, had not been drawn by
Acheson but by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the concurrence of the National Security
Council and President Truman.
On March 1949, General MacArthur had also proposed a line of defense that ran
through a chain of islands from the Philippines to the Aleutians through the Ryukyu
Archipelago.
653 United States policy makers considered Japan and the Philippines the
most vital to United States security interests and stability in the Pacific. In case of full-
scale war in East Asia, the Korean peninsular supposedly would be by-passed. The
United States’ fears were primarily about internal threats rather than external ones.
Therefore, the United States became increasingly concerned about South Korea’s critical
economic situation and its political development. Acheson’s speech not only led to great
controversy among the American people but also contributed to critical consequences in
South Korea.
As Senator Arthur Vandenburg described the situation, the United States now
faced a different world because of the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb in September
651 I.F. Stone, The Hidden of the Korean War (New York; Monthly Review Press, 1952); Bruce Cumings,




22, 1949 and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in China December 8.
654 President
Truman, with the National Security Council, made a readjustment of policy and approved
a paper known as NSC-68. This paper called for a massive rearmament program and
stressed the expansion of the military strength of the United States and its allies including
both atomic capabilities and conventional forces.
655 Although NSC-68 required an
immediate and large scale military build-up, there was no chance of this proposal passing
Congress. However, the outbreak of the Korean War saved NSC-68.
Form the beginning of their occupation, the Soviet Union had actively assisted the
military and economy of North Korea, especially during the six months before the
invasion. The North Korean forces had doubled in size, supported by a substantial
amount of equipment from the Soviet Union.
656 Compared to the South Korean
Constabulary, the overwhelming superiority of the North Korean army was not
recognized by United States military authorities before the invasion.
657 Nevertheless,
several months before the Korean War started, the US government had received warnings
and information on the military build-up in North Korea and the imminent invasion of
South Korea.
In his report to the State Department, on June 14, 1950, Muccio maintained the
material superiority of North Korea in air power, tanks, and heavier artillery.
658 On June
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19, 1950, six days before the outbreak of the war, the United States Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) finally recognized the capability and superiority of the North Korean
armed forces. However, this agency thought North Korea would not have sufficient
military power to control the whole Korean peninsula without Russian assistance. Also,
most American leaders believed that North Korea was firmly controlled by the Soviets
and depended entirely on their support for existence. Therefore, as long as the United
States continued to support economic and military assistance to South Korea, ROK
would survive the threat of the Communists.
659
The CIA made it clear that it believed the ultimate goal of North Korea and the
Soviet Union was to unify the Korean peninsula under Communist domination. To this
end, an overt invasion of South Korea by North Korea was delayed because the Soviet
Union and North Korea thought they still had a good chance of taking over South Korea
through political pressure, subversion, propaganda, intimidation, economic pressure, and
military actions by infiltration of guerrilla forces.
660 The CIA did not think an invasion
of Communists was imminent. Nonetheless, the Korean War started on June 25, 1950.
This brings up several questions for historians to ponder. Why did the Korean War occur
in 1950? Who was the responsible for its outbreak? What were the reasons for the
rollback of Americans in the Korean peninsula?
After establishment of separate governments in 1948, it is apparent that both
leaders, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, cherished a common goal to unify the Korean
peninsula by any means, including military force. After foreign troops withdrew, the two
659 Sawyer, 104; CIA Memorandum, June 19, 1950, FRUS, 1950, 109-111.
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Korean governments initiated and sometimes escalated border clashes in order to obtain
military assistance from the former occupying powers and to boost the morale of their
people.
661 South and North Korean armies frequently participated in regional combat to
“liberate” countrymen oppressed under reactionary regimes during the two years before
the outbreak of Korean War.
662
As noted earlier, Rhee participated in the independence movement, and believed
that the South Korean government was the only lawful and legitimate government in the
Korean peninsula because the United Nations created the Republic of Korea. Therefore,
South Koreans could not negotiate with North Koreans and did not recognize their
government because Rhee’s government thought that Kim’s government was an illegal
organization. However, it should be noted that this resolution carefully avoided declaring
that the ROK was the national government of Korea throughout the peninsula.
663 Rhee’s
government believed that the immediate task of his government, as the only lawful
national government, was to restore “lost territory.” As a result, President Rhee publicly
and frequently demanded a “March North.”
664 On July 17, 1949, Shin Sung Mo, South
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Korean’s Defense Minister, told reporters that “South Korea could occupy Yangyang or
Wonsan in a day” if President Rhee ordered.
665
In reality the military forces of South Korea were not strong enough to even resist
military attack from North Korea, much less go on the offensive. Some scholars argue
that Rhee’s rhetoric for a “March North” unification policy was a “policy of bluff” to get
military and economic assistance from the United States.
666 General Roberts also
believed that border incidents were deliberately exaggerated by the South in order to
obtain more aid.
667 President Rhee knew that the United States Congress hesitated to
provide further aid to South Korea so he attempted to escalate border clashes against
North Korea and disseminate propaganda of a “March North” by demonstrating his
determination to fight against Communism.
668
President Rhee warned the US of the imminence of war in Korea and criticized
current United States policy in Korea.
A few days ago an American friend said that if the United States gives weapons to
South Korea, she feared that South Korea would invade North Korea. This is a
useless worry of some Americans who do not know South Korea. Our present
war is not a cold war, but a real shooting war. In South Korea the United States
has one foot in South Korea and one foot outside so that in case of an unfavorable
situation it could pull out of our country. I daresay that if the United States wants
to aid our country, it should not be only lip-service. General Roberts and
Ambassador Muccio have worked to obtain more arms for Korea, but people in
the United States are dreaming.
669
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As Charles Armstrong points out, the North Korean government came to be
dominated by individuals who participated in the anti-colonial guerrilla struggle in
Manchuria during the 1930s and early 1940s.
670 North Korean leaders, therefore,
regarded themselves as “good nationalists.”
671 In The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its
Origins, Korean scholar Park Myong Lim argues that North Korean leaders have
remarkably transformed their state and society into a radical nationalist and militarist
state. As a consequence, the North Korean leaders believed that they were fit to liberate
South Koreans from American imperialism. In late 1949 and early in 1950, Kim Il Sung
visited Moscow several times to get permission for a war plan from Stalin. Even though
Stalin hesitated to approve it until he could make sure that the United States would not
intervene in the war, and the new Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung agreed with the decision
of the North Koreans. According to Chinese historian Chen Jian in China’s Road to the
Korean War, Stalin recommended Kim Il Sung travel to Beijing to secure Mao’s consent
to the invasion.
672 It is almost certain that China did not play a major role in preparations
for the war. However, Jian argues that in order to enhance communist control of China’s
state and society and to promote its international prestige and influence, Chinese leaders,
including Mao Tse-tung, intended to win a glorious victory in Korea by driving the
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Americans out of the peninsula.
673 Later, Stalin approved Kim’s war plan, at least
passively.
674
North Korean leaders believed that their invasion plan for South Korea was well
designed and ready, now that the support of the Soviet Union had been attained. More
important, as noted earlier, the situation in East Asia, they believed, favored their plan in
the early 1950s. Had the United States expressed a firm determination to defend South
Korea, the Korean War might probably not have occurred. It is clear that the time was a
transitional period in United States policy in the context of the global war between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Due to preoccupation with the Cold War, the
Truman administration limited economic and military assistance to South Korea because
it was deemed of no strategic importance for the security of the United States. The
United States misunderstood Stalin’s intention and plan, and the contingency of local
Korean actions, because the United States policy makers believed that next war would be
a global war and that the Soviet Union was not yet ready to start a war against the United
States. Historian William Stueck argues that “the Korean War was substituted for World
War III”
675 and the Korean War, in turn, transformed and intensified the Cold War.
The outbreak of the Korean War was not only a by-product of the ideological
confrontation between the two Koreas intensified by the international powers, but also
673 Ibid., ix.
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the result of an imbalance in the military strength of the two sides. Before the outbreak
of the Korean War, the U.S. military believed that direct involvement of U.S. troops in
any Korean conflict would be “ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities
of the over-all world situation and our heavy international obligations as compared with
our current military strength.”
676
When the Korea War did break out in June 25, 1950, however, American leaders
thought that if North Korea overran South Korea, it would prove not only a direct
challenge to the free world and collective security system of the United Nations that
established the ROK under its auspices, but also it would tremendously impact Japanese
security in a negative fashion.
677 If the United States failed to protect ROK from the
attack of the Communists, the result would be rising criticism of the foreign policy of the
Truman administration. Throughout America, Truman was increasing accused of being
“soft” and willing to appease Communists, while on the international front, the United
States still feared direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. As a result, it seemed
might spell total failure for the United States foreign policy during the Cold War to
contain the Communists.
In sum, after the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—
compromised their own interests in Korea somewhat, each of them sought a policy of
withdrawal without further endangering their interests. The two rival regimes in North
and South Korea, however, were unable to compromise their differences and co-exist
676 Army Department memo., June 27 1949, FRUS 1949, 7:2: 1046-48, 1052-56.
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peaceably. Painfully aware of his government’s vulnerability, Syngman Rhee, as a leader
of a weak state, adopted a “March North” unification policy. He thereby designed to
manipulate the Korean situation to maximize military aid and economic assistance from
the United States and also to turn American containment policy to the aid of unifying the
Korean peninsula through military force. In short, Rhee was not a pliant tool of the
United States. However, Rhee’s hostile policy toward North Korea instead prompted
Washington to become hesitant about supplying offensive weapons. That decision left a
military imbalance between the armies of North and South. In addition, the relationship
between North and South deteriorated further.
In a parallel development, North Korean leaders also viewed themselves as “good
nationalists.” They tried to persuade a reluctant Stalin and Mao that North Korean people
were ready to liberate the South Korean people from the imperialist grasp of the United
States. As Weathersby and Park Myong Lim argue, Kim Il Sung, if the “initiator” of the
Korean war, also was able to manipulate the rivalry between Stalin and Mao for his own
political ends. Actually, the international situation at the time was quite favorable for
Kim Il Sung. The Soviet Union acquired atomic capability in September 1949. Mao’s
communists in China defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists that December. Earlier,
moreover, the Truman administration—after Republicans accused him of being “soft” on
communists, decided to withdraw U. S. troops from Korea by June.
Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung and his followers, ever since 1945, had been busy
transforming North Korean society into a “radical nationalist and militaristic state.”
Buoyed by both internal and external developments, North Korean leaders started the
attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950. The two leaders in Korea no longer tried to co-238
exist by peaceful means. Instead, the two Koreas become more hostile to one another,
even after the foreign occupying countries withdrew. In addition, more direct
confrontation deepened the ideological conflict between the Great Powers, escalated
hostilities in the local region, and eventually led to a bloodbath. Again, Koreans would
become a victim of the early Cold War in East Asia but not a completely passive one.239
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion: Summary and General Thoughts
The purpose of this study was to better comprehend the relationship between the
Korean nationalist movement and foreign powers when it came to building a nation-state,
set in the broader context of Korean history. More narrowly, it examined how Koreans
and foreign powers viewed each other, the origins of Korean nationalism, the Korean
response to foreign powers during the period of Japanese colonialism and American
military government from 1945 to 1948, and how U.S. policy impacted the fate of Korea.
In particular, it examined how Korean nationalism was framed during the Japanese
colonial era, and how this framing affected the postwar formation of the state during the
period of American military government. It postulates that Syngman Rhee and Kim Il
Sung, after the two Koreas were established in 1948, each viewed himself as a “good
nationalist.” Both favored unification of some kind and, as leaders of a weak state, both
used the Korean situation to manipulate their sponsor countries—the United States and
the Soviet Union—to accomplish their oftentimes divergent goals and purposes.
The story of what happened in the late 1940s also has deeper roots. As described
in Chapter 1, the United States was the first country to withdraw its legation when Korea
became a Japanese protectorate in 1905. Even though the Americans seemingly betrayed
Korea, most Koreans did not abandon their initial image of the United States as a240
“benevolent Great Power” and hopes for American assistance to help regain
independence. Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, however,
Korea essentially remained a “forgotten nation” to the American people. The outbreak of
the World War II ended this policy of American indifference.
Prior to the Second World War, many Korean nationalists involved themselves in
the independence movement both in Korea and abroad. After the March First
independence movement in Korea, Korean exiles established the Korean Provisional
Government in Shanghai in 1919. Under the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku,
Korean nationalists tried to gain American recognition of the Korean Provisional
Government and sought American military and financial support to regain independence
from Japanese colonial rule. The KPG’s efforts were unsuccessful. As shown in Chapter
2, different stances on anti-colonial nationalism produced antagonism between Korean
left and right. The existence of left and right during the Japanese colonial period set
limits on the course of postwar state formation. Realizing a complicated political
situation existed, with China and the Soviet Union also having interests in Korea, the
United States chose not to recognize the Korean Provisional Government.
Much later, at the Cairo Conference in 1943, the Allied leaders, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Winston Churchill, discussed policies for the postwar
world, including for the first time the future of Korea. President Roosevelt presented a
multinational trusteeship plan for consideration. He advocated a certain period of
tutelage for liberated countries like Korea to improve propensities for self-rule before
achieving their independence. The Cairo Declaration asserts that Allied leaders were
“determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” At the241
Teheran conference, Stalin also accepted Roosevelt’s idea of international trusteeship for
Korea. However, during several other wartime conferences, Roosevelt and American
officials failed to devise specific plans to implement the international trusteeship idea for
postwar Korea.
Regardless of Korean sentiment, the trusteeship plan, Roosevelt believed, gave
the United States an opportunity not only to dismantle older imperial systems but also to
check the Soviets and Chinese in East Asia. Roosevelt never thought his trusteeship idea
would bring chaos and turbulence, or lead to a deepening ideological struggle between
rightists and leftists in Korea, much less eventually contribute to the emergence of two
separate and hostile governments and a tragic war. Churchill vehemently opposed the
trusteeship idea, not wishing to set a precedent that could apply to the former British
colonies. Furthermore, American policy makers also did not make a specific plan for
Korea because of its low priority in terms of U.S. strategic interests. As revisionist
Korean historians argued, had Korean leaders accepted a trusteeship plan, Korea might
have followed a different path after December, 1945 because that was the last tentative
agreement for Korea’s independence and reunification between the two superpowers.
The United States’ non-recognition policy toward the Korean Provisional
Government remained intact until the Japanese surrendered to the Allied powers in
August 1945. During the war Korea was not a major concern to Roosevelt and policy
makers in the United States because their first priority was winning the war with the
assistance of its allies. The focus was on Japan, given Korea’s limited strategic
importance for the security of the United States. Moreover, Korean liberation was
achieved not by the fighting of Koreans but by the victory of Allied powers. Therefore,242
the future of Korea was not decided based on the desires and hopes of Korean people, but
by the interests and priorities of the Allied powers.
As described in Chapter 3, the Truman administration suggested the partition of
Korea at the 38
th parallel to accept the surrender of Japanese troops and to prevent the
Soviet Union from dominating Korea. When Korea was on the verge of being occupied
by the Soviet Union during the last few days before the Japanese surrendered to the
Allies, the best option seemed to be to divide the Korean peninsula to protect U.S.
interests. In the south, the United States became the dominant force ruling Korea through
a military government from 1945 to 1948 and shaping local society and politics in
significant ways.
The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in Korea, as related in
Chapter 3, precipitated ideological conflicts between Korean left and right. Given their
naïve bipolar worldview, American policy makers in Washington and military officials in
Korea perceived local revolutionary nationalists and leftists as monolithic and Soviet-
directed. In addition, the rising tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union
immediately had ramifications which impacted and soured relations between the two
occupying authorities in Korea. The Cold War also left its imprint on internal political
forces and the American military government.
The Japanese emperor’s announcement of unconditional surrender in 1945 had
excited the Korean people. They now anticipated building an independent and
democratic country. But an end to Japanese colonial rule did not bring independence to
Koreans. The Allied powers instead imposed a military occupation, and not only thereby
denied the hope of Koreans to immediately build a democratic country but also fostered243
division among Koreans. After thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean
people wanted their independence posthaste. The sudden surrender of the Japanese led to
resurgent Korean nationalism that persisted during the period of American military
government in the south from 1945 to 1948. The ensuing chaos and turbulence were
typical phenomena of a newly liberated country emerging from long years of imperial
rule. Korea thus was ripe for a social revolution. Led by Yo Un-hyong and the leftists,
the “People’s Committee” had enjoyed a window of self-rule until the Americans arrived
in South Korea in September 1945. Furthermore, Korean people were determined to get
rid of all vestiges of Japanese colonial rule. They wanted to build an independent and
democratic society by removing collaborators from positions of power. They also sought
political and socioeconomic reforms, such as in land and labor policies, which set the
stage for clashes with U.S. interests.
No one can know for sure what would have happened in Korea if the American
military government, like the Soviets in the north, had accepted the leadership of Yo and
his CPKI from the beginning of their occupation of the south. Perhaps Korea would have
gone in a different direction, such as Austria did, as noted in Chapter 3. However, the
American military authorities denied the existence of the Korean People’s Republic, the
de facto government, and People’s Committee. Yet, according to James Matray, “the
KPR had demonstrated efficiency and popularity during its short period of ascendance.
Genuine impartiality and a desire for national self-determination would seem to have
required that the United States at least cooperate with Yo” from the beginning of
occupation before control was lost to the Communists because of the U.S. oppression.
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American military leaders regarded the volatile political and social situation in Korea as a
product of communist insurgency and as a threat to American interests and security
needs.
679 In particular, General Hodge, the commander of the American military
government, was not the best “soldier-statesmen” for the critical situation in Korea. As
an essentially “counterrevolutionary force,” the American military authorities apparently
misunderstood or chose to ignore the urgency of Korean nationalism. Due, in part, to
fears of a leftist dominated Korea, General Hodge became a “premature Cold Warrior;”
in turn, his influence served as a vehicle to facilitate rightists in their efforts to gain
political hegemony after the Japanese surrender. Therefore, Hodge lost credibility as a
political leader among much of the local populous because of his leaning toward the
rightists and his status quo policy delayed progressive reforms.
As the Moscow Conference began in December 1945, tensions mounted between
American and Russian military authorities and the internal politics in the south, as
depicted in Chapter 4, became increasingly more polarized because of ideological
confrontations between leftists and rightists in their respective quests to seize political
power. After a few months, Hodge realized the trusteeship plan would not work in this
situation. Thus, he recommended that the United States government abandon the idea
and create a Korean ‘governing commission’ to succeed the American military
government in November 1945. His suggestion was not accepted in Washington. From
the beginning of the occupation, Hodge faced a confused situation and suffered
embarrassment from interdepartmental disagreements over the Korean situation between
679 According to Suh Jin Kyu, the Japanese leaders of the former colonial government played a significant
role in shaping American attitude toward Koreas, most importantly, Yo and his CPKI. Japanese leaders
effort to portray Yo and his CPKI as Communists loyal to the Soviets and led Americans hostile those
groups at the most significant period of the occupation.245
the Department of State, the War Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He blamed
officials in the State Department; its Korean policy, it seemed to him, was not based on
realities but mere theory.
The Moscow Conference agreed that American and Soviet commanders in Korea
should establish a joint commission to work for unification. However, the Joint
Commission failed to form a provisional government through consultation with Korean
political parties and social organizations. To make matters worse, deep-rooted domestic
political and factional struggles within Korea, stirred by the Moscow Agreement, fueled
divisions within the nation. After the Korean Communist Party decided to support the
Moscow agreement, the Korean people--many of whom considered communists as
champions of the earlier anti-Japanese movement--felt a deep sense of betrayal.
Moreover, many Korean people vehemently opposed “trusteeship” because it was
reminiscence of the method by which the Japanese ruled earlier in the colonial era.
Korean leaders like Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku regarded the trusteeship idea with
suspicion; implicitly, it appeared to them that the United States government in practice
was willing to hand Korea over to the Soviet Union. At the same time, important
memories with deep historical roots shaped the collective attitudes of Korean leaders.
This period was a turning point in the internal politics of Korea. Thereafter,
throughout the duration of the anti-trusteeship movement, the right perennially
challenged “the nationalist credentials of the Left.” The anti-trusteeship campaign, as an
outburst of “anti-trusteeship nationalism,” provided the rightists, whose ranks included
many former Japanese collaborators, with an opportunity to transform themselves and the
government in the south into “anti-communist” patriots and an “anti-Soviet movement.”246
Due to vehement resistance of rightists in the south and a lukewarm attitude among
officials of the American military government, the decisions reached in Moscow
Agreement could not be fulfilled in Korea. This result, in turn, further illustrated that the
relationship between two superpowers was deteriorating. In the case of the trusteeship
plan in Korea, the framework of power relations between regional politics in the local
area and the superpowers did not feature a one-dimensional flow from the top down.
Sometimes power relations reflected such a pattern yet often the trajectories were
distinct.
After the first Joint Commission, United States policy makers belatedly tried to
consolidate the moderate left-right represented by Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik as a
group acceptable to both occupation forces in 1946. However, Yo and Kim’s coalition
groups could not consolidate their political bases because of a lukewarm attitude on the
part of the American military authorities and increasing ideological polarization in South
Korean politics. The American military authorities did not consider coalition groups the
proper political forces to carry out progressive reforms, but instead regarded them as
instruments to expand the influence and power of the right. Also, Hodge’s efforts came
too late because Rhee and KDP already had moved to consolidate their power and were
prepared to establish a separate government in the south. Later, the efforts of these
coalition groups, including die-hard rightist Kim Ku consolidated the position of the
right-wing until 1948, brought about North-South Korean Leaders Conference for a
peaceful unification. This effort, though, proved barren of results. From the beginning of
the occupation, had the American military authorities offered administrative power to the
coalition groups or the moderate rightist and leftist groups, which comprised the majority247
of Korean nationalists, the Americans would have obtained more comprehensive support
among the Korean people who wanted to eliminate the legacy of Japanese colonial rule
and build a free, independent, and democratic country.
From early 1946 to the summer of 1947, the Korean unification problem could
not be solved through bilateral negotiation between the two occupying foreign powers.
As a result, the United States by the end of 1947 gave up its initial goal of securing local
self-determination and instead decided to establish a separate government in the south.
Dissatisfied with the Moscow agreement and feeling that Secretary of State Byrnes was
too “soft on communism,” Truman soon adopted a “get tough” policy toward the Soviet
Union. At this moment, the United States government chose to endorse the extreme
rightists, who were the most anti-communist in sentiment and who were thought to best
serve American interests in the Cold War. The extreme rightists, represented by
Syngman Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party, had advocated a separate government
in the south since the first Joint Commission had failed. With support from the American
military government in Korea and the United States, Rhee now finally seized power. The
United States, for its part, heralded the Republic of Korea in idealistic terms as a
symbolic “outpost of democracy” against communist expansion in East Asia.
As illustrated in Chapter 3, in a comparative sense, when the Soviet troops arrived
almost one month earlier than American troops at this crucial juncture, the Soviets were
much better informed about Korean politics and culture even though they did not have a
master plan for North Korea. According to Kathryn Weathersby, Charles Armstrong, and
Park Myung Lim, Stalin did not want to sovietize North Korea while North Koreans tried248
to build their nation and integrate it into a Soviet style state.
680 Unlike the American
military government which governed directly in South Korea, the Soviet occupation
authorities formally recognized local committees and gave them administrative power to
govern themselves without a military government. However, Soviet occupation
authorities still retained indirect control and closely supervised political events in North
Korea. They more easily adapted to the ongoing social revolution and proceeded to
implement a thorough liquidation of the colonial legacy in the north. That mission was
made easier due to the circumstance that not many social groups, such as landlords,
businessmen, or religious organizations, existed to resist the change. Regarding
themselves as “good nationalists” because of their background in the anti-guerrilla fight
in Manchuria in the 1930s, North Korean leaders believed that they should ultimately
liberate South Koreans from American imperialism. As Park Myong Lim argues, North
Korean leaders had remarkably transformed their state and society into a “radical
nationalist and militarist state.”
After the Second World War ended, the Truman administration faced strong
pressure from the people and Congress of the United States to bring their soldiers home
and reduce the military budget. After the breakdown of the Joint Commission, the
Truman administration, as described in Chapter 5, next decided to hand the Korean
problem over to the United Nations, establish a separate government in the South, and
withdraw U.S. troops from Korea “without serious bad effects.” Under a decision of the
United Nations, the United States established an official South Korean government in
1948. However, the newly born Republic of Korea still faced many problems, especially
680 Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Aims in Korea,” 16; Charles Armstrong, The North Korean
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a military build up in the North, domestic economic problems, social instability, and
intense political struggles. Most of all, internal local resistance seriously challenged the
survival of Rhee’s government in the south. The more Rhee’s government and the
extreme rightists suppressed left-wing nationalists, including the communists, the more
opposition groups escalated their challenge to the central government’s authority in local
areas, radicalizing many Koreans.
As described in Chapter 6, Rhee, fully aware of his government’s vulnerability,
and as leader of a weak state, adopted a “March North” unification policy. It was not
only designed to manipulate the Korean situation to maximize aid for military and
economic assistance from the United States but also to turn American containment policy
to the aid of unifying the Korean peninsula through military force. Because of Rhee’s
hostile policy toward North Korea, however, Washington hesitated to supply offensive
weapons such as tanks and heavy artillery. Therefore, the ROK armed forces could not
prepare for a large-scale war, leaving a military imbalance between the South and the
North Korean armies. In short, North Korea had a decisive military advantage over the
South. Contrary to its intended purpose, Rhee’s “March North” unification policy not
only failed to build up the military but also deteriorated the relationship between North
and South.
Reluctant to accept the decision to withdraw from Korea due to its value as a
symbol of the Cold War in East Asia, the State Department recommended delay several
times because of the unstable situation of South Korea. Nevertheless, the plan was
finally completed on June 30, 1949. After the American troops withdrew, the United
States government continued to assist the South Korean armed forces through250
deployment of the Korean military advisory group. The United States continued to
provide other forms of military assistance and economic aid, too.
The United States chose Korea as its “showcase of democracy” in Asia to
demonstrate how the American way of life would be better than communism and as a
symbol of the containment of Communism in East Asia. Therefore, the United States
gave priority to economic aid over military assistance. When Americans did assist to
build up ROK military strength, their main concern was that a large military force in the
formative period of the new republic might damage the economy. As a result, military
assistance was limited to arms used primarily for maintaining internal security. Among
military leaders in Washington, Korea had little strategic value for the security of the
United States, except for the defense of Japan. In case of a full-scale war in East Asia,
the Korean peninsula, it was anticipated, would be by-passed because Japan and
Manchuria were more important strategic targets.
The United States’ determination to withdraw from Korea stemmed from a
misjudgment by the Truman administration of Stalin’s intentions, and the volition and
abilities of North Korean leaders. Americans believed after the Second World War ended
that Stalin did not want war in Korea because it was not very important to Soviet security
and Stalin could control Kim Il Sung and his regime through other means. They also
believed that as long as overt aggression did not come from the outside, the South Korean
internal forces could handle internal conflicts.
However, the international situation was more favorable for Kim Il Sung. The
Soviet Union not only acquired atomic capability in September 1949 but also Mao Tse-
tung’s communists in China defeated Chang Kai-shek’s nationalists that December.251
Inspired by these international developments, Kim Il Sung tried to persuade a reluctant
Stalin and Mao that North Korean people were ready to liberate the South Korean people.
We now know that Kim Il Sung was able to manipulate the rivalry between Stalin and
Mao, both of whom were hesitant to get involved in the Korean conflict in June 1950. As
Park Myong Lim and Kathryn Weathersby argue, Kim Il Sung was the “initiator” of the
Korean War and Stalin its “facilitator.”
Then, Secretary Acheson’s national press club speech excluded Korea from
America’s defense perimeter in January 1950 and several interviews of Congressmen at
the time also gave the wrong message at the wrong time. Due to such utterances, Stalin
and Kim believed the United States would not intervene in Korean internal affairs.
However, the communists miscalculated. The Korean War resulted not only from the
ideological confrontation between two Koreas but also was spawned in the psychological
confidence of North Korea’s leaders in their superior position. Stimulated by the
international situation unfolding at the time, North Korean leaders believed their military
power was dominant, their army was more experienced, and that Soviet aid would ensure
victory. Believing they could wipe out the South quickly, North Korean leaders ordered
a sudden invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950.
Contrary to North Korean expectations, as well as those of Stalin, the United
States government did opt to intervene in the Korean War as a measure of its Cold War
commitments. Americans thought that if they failed to protect Korea from the
communist threat internationally, it would seriously damage the credibility and prestige
of the United States in the world, given the recent fall of China, and impair the collective
security system of the United Nations designed to ward off Communist aggression. In252
the public forum, President Truman was accused of being “soft” on the Communists.
Therefore, to avoid pressures emanating from both at home and abroad, Truman acted
against the aggressive actions of the Communists. The Korean War was a turning point
for United States foreign policy in the early stages of the Cold War and, at one level,
must be understood in the context of global American strategy to contain aggressions of
communism. But the story is actually much more complex.
For Americans and Russians, the goals of occupation might be attained if the two
occupation authorities could establish two Korean governments with socialism in one
zone and capitalism in the other. In retrospect, however, their policies not only failed to
fulfill the promise to establish a united, independent, and democratic country for Koreans
but also failed to establish two Koreas which could live peacefully side by side.
Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung of South and North Korea each respectively claimed that
their governments represented all of Korea. After foreign troops withdrew, while
Syngman Rhee appealed to a “March North” unification policy, Kim Il Sung transformed
North Korean society into a “radical nationalist and militarist state” that was detrimental
to the unification of North and South.
Thus, the radical communists/militarists in the North and the extreme rightists in
the South hoped that they could unify the country, by any means if necessary, even by
military force under their own initiatives. After the foreign occupying countries
withdrew, the two Koreas became even more hostile to one another. At this early point in
the existence of the North and South governments, neither tried to co-exist by peaceful
means or utterly avoid escalating hostilities which could eventually lead to a bloody war.
As a result, the temporary geographical division of 1945 became a more durable political253
division in 1948. Finally, the tragic Korean War, beginning on June 25, 1950,
transformed two Koreas into a more permanent ideological division.
In conclusion, I have made several general assertions in this dissertation. First,
this study demonstrates that many American diplomatic historians, including traditional
and revisionist historians, unduly downplay the influence of Third World leaders as an
active players in geo-politics. In the case of Korea, in terms of building a nation-state,
these diplomatic historians neglect the influence of key individuals in local areas and
local politics, each of whom affected relations not only between local power bases and
the superpowers but also between the two superpowers. In part, local developments
eventually changed the overall course of the Cold War in East Asia. As described in
Chapter 4, the Moscow agreement, whereby the two superpowers attempted to decide the
future of Korea for the first time, could not be fulfilled because a strong Korean
nationalist movement persisted in trying to establish an independent, unified, and
democratic country. This local situation not only tremendously influenced internal
politics in Korea but also contributed to the deteriorating relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union and to an early onset of the Cold War in Korea and the East
Asia as a whole. Simply put, this study emphasizes the influence of Korean nationalism
alongside analysis of superpower relations.
Second, I have pointed out that relations between local power bases and the
superpowers were not one-dimensional in practice; power often did not always flow from
the top down within this framework. Countervailing forces also were operative. Future
study of diplomatic relations between Korea and the United States needs to scrutinize a
fuller range along a spectrum of attitudes simultaneously. Before the Korean War, but254
after two Koreas were established, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung each viewed
themselves as “good nationalists.” Both on occasion influenced and used the sponsor
superpowers for their own purposes to attain local political goals, even if at many
junctures they were used by these foreign powers for their own aggrandizement.
Third, I stress the need to consider the impact of earlier experiences before 1945
as long-term factors affecting U.S. policy toward Korea or how Koreans felt towards the
United States afterwards. In other words, some important events and attitudes had deep
historical roots. For instance, the Moscow agreement was the most important historical
event in modern Korean history in terms of unification of Korea. Yet perhaps Korea
might have followed a different path if its people had not experienced Japanese
colonialism. However, the lessons and experiences of the past would not dispose
Koreans to take the trusteeship seriously at that time, a time when the situation could
easily have gone in a different direction, as the Korean nationalists wanted, in particular
Kim Ku and Korean Provisional Government.
Last, this study also confirms that idealistic U.S. rhetoric was often though not
always, cloak for the pursuit of self-interest. Viewed from this perspective, the United
States aid to Korean democratization proved to have clear limits. Actions, simply put,
fell short of words.
The legacy of the United States occupation left a more permanent imprint than
simply three years of military government. It had impacted five decades of Korean
history ever since 1945: it left an ultra conservative ruling class party, as well as an
authoritarian state ruled by physical force, such as the police and military. It
unintentionally generated recurrences of radical Korean nationalism. Actually, it255
provided the origins of dictatorial governments lasting from the 1960s through the 1980s.
which featured a contest between the outpost of democracy and communism on the
Korean peninsula as well as the oppression of democratic movement leaders and groups
in the name of anti-communism. In the name of democracy, moreover, it introduced an
unstable political system. All of these outcomes trace their roots to this earlier period. In
short, American policy toward Korea failed to achieve national unification and, for the
time being, tended to obstruct Korean efforts to build a genuine democratic society.
Overall, the image of America from the nineteenth century until the Korean War as a
“benevolent Great Power” changed to that of an imperial nation bent only on pursuing its
own interests and, in the process, betraying the hopes and desires of many Koreans. In
particular, that is what happened between the United States and South Korea since the
Korean War and demonstrates why the Americans have and continue to face strong anti-
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